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On the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries of prosecutors and some other state officials

Case No. 6/2014-7/2014-8/2014-9/2014-11/2014-12/2014-18/2014-19/2014-20/2014-21/2014-22/2014-23/2014-24/2014-25/2014-27/2014-28/2014-30/2014-31/2014-32/2014-33/2014-43/2014

 

 

 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

IN THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

 

RULING

ON THE COMPLIANCE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA ESTABLISHING THE REDUCED COEFFICIENTS OF THE POSITIONAL SALARIES OF PROSECUTORS AND SOME OTHER STATE OFFICIALS UPON THE OCCURRENCE OF AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION IN THE STATE WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

 

22 December 2014, No. KT51-N17/2014

Vilnius

 

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, composed of the Justices of the Constitutional Court: Elvyra Baltutytė, Vytautas Greičius, Danutė Jočienė, Pranas Kuconis, Gediminas Mesonis, Vytas Milius, Egidijus Šileikis, Algirdas Taminskas, and Dainius Žalimas

The court reporter—Daiva Pitrėnaitė

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, pursuant to Articles 102 and 105 the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 1 and 531 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, in the Court’s hearing, on 17 December 2014, considered, under written procedure, constitutional justice case No. 6/2014-7/2014-8/2014-9/2014-11/2014-12/2014-18/2014-19/2014-20/2014-21/2014-22/2014-23/2014-24/2014-25/2014-27/2014-28/2014-30/2014-31/2014-32/2014-33/2014-43/2014 subsequent to:

1) the petition (No. 1B-5/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 23 April 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2009 until 31 July 2009, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Department of Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.8 down to 12.14, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Department of Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.8 down to 11.23, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Department of Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.8 down to 11.23, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wording of 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

2) the petition (No. 1B-8/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 23 April 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2009 until 31 July 2009, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Department of Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.8 down to 12.14, that of a prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.1 down to 11.53, and that of a prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.0 down to 11.44, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Department of Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.8 down to 11.23, that of a prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.1 down to 10.67, and that of a prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.0 down to 10.58, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Department of Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.8 down to 11.23, and that of a prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.1 down to 10.67, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

3) the petition (No. 1B-9/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section IV of the Appendix (wording of 23 April 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2009 until 31 July 2009, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of Deputy Auditors General was reduced from 13.8 down to 12.14, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section IV of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2013) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of Deputy Auditors General was reduced from 13.8 down to 11.23, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

4) the petition (No. 1B-10/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 23 April 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials and Section III (wordings of 17 July 2009 and 21 December 2011) of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, they disproportionately reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General and the chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, were not in conflict with Article 23, Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Paragraph 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009, 30 June 2010, and 22 November 2011) of Article 3 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, and 22 November 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, they established the time limits of the entry into force of the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General and the chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, also insofar as these time limits used to be prolonged, were not in conflict with Article 23, Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

5) the petition (No. 1B-14/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the deputy chief prosecutor of a regional prosecutor’s office was reduced from 10.8 down to 10.10, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.1 down to 10.67, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

6) the petition (No. 1B-15/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the deputy chief prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 14.1 down to 11.47, that of a prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.1 down to 10.67, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.1 down to 10.67, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

7) the petition (No. 1B-17/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 11.8 down to 10.92, and that of the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 9.8 down to 9.26, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

8) the petition (No. 1B-18/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of divisions of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.5 down to 8.20, and that of prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 9.5 down to 9.03 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 9.5 down to 9.45, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

9) the petition (No. 1B-19/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 9.5 down to 9.03, that of the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 9.8 down to 9.26, that of the deputy chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 9.3 down to 8.88, that of the chief prosecutors of divisions of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.5 down to 8.20, that of prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.3 down to 8.01, that of the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from 9.3 down to 8.88, that of the deputy chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from 8.8 down to 8.45, and that of prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from 8.0 down to 7.76, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established the terms of the entry into force of the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices, those of the chief prosecutors, deputy chief prosecutors, the chief prosecutors of divisions, and prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda and those of the chief prosecutors, deputy chief prosecutors, and prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns), and insofar as the said terms used to be prolonged, was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

10) the petition (No. 1B-20/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 1 May 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 9.5 down to 9.03, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it established coefficient 9.45 of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

11) the petition (No. 1B-21/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 1 May 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10.4 down to 9.72, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it established coefficient 9.45 of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

12) the petition (No. 1B-22/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 1 May 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.3 down to 8.01, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

13) the petition (No. 1B-23/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 1 May 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from 8.0 down to 7.76, that of the deputy chief prosecutors of divisions of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.4 down to 8.11, and that of prosecutors of divisions of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.3 down to 8.01, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

14) the petition (No. 1B-24/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the chief prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 14.5 down to 11.80, that of a prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13 down to 10.58, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the chief prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 14.5 down to 11.80, and that of a prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 13 down to 10.67, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

15) the petition (No. 1B-31/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, the remuneration of the chief prosecutors, deputy chief prosecutors, prosecutors of organised crime and corruption investigation, prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices, and prosecutors of other district (city) local prosecutors’ offices was reduced in a disproportionate manner, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, the remuneration of the chief prosecutors, deputy chief prosecutors and prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices and that of the prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced in a disproportionate manner, was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

16) the petition (No. 1B-32/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, the remuneration of the prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced in a disproportionate manner, was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

17) the petition (No. 1B-33/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 23 April 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, from 1 May 2009 until 31 July 2009, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 14.7 down to 12.94, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 12.94 down to 11.97, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, the size of the coefficient of the positional salary of the chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 12.94 down to 11.97, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 and Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established the terms of the entry into force of the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salary of the chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, and insofar as the said terms used to be prolonged, were not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

18) the petition (No. 1B-34/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 1 May 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10.4 down to 9.72, that of the deputy chief prosecutors of division of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10.1 down to 9.54, that of prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 9.5 down to 9.03, that of the chief prosecutors of divisions of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.5 down to 8.2, that of the deputy chief prosecutors of divisions of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.4 down to 8.11, that of prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.3 down to 8.01, that of the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from 9.3 down to 8.88, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, it established coefficient 9.72 of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices, and coefficient 9.45 of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

19) the petition (No. 1B-35/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 1 May 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of prosecutors of organised crime and corruption investigation of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10 down to 9.45, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established coefficient 9.45 of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

20) the petition (No. 1B-36/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 1 May 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 9.5 down to 9.03, that of the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys was reduced from 8.5 down to 8.2, and that of prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys was reduced from 8.3 down to 8.01, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established coefficient 9.45 of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

21) the petition (No. 1B-54/2014) of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, from 1 August 2009 until 30 April 2012, the size of the coefficient of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 11.8 down to 10.92, that of the deputy chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10.8 down to 10.10, that of the chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10.4 down to 9.72, that of the deputy chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10.1 down to 9.54, that of prosecutors of organised crime and corruption investigation of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 10.0 down to 9.45, that of prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 9.5 down to 9.03, that of the chief prosecutor of a division of the local prosecutor’s office of the city of Panevėžys was reduced from 8.5 down to 8.20, that of a prosecutor of the local prosecutor’s office of the city of Panevėžys was reduced from 8.3 down to 8.01, that of the chief prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from 9.3 down to 8.88, and that of prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from was reduced from 8.0 down to 7.76, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Section III (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, it established coefficient 9.72 of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices, and coefficient 9.45 of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices from 1 May 2012 until 31 December 2013, is not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

By the Constitutional Court’s decision of 2 December 2014, all these petitions were joined into one case and it was given reference No. 6/2014-7/2014-8/2014-9/2014-11/2014-12/2014-18/2014-19/2014-20/2014-21/2014-22/2014-23/2014-24/2014-25/2014-27/2014-28/2014-30/2014-31/2014-32/2014-33/2014-43/2014.

The Constitutional Court

has established:

I

1. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, has considered the administrative cases in which prosecutors of prosecutors’ offices of various levels, who were holding different positions (petitions Nos. 1B-5/2014, 1B-8/2014, 1B-10/2014, 1B-14/2014, 1B-15/2014, 1B-17/2014, 1B-18/2014, 1B-19/2014, 1B-20/2014, 1B-21/2014, 1B-22/2014, 1B-23/2014, 1B-24/2014, 1B-31/2014, 1B-32/2014, 1B-33/2014, 1B-34/2014, 1B-35/2014, 1B-36/2014, 1B-54/2014), as well as some other state officials (petition No. 1B-9/2014) applied to the said court for awarding them the unreasonably unpaid parts of positional salaries due to that fact that, according to them, the coefficients of their positional salaries had been reduced in a disproportionate manner.

The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, having held that there are the sufficient grounds for doubting about the constitutionality of the provisions of the corresponding sections of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials by which, in its opinion, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors and some other state officials were reduced in a disproportionate manner, and about the constitutionality of the provisions of the laws amending the said law by which the validity of the legal regulation establishing the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries had been prolonged, and about the constitutionality of the provisions postponing the entry into force of the legal regulation providing for the application (with certain exceptions) of the coefficients of the positional salaries that had been in force prior to the reduction, suspended the consideration of the administrative cases and applied to the Constitutional Court with the petitions requesting an investigation in the compliance of such legal regulation governing the work pay of prosecutors and some other state officials with the Constitution.

2. Although the petitioner requests an investigation, to a different extent, into the compliance of the provisions of the laws by which, upon the occurrence of a very difficult economic and financial situation in the state, the reduced coefficients of positional salaries of, inter alia, prosecutors and some other state officials were established, with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, its petitions are essentially substantiated by the same arguments.

According to the petitioner, while establishing the extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors and some other state officials by means of the impugned legal regulation, one disregarded the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution when it is construed in conjunction with the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law, justice, and proportionality: the positional salary was reduced to a different extent for prosecutors holding different positions that are differentiated according to the complexity of assigned work and the qualification held, and for some other state officials, i.e. such a salary was reduced to a greater extent for the prosecutors who discharge more complex functions requiring higher qualification and who consequently receive bigger remuneration, and to a greater extent for some other state officials receiving bigger remuneration than for other prosecutors who hold lower-level positions for which lesser qualification is needed, and to a greater extent than for other state officials receiving smaller remuneration. In addition, the remuneration for all prosecutors and state officials, regardless of the positions held, as well as for all other persons to whom the remuneration is calculated on the grounds of the basic size of the positional salary (remuneration) which is approved by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, was reduced to the same extent upon the reduction of the said size.

II

In the course of the preparation of the case for the Constitutional Court’s hearing, written explanations were received from Seimas Deputy Speaker Algirdas Sysas, acting as the representative of the Seimas, the party concerned, in which it is maintained that the impugned legal regulation was not in conflict with the Constitution. The position of the representative of the Seimas is substantiated by the following arguments.

1. The Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009 and its subsequent amendments regulating the relations of the work pay of state politicians and state officials were adopted during the deterioration of the economic and financial situation of this country, in order to implement the Crisis Management Plan prepared within the programme of the 15th Government of the Republic of Lithuania, through which one made an attempt to reduce the state budget allocations for the work remuneration and to stabilise the financial system of the state, as well as to use state funds in a more rational manner. After the coefficients of the positional salary of the remuneration of state politicians and state officials had been reduced through this law, there was a reduction in the state budget expenditure. In the course of making these changes in the legal regulation governing the work pay of state politicians and state officials, one invoked the doctrine of the Constitutional Court that the legislature has the right to reduce remuneration only by means of a law and only on a temporary basis, however, in line with the requirements of proportionality, whilst the said reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries was in line with the proportions of the provided reduction of the positional salaries of state officials and one preserved the balance of the work remuneration between the rights and legitimate interests of the persons to whom less favourable legal regulation was established and the interests of the entire society and the state, i.e. one paid heed to the requirements of the principle of proportionality. Since, in 2013–2008, one reduced not only the remuneration of the state officials specified by the petitioner, but also that of all employees and servants of the public sector, therefore, the impugned legal regulation was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. Upon the adoption of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on the Financial Indicators of the 2009 State Budget and Municipal Budgets, the established and predicted sizes of the revenue and expenditure of the budget were reduced. In view of such amendments, the legal regulation established in the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009 reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of state politicians and state officials. Since the impugned legal regulation is connected, inter alia, with the specified amendment of the financial indicators of the state budget, these laws should be regarded as a fiscal decision taken by the state, which is designated, among other things, for the stabilisation of state finances. In addition, after the corresponding budget year is over (in this case, after 31 December 2009), the Law on the Financial Indicators of the 2009 State Budget and Municipal Budgets cannot be applied at all. Thus, it is no longer possible to establish any such legal regulation, either, on the grounds of which additional funds should be allocated that are connected with the financial indicators established in other laws on the indicators of the budget, whilst, having held that the laws that reduced the state budget expenditure were in conflict with the Constitution, it would be possible to state that the laws that established the budget revenue were also not in line with the provisions of the Constitution that imply the duty of the state to ensure a balance between revenue and income.

3. In view of the construction, presented in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 1 July 2013, of the legal regulation governing the work pay of state servants and some officials of the institutions funded from the funds of the state budget and municipal budgets by which, inter alia, the coefficients of their positional salaries were reduced, the representative of the party concerned emphasises that the impugned legal regulation of the work pay of prosecutors was relatively more favourable in comparison with that established in the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials for other state politicians and state officials. At the time when the impugned legal regulation was valid, the reform of the prosecution office of the Republic of Lithuania was also carried out (on the basis of the amendments to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecutor’s Office that were adopted on 30 June 2011) and bigger coefficients of positional salaries were either re-established or established for certain prosecutors in comparison with those established prior to the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries. Thus, even though one failed to evade certain disproportions in the course of legally regulating the work pay of judges, state officials, state servants, and prosecutors, however, these disproportions where not the ones enabling creating preconditions for violating the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution.

The Constitutional Court

holds that:

I

1. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requests an investigation (to a different extent), inter alia, into the compliance of the legal regulation, consolidated in Sections III and IV of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, which, according to the petitioner, established the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of some prosecutors and other state officials upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, with the Constitution.

1.1. According to Article 2 “Application of the Law” of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, the sizes of the work remuneration established by this law and the conditions for the payment thereof are applied, inter alia, to the state politicians specified in Paragraph 1 of this article and to the state officials specified in Paragraph 3 of the article to whom the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the State Service is not applied, inter alia, to prosecutors, other state officials—the Auditor General, Deputy Auditors General, Seimas ombudsmen, etc.; the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors were and are established in Section III “Positional Salaries of Prosecutors” of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, whilst Section IV “Positional Salaries of State Officials” thereof establishes the coefficients of the positional salaries of other state officials listed in this section (hereinafter also referred to as the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix).

1.2. It should be noted that the petitions of the petitioner (save its petition No. 1B-9/2014, which impugns the legal regulation established not in the Section III, but in Section IV of the said law) are essentially substantiated by the fact that, according to the petitioner, by means of the impugned legal regulation that was consolidated in 2009 and 2011, in the course of the establishing of the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, one disregarded the requirements, arising out of the Constitution, for the legal regulation reducing the size of the remuneration of state servants and of the officials of the institutions funded from the funds of the state budget and municipal budgets: the coefficients of the positional salaries of the prosecutors who held different positions, differentiated according to the complexity of assigned work and the qualification held, were reduced to a different extent, i.e., the coefficients of the positional salaries of the prosecutors discharging more complex functions, for which higher qualification was necessary, and, who, accordingly, received a bigger positional salary, were reduced to a greater extent than for other prosecutors who held lower positions for which lesser qualification was necessary.

The petitioner’s petition requesting an investigation into the compliance of the legal regulation that, according to the petitioner, established the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix (petition No. 1B-9/2014) with the Constitution, is essentially substantiated by the same arguments.

1.3. Since the petitioner’s doubts about the compliance of the impugned legal regulation with the Constitution are substantiated by the fact that the coefficients of the positional salaries of the prosecutors and some other state officials specified in its petitions were reduced in a disproportionate manner, therefore, in an attempt to assess the reasonableness of these doubts, it is necessary to investigate the compliance of the entire legal regulation governing the work pay of particular state officials, in the specified aspect, with the Constitution, i.e. insofar as, according to the petitioner, a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries was established.

Consequently, in the constitutional justice case at issue, subsequent to the petitioner’s petitions, to the specified extent, one should investigate the constitutionality of the legal regulation established in:

Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials and Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the same law;

Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials.

In this context it should be noted that this impugned legal regulation and, inter alia, the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors and the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix established by this legal regulation, are no longer in force, whilst, on 1 January 2014, the legal regulation came into force by which non-reduced coefficients of their positional salaries were established.

2. In most of its petitions, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, also requests an investigation into the constitutionality of the specified legal regulation which extended the time of the validity of the legal regulation by which, inter alia, the coefficients of the positional salaries of certain prosecutors and of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix were reduced, and the constitutionality of the legal regulation postponing the entry into effect of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced (inter alia, valid prior to 30 April 2009) coefficients of the positional salaries of the specified prosecutors and of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix.

Thus, in the constitutional justice case at issue, subsequent to the petitioner’s petitions, one should also investigate the constitutionality of the following:

Paragraph 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009, 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012) of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, insofar as it established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, and 22 November 2011) and Paragraph 2 of Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials;

Paragraph 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009, 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012) of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, insofar as it established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, and 22 November 2011) and Paragraph 1 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix.

In this context, it should also be noted that this impugned legal regulation is no longer valid, whilst, on 1 January 2014, the legal regulation came into force that established non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors and the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, which were valid, inter alia, prior to 30 April 2009.

3. In all its petitions, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requests an investigation into the compliance of the impugned legal regulation with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 thereof, and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

In one of its petitions (No. 1B-10/2014), the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, requests an investigation into the compliance of the impugned legal regulation with Article 23 of the Constitution, however, does not provide any concrete arguments substantiating such doubts; thus, the petitioner’s petition requesting an investigation into the compliance of the impugned legal regulation with Article 23, Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law should be treated as a petition requesting an investigation into the compliance of the impugned legal regulation with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 thereof, and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

It should also be noted that, although the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, in one of its petitions (No. 1B-15/2014), additionally requests an investigation into the compliance of the specified legal regulation governing the work pay of prosecutors with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution, however, does not provide any arguments substantiating such doubts.

4. Consequently, in the constitutional justice case at issue, subsequent to the petitions of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court, the petitioner, the Constitutional Court will investigate whether the following was not in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 thereof, and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law:

Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials and Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors;

Paragraph 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009, 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012) of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, insofar as it established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, and 22 November 2011) and Paragraph 2 of Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors;

Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials;

Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix;

Paragraph 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009, 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012) of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, insofar as it established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix;

Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, and 22 November 2011) and Paragraph 1 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix.

II

1. As is known, due to an economic crisis, an especially grave economic and financial situation occurred in Lithuania at the second half of 2008. The Programme of the Fifteenth Government held that “Lithuania is facing an economic crisis” and provided for the most important task for the nearest future, which was handling the economic crisis and its consequences (Paragraph 1).

2. In an attempt to reduce the allocation of the state budget for the work remuneration, the Seimas adopted several laws, inter alia, related to the reduction of the work remuneration of the officials funded from the funds of state and municipal budgets and that of the work remuneration of state servants (employees) and judges.

3. In its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court assessed the constitutionality of certain provisions of laws of the Republic of Lithuania that had established reduced remuneration of state servants and judges—part of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets—upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

3.1. In its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court, while assessing the compliance of the impugned legal regulation with the Constitution, inter alia, from the aspect of the proportionality of the reduction of remuneration for work, mentioned, among other things, the letter of Republic of Lithuania’s Finance Minister Rimantas Šadžius, in which, inter alia, it was pointed out that:

as from 1 May 2009, the coefficients of the positional salaries of state politicians, judges, and state officials and the coefficients of the positional salaries of state servants (categories 15–20) had been reduced in a differentiated manner (from 2 to 12 percent); because of such measures the sum of about LTL 11 million was saved in the state budget in 2009 (including social insurance contributions);

as from 1 August 2009, the coefficients of the positional salaries of state politicians, judges, and state officials, the coefficients of the positional salaries of state servants (categories 11–20) were reduced in a differentiated manner (from by 0.58 percent to by 10 percent); in addition, the sizes of the additional pay paid to state servants for their qualification class had also been reduced; because of such measures the sum of about LTL 40 million was saved in the state budget in 2009 (including social insurance contributions);

due to all the above reductions, during each subsequent year (including 2013), the sum of about LTL 112 million has been saved annually in the state budget;

in order to save the state budget funds in the sum of LTL 112 million every year, the payroll budget of the employees of the above categories should have been reduced in a gradual manner: in 2009—about 2 percent and during each successive year—about 4.5 percent.

3.2. In its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court recognised, among other things, that, in view of the deteriorating economic and financial situation in the state, when the funds for financing the needs provided for in the state budget law used not to be collected, the established legal regulation of the basic size of the positional salary (remuneration) of state politicians, judges, state officials, and state servants, by which the basic size had been reduced for the current year, and which had been applied for the calculation of remuneration, was not in conflict with the Constitution.

In this context, inter alia, it was noted that, according to Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 3 of the Law on the Basic Size, Applicable in 2009, of the Positional Salary (Remuneration) of State Politicians, Judges, State Officials and State Servants, as from 1 August 2009, the positional salaries of state politicians, judges of courts of general jurisdiction and of specialised courts, state officials, and state servants, the remuneration of justices of the Constitutional Court and the service remuneration of servicemen, if assessed in percentage terms, were reduced to the same extent (in a proportionate manner) and for the same period.

3.3. In assessing the constitutionality of the legal regulation by which, inter alia, the remuneration of state servants and judges had been reduced upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, due to which, inter alia, the funds for financing the needs provided for in the state budget law used not to be collected, the Constitutional Court, by taking into consideration, among other things, the overall legal regulation by which the remuneration of all officials of institutions of state power (those of legislative, executive, and judicial branches) and state servants (i.e., under the then valid legal regulation—state politicians and officials, judges, and state servants) had been reduced, held that the impugned legal regulation violated, among other things, the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established for the persons categorised as state servants as well as for the judges holding different positions at the time before the occurrence of the especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

The Constitutional Court recognised that the provisions of certain laws that had been adopted upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state and had been related to the work pay of state servants and judges were in conflict with the Constitution insofar as they had reduced the remuneration of state servants and judges in a disproportionate manner.

3.4. In its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court also noted that when the legislature had been adopting the laws on the disproportionate reduction of the remuneration of state servants and judges that had been ruled in conflict with the Constitution by that Constitutional Court’s ruling, it must have been aware of the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine upon which that ruling was grounded, inter alia, the following provisions:

the legislature may change the legal regulation governing the salaries to various persons and may consolidate the legal regulation on the salaries that would be less favourable to these persons if it is necessary in order to ensure the vital interests of society and the state and to protect other constitutional values; however, also in such cases the legislature must keep the balance between the rights and legitimate interests of the persons for whom the less favourable legal regulation is established and the interests of society and the state, i.e. the legislature must pay heed to the requirements of the principle of proportionality (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 28 March 2006);

the constitutional principle of proportionality means, inter alia, that when there is a particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state and when, due to this, there is a necessity for a temporary reduction of the remuneration of state servants in order to secure vitally important interests of society and the state and to protect other constitutional values, the legislature is under obligation to establish a uniform and non-discriminatory scale of the reduction of the remuneration of state servants, according to which, with respect to all categories of state servants (and other employees financed from the funds of the state or municipal budget), the remuneration would be reduced by not violating the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established with regard to different categories of state servants prior to the occurrence of the particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state; the Constitution does not tolerate any such situations where the remuneration of state servants, when there is a difficult economic and financial situation in the state, is reduced in a disproportionate manner, inter alia, by approximating the size of the remuneration of a state servant of high qualification, who performs a complex job, to the remuneration of a state servant of lesser qualification, who performs a less complex job, or where the former remuneration is equalised with the latter, or where the remuneration of state servants of certain groups is reduced by taking into consideration not the entire work remuneration received, but only individual constituent parts of the work remuneration of state servants, etc.; in such situations not only the constitutional principles of proportionality, the equality of rights and justice are denied, but one also deviates from the constitutional concept of the state service as well as from the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution consolidating the human right to receive fair pay for work (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 11 December 2009 and 20 April 2010);

the provision of the constitutional doctrine that the reduction of the work remuneration must be temporary may not be construed as meaning that the state, after the legislature has reduced the remuneration of officials of the institutions that are financed from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets (and of other employees who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget) as well as that of state servants, is released from the duty to look for ways of the securing of the accumulation of the funds necessary in order to pay the remuneration in the sizes that had been prior to their reduction; quite to the contrary, if, before the end of the economic crisis, an opportunity occurs to accumulate (receive) the funds necessary to pay the remuneration in the size that had been before the reduction of the remuneration, the legal regulation governing the reduction of the work remuneration of officials of the institutions that are financed from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets (and of other employees who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget) as well as the work remuneration of state servants must be repealed (the Constitutional Court’s decision of 20 April 2010).

3.5. In the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 1 July 2013, it was held that, after declaring the legal regulation that laid down the disproportionate extent of the reduction of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budget to be in conflict with the provision ‘[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work’ of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, a requirement arises from Article 23 of the Constitution to establish a mechanism of the compensation for the losses incurred by the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets; such a mechanism means the procedure, according to which the state will compensate for such losses within a reasonable time (inter alia, in view of the economic and financial situation of the state and after an assessment of the accumulation (receiving) of the funds required for such compensation) and in a fair manner, to the extent that the incurred losses were disproportionate.

4. In this context, it should be noted that, while invoking its already formed official constitutional doctrine and precedents, the Constitutional Court must ensure the continuity of the constitutional jurisprudence (its consistency and non-discrepancy) as well as the predictability of its decisions (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 28 March 2006, its decision of 21 November 2006, its rulings of 22 October 2007 and 5 September 2012, and its decision of 13 March 2013).

III

1. It has been mentioned that, in the constitutional justice case at issue, subsequent to the petitions of the petitioner, the Constitutional Court investigates, inter alia, the compliance of Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, with the Constitution.

2. Section III “Positional Salaries of Prosecutors” of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials established the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors by taking account of the levels of prosecutors’ offices and the positions of prosecutors established for them.

2.1. In this context, it should be noted that Paragraph 3 of Article 3 “Work Remuneration of State Politicians and State Officials” (wording of 22 April 2003) of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials provides that the work remuneration of prosecutors shall consist of the positional salary, the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania, and the additional pay for the qualification grade.

According to Article 4 “Positional Salaries of State Politicians and State Officials” of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, the positional salaries of state officials are calculated by applying the basic size (Paragraph 1 (wording of 19 July 2006)); the positional salary is calculated by multiplying the corresponding coefficient of the positional salary, which is set in the Appendix to this law, by the basic size (Paragraph 2 (wording of 19 July 2006)); according to Article 5 “Additional Pay for the Years Served for the State of Lithuania” of the same law, additional pay is paid for state officials for the years served for the State of Lithuania, as from 11 March 1990, provided that such state officials held the positions specified in Paragraphs 1–4 and Items 1–4 of Paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Law on the State Service (Paragraph 1 (wording of 6 November 2008)); the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania shall be three percent for each three years of the positional salary of a state politician or state official, however, the size of the additional pay must not exceed 30 percent of the positional salary (Paragraph 3 (wording of 6 November 2008)).

Article 51 “Additional Pay for the Qualification Grade” (wording of 3 July 2007) of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials prescribes:

The additional pay for prosecutors shall be calculated on the basis of the positional salary:

1) for a junior justice adviser—the size of 10 percent;

2) for a justice adviser—the size of 10 percent;

3) for a senior justice adviser—the size of 20 percent;

4) for a chief justice adviser—the size of 25 percent;

5) for a state justice adviser—the size of 30 percent;

6) for a chief state justice adviser—the size of 40 percent;

2.2. Thus, according to the legal regulation established in the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, the positional salary comprises the main part of the work remuneration of prosecutors; the size of the positional salary is calculated by applying the coefficient of the positional salary established for particular positions of prosecutors in Section III of the Appendix; the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania and the additional pay for the qualification grade are also a part of the work remuneration of prosecutors and are calculated on the size of the positional salary, i.e., the size of such types of additional pay directly depends on the size of the positional salary: in case the coefficient of the positional salary is changed, the monetary expression of the granted additional pay also changes, i.e., if assessed in percentage terms, it changes to the same extent.

2.3. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials establishes different coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of various levels of prosecutors’ offices.

2.3.1. In this context, some provisions of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecutor’s Office (wording of 22 April 2003) disclosing the peculiarities of the system of the prosecutor’s office, which are, among other things, relevant for the establishment of different coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of different levels of prosecutors’ offices should be mentioned:

under the provisions valid prior to 31 December 2011, the prosecutor’s office was composed of the Office of the Prosecutor General and territorial prosecutors’ offices; territorial prosecutors’ offices were regional prosecutors’ offices and local prosecutors’ offices (Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6); under the provisions valid as from 1 January 2012, the prosecutor’s office is composed of the Office of the Prosecutor General and territorial-regional prosecutors’ offices; a regional prosecutor’s office is composed of local prosecutors’ offices and specialised divisions of the regional prosecutor’s office (Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 (wording of 30 June 2011));

the Office of the Prosecutor General shall guide the territorial prosecutors’ offices and supervise their activities (Paragraph 1 of Article 8 (wordings of 22 April 2003 and 30 June 2011));

when executing procedural laws, the superior prosecutors (superior prosecutor) are (is) prosecutors (a prosecutor) holding a higher position in the prosecutor’s office of the same level, and, in some situations, prosecutors (a prosecutor) holding particular positions in the prosecutors’ offices of other levels (respectively, prior to 31 December 2011—in regional prosecutors’ offices and the Office of the Prosecutor General, whilst, as from 1 January 2012—in specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices and the Office of the Prosecutor General, or only in the Office of the Prosecutor General) (Article 15 (wordings of 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2011));

bigger requirements regarding the length of service as a prosecutor or the length of service in other positions specified by law are raised for the prosecutors seeking promotion for higher positions in the prosecutor’s office of the same level or in the prosecutor’s office of a higher level than the requirements for the prosecutors seeking appointment in a lower position (Article 34 (wordings of 22 April 2003 and 30 June 2011)).

2.3.2. It should be noted that, with certain exceptions, bigger coefficients of positional salaries were and are established (Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials) for higher positions of prosecutors of the prosecutor’s office of each level and for the positions of prosecutors of the prosecutors’ offices of higher levels than for lower positions of prosecutors of the prosecutor’s office of the corresponding level and for the positions of prosecutors of prosecutors’ offices of lower levels.

2.3.3. Thus, if the specified legal regulation that is consolidated in the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office (wording of 22 April 2003) is construed in the constitutional justice case at issue from the relevant aspect of the establishment of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, it should be noted that bigger coefficients of the positional salaries have been established for the prosecutors holding higher positions that require higher qualification, more experience and more responsibility (holding higher positions in the prosecutor’s office of the same level or, inter alia, positions in prosecutors’ offices of higher levels requiring higher qualification), than those of the prosecutors holding lower positions requiring lesser qualification, less experience, and less responsibility.

3. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that, as the Constitutional Court held in its ruling of 1 July 2013, upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, several measures of the reduction of the work remuneration (remuneration) of, inter alia, state officials (prosecutors, a group of state officials that is relevant in the constitutional justice case at issue, inclusive) had been applied.

First of all, the basic size applicable for the calculation of the work remuneration (remuneration) was reduced (this was done through the Law on the Basic Size, Applicable in 2009, of the Positional Salary (Remuneration) of State Politicians, Judges, State Officials and State Servants that was adopted on 19 December 2008 and through the Law Amending Article 3 of the Law on the Basic Size, Applicable in 2009, of the Positional Salary (Remuneration) of State Politicians, Judges, State Officials and State Servants): the basic size of the positional salary (remuneration) of state politicians, judges, state officials and state servants applicable from 1 January 2009 until 31 July 2009 was established at LTL 475; the same size applicable from 1 August 2009 until 31 December 2009 was established at LTL 450, whereas, in 2010–2013, the basic size was not changed, i.e. it stayed at LTL 450. As from 1 August 2009, according to Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 3 of the Law on the Basic Size, Applicable in 2009, of the Positional Salary (Remuneration) of State Politicians, Judges, State Officials and State Servants, the positional salaries of state politicians, judges of courts of general jurisdiction and of specialised courts, state officials, and state servants, the remuneration of justices of the Constitutional Court and the service remuneration of servicemen, if assessed in percentage terms (where no account is taken of the changes in the other sizes), were reduced to the same extent (in a proportionate manner) by 8.16 percent, if compared with the positional salaries (remuneration) established according to the basic size applicable in 2008 prior to the occurrence of the especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state and for the same period.

4. The impugned legal regulation consolidated in Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials established an additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration of prosecutors—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries—was applied twice.

In this context, it should be noted that, in the course of the amendment of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors through the impugned legal regulation, the percentage size of the additional pay was not changed. The procedure for the calculation of the additional pay for the years served for the state was not changed, either. As mentioned before, the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania and the additional pay for the qualification grade, which are constituent parts of the work pay of prosecutors, are calculated on the size of the positional salary, i.e., the size of such types of additional pay directly depends on the size of the positional salary: in case, inter alia, the coefficient of the positional salary is changed, the monetary expression of the granted additional pay also changes, i.e., if assessed in percentage terms, it changes to the same extent. Thus, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, the monetary expression of the work remuneration (remuneration) of prosecutors decreased to the same extent if assessed in percentage terms.

4.1. Until the application of the aforementioned additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration, i.e., until 30 April 2009, Section III of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials was in force, in which the following coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors were established:

 

Title of position

Coefficient of positional salary

Office of the Prosecutor General

Prosecutor General

16.7

Deputy Prosecutor General

15.2

Chief prosecutor of a department

14.7

Chief prosecutor of a division

14.5

Chief deputy prosecutor of a department

14.3

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

14.1

Prosecutor of the Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation Department

13.8

Prosecutor of a department

13.1

Prosecutor of a division

13.0

Prosecutor

12.9

Regional Prosecutors’ Offices

Chief prosecutor

11.8

Chief deputy prosecutor

10.8

Chief prosecutor of a division

10.4

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

10.1

Prosecutor of the Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation Department

10.0

Prosecutor

9.5

Local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda

Chief prosecutor

9.8

Chief deputy prosecutor

9.3

Chief prosecutor of a division

8.5

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

8.4

Prosecutor

8.3

Local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys

Chief prosecutor

9.7

Chief deputy prosecutor

9.2

Chief prosecutor of a division

8.5

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

8.4

Prosecutor

8.3

Local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns)

Chief prosecutor

9.3

Chief deputy prosecutor

8.8

Prosecutor

8.0

4.2. On 23 April 2009, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials through Article 1 whereof, that came into force on 1 May 2009, it amended the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, inter alia, Section III thereof, by reducing the coefficients of positional salaries for the first time.

From the explanatory note to the draft of this law it is clear that the said draft law was prepared at the time when the economic and financial situation of this country was deteriorating, and in an attempt to implement the Crisis Management Plan provided for in Part II of the Programme of the 15th Government that was approved by the Seimas resolution No. XI-52 of 9 December 2008. Through the Crisis Management Plan attempts were made to reduce the state budget allocations for the work remuneration and to stabilise the financial system of the state, as well as to use state funds in a more rational manner.

This law reduced only the coefficients of the positional salaries of the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General: the coefficient of the positional salary of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 16.7 down to 14.7, that of the Deputy Prosecutor General was reduced from 15.2 down to 13.38, that of the chief prosecutor of a department was reduced from 14.7 down to 12.94, that of the chief prosecutor of a division was reduced from 14.5 down to 12.76, that of the chief deputy prosecutor of a department was reduced from 14.3 down to 12.58, that of the chief deputy prosecutor of a division was reduced from 14.1 down to 12.4, that of a prosecutor of the Department of Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation (OCCI) was reduced from 13.8 down to 12.14, that of a prosecutor of a department was reduced from 13.1 down to 11.53, that of a prosecutor of a division was reduced from 13 down to 11.44, and that of a prosecutor was reduced from 12.9 down to 11.35. It should be noted that the coefficients of the positional salaries of other levels of prosecutors’ offices—regional and local prosecutors’ offices—were not reduced.

4.3. On 17 July 2009, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials through Article 1 whereof, that came into force on 1 August 2009, it amended the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, inter alia, Section III thereof, by reducing the coefficients of positional salaries for the second time.

In the explanatory note to the draft of this law, it is pointed out that this draft law was prepared in view of a difficult situation of the state budget and because of the necessity of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of state politicians and state officials; the coefficients of the positional salaries of state officials were reduced to the maximum—by 7.5 percent—for the state officials who received the biggest positional salary.

This law reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of all prosecutors: for example, in the course of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General for the second time, the coefficient of the positional salary of the Prosecutor General was reduced from 14.7 down to 13.60, that of the Deputy Prosecutor General was reduced from 13.38 down to 12.38, that of the chief prosecutor of a division was reduced from 12.76 down to 11.80, that of a prosecutor of a division was reduced from 11.44 down to 10.58, and that of a prosecutor was reduced from 11.35 down to 10.50. As mentioned before, in the course of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries for the first time, they were not reduced for the prosecutors of regional and local prosecutors’ offices, meanwhile, the said law also reduced the coefficients of their positional salaries: for example, the coefficient of the positional salary of the chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was reduced from 11.80 down to 10.92, that of the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda was reduced from 9.8 down to 9.26, that of the prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda was reduced from 8.3 down to 8.01, and that of the prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) was reduced from 8.0 down to 7.76.

4.4. In the table presented below it is evident how the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established in Section III of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials were reduced on 23 April 2009 and 17 July 2009 upon the adoption of the respective laws amending the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials:

Positions

Coefficients of positional salaries prior to the application of their reduction measures (Chapter III of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Coefficients of positional salaries as from 1 May 2009 (Chapter III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries as from 1 May 2009 (in percentage terms, in comparison with Chapter III of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Coefficients of positional salaries as from 1 August 2009 (Chapter III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries as from 1 August 2009 (in percentage terms, in comparison with Chapter III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The general extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries (in coefficient units, in comparison with Chapter III of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The general extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries (in percentage terms, in comparison with Chapter III of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Office of the Prosecutor General

Prosecutor General

16.7

14.7

11.98

13.60

7.48

3.1

18.56

Deputy Prosecutor General

15.2

13.38

11.97

12.38

7.47

2.82

18.55

Chief prosecutor of a department

14.7

12.94

11.97

11.97

7.5

2.73

18.57

Chief prosecutor of a division

14.5

12.76

12

11.80

7.52

2.7

18.62

Chief deputy prosecutor of a department

14.3

12.58

12.03

11.64

7.47

2.66

18.6

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

14.1

12.4

12.06

11.47

7.5

2.63

18.65

Prosecutor of the OCCI Department

13.8

12.14

12.03

11.23

7.5

2.57

18.62

Prosecutor of a department

13.1

11.53

11.98

10.67

7.46

2.43

18.55

Prosecutor of a division

13.0

11.44

12

10.58

7.52

2.42

18.62

Prosecutor

12.9

11.35

12.02

10.50

7.49

2.4

18.6

Regional prosecutors’ offices

Chief prosecutor

11.8

11.8

Not reduced

10.92

7.46

0.88

7.46

Chief deputy prosecutor

10.8

10.8

Not reduced

10.10

6.48

0.7

6.48

Chief prosecutor of a division

10.4

10.4

Not reduced

9.72

6.54

0.68

6.54

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

10.1

10.1

Not reduced

9.54

5.54

0.56

5.54

Prosecutor of the OCCI

10.0

10.0

Not reduced

9.45

5.5

0.55

5.5

Prosecutor

9.5

9.5

Not reduced

9.03

4.95

0.47

4.95

Local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda

Chief prosecutor

9.8

9.8

Not reduced

9.26

5.51

0.54

5.51

Chief deputy prosecutor

9.3

9.3

Not reduced

8.88

4.52

0.42

4.52

Chief prosecutor of a division

8.5

8.5

Not reduced

8.20

3.53

0.3

3.53

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

8.4

8.4

Not reduced

8.11

3.45

0.29

3.45

Prosecutor

8.3

8.3

Not reduced

8.01

3.49

0.29

3.49

Local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys

Chief prosecutor

9.7

9.7

Not reduced

9.22

4.95

0.48

4.95

Chief deputy prosecutor

9.2

9.2

Not reduced

8.79

4.46

0.41

4.46

Chief prosecutor of a division

8.5

8.5

Not reduced

8.20

3.53

0.3

3.53

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

8.4

8.4

Not reduced

8.11

3.45

0.29

3.45

Prosecutor

8.3

8.3

Not reduced

8.01

3.49

0.29

3.49

Local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns)

Chief prosecutor

9.3

9.3

Not reduced

8.88

4.52

0.42

4.52

Chief deputy prosecutor

8.8

8.8

Not reduced

8.45

3.98

0.35

3.98

Prosecutor

8.0

8.0

Not reduced

7.76

3

0.24

3

4.5. Thus, by means of the impugned legal regulation consolidated in Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials and in Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to this law, in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors had been established:

the coefficients of the positional salaries of all prosecutors of all levels of prosecutors’ offices were reduced;

the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries—was applied differently with regard to prosecutors: the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of regional and local prosecutors’ offices were reduced once, whilst this measure was applied twice for prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, i.e. for prosecutors holding the positions for which higher qualification, more experience and more responsibility are necessary;

if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors were reduced to a different extent: from by 3 percent—for prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) to by 18.65 percent—for the chief deputy prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General;

the different extent of the reduction of the positional salaries of prosecutors, if assessed in percentage terms, essentially depended on the level of a prosecutor’s office for which a concrete position was assigned and on the size of the coefficient of the positional salary established for that position: if assessed in percentage terms, bigger coefficients of positional salaries were reduced to a greater extent than smaller coefficients of positional salaries; thus, if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors holding higher positions for which higher qualification, more experience and more responsibility are necessary (holding higher positions in the prosecutor’s office of the same level or, inter alia, positions in prosecutors’ offices of higher levels requiring higher qualification) were reduced to a greater extent than those of the prosecutors holding lower positions requiring lesser qualification, less experience, and less responsibility;

after the legislature had reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries for the second time (i.e. after the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General had been reduced for the second time, and after the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of prosecutors’ offices of other levels had been reduced for the first time), the established coefficient of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was bigger than the established coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, prosecutors of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General, and prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, i.e., bigger than the established coefficients of the positional salaries of some prosecutors for whom bigger coefficients of the positional salaries had been established in comparison with the coefficient established for the chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices; the coefficients of the positional salaries of the chief deputy prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices and the chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices were approximated, inter alia, to the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General and to the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Office of the Prosecutor, i.e. they were approximated to the positional salaries of those prosecutors for whom substantially bigger coefficients of the positional salaries had been established in comparison with the coefficient established for chief deputy prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices and for the chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices; thus, such legal regulation distorted the proportions of the sizes of the work remuneration of prosecutors established prior to the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state: the positional salaries of some prosecutors who had received bigger work remuneration before the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries not only were approximated to the positional salaries of the prosecutors that had received smaller positional salaries, but for some of the latter prosecutors bigger coefficients of positional salaries were established in comparison with the coefficients established for the prosecutors who had received bigger positional salaries prior to the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries.

5. It should be noted that Articles 1 of the Republic of Lithuania’s laws amending Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011, extended the validity of the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established through Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009.

It should also be noted that Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009 provided that the non-reduced (i.e., valid prior to 30 April 2009) coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established in Article 2 of this law must be applied again, however, the entry into force of this legal regulation was postponed by means of Articles 1 of the Republic of Lithuania’s laws amending Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 30 June 2010 and 22 November 2011.

6. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that, on 1 January 2014, the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established in Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009 came into force.

IV

1. It has been mentioned that, in the constitutional justice case at issue, subsequent to the petitioner’s petitions, the Constitutional Court investigates, inter alia, the compliance of Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, with the Constitution.

2. On 21 December 2011, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, which came into force on 1 May 2012, through Article 1 whereof, it amended Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials in which, as mentioned before, by applying additional measures of the reduction of work remuneration, the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors were established.

2.1. It is clear from the explanatory note to the draft of the aforesaid law that this law was adopted in order to successfully implement the reform of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania in view of the amendments to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecutor’s Office.

2.1.1. In this context, it should be noted that, on 30 June 2011, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending and Supplementing Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 47, 52 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, Supplementing the Law with Articles 341 and 391 and Recognising Article 38 Thereof as No Longer Valid that came into force 1 January 2012.

This law changed, among other things, the structure of the prosecutor’s office that had been established in the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office until then. As mentioned before, under the provisions valid prior to 31 December 2011, the prosecutor’s office was composed of the Office of the Prosecutor General and territorial prosecutors’ offices; territorial prosecutors’ offices were regional prosecutors’ offices and local prosecutors’ offices (Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6); under the provisions valid as from 1 January 2012, the prosecutor’s office is composed of the Office of the Prosecutor General and territorial-regional prosecutors’ offices; a regional prosecutor’s office is composed of local prosecutors’ offices and specialised divisions of the regional prosecutor’s office (Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 (wording of 30 June 2011)). Thus, upon the reorganisation of the Republic of Lithuania’s prosecutor’s office, the local prosecutors’ offices that operated in the territory of the activity of regional prosecutors’ offices were merged with those regional prosecutors’ offices. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that, after the said reorganisation had been carried out, some positions of prosecutors established before that were changed and certain new positions of prosecutors were established.

2.1.2. It should be noted that the legal regulation by which the reorganised system of the prosecutor’s office was consolidated is not a matter for an investigation in the constitutional justice case at issue.

2.2. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that, inter alia, it is obvious from the explanatory note to the draft Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials that, in view of the restructuring of the Republic of Lithuania’s prosecutor’s office, this legal regulation sought to improve the system of the work remuneration of prosecutors by diminishing the split in the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors and by increasing the motivation of prosecutors thus seeking to pay for their work in a more efficient and fairer manner and to implement the principle of the equality of persons before the law. In order to achieve the specified objectives, the following measures were applied:

the diminishing of the split of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors by amending the legal regulation governing the work remuneration of prosecutors so that the prosecutors discharging the same or very similar functions would receive the same work remuneration or at least the work remuneration that is only slightly different;

the equating of the remuneration of the chief prosecutors and deputy chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices with the remuneration of the chief prosecutor and deputy chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the establishment of the margins of the coefficients for prosecutors of territorial prosecutors’ offices in view of their qualification; in addition, the establishment of the bigger coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of specialised divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices in comparison with the coefficients of the positional salaries of local prosecutors’ offices.

2.3. In this context, it should also be noted that the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Recognising Article 1 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials as No Longer Valid and Amending Articles 2 and 3 Thereof, which was adopted by the Seimas on 21 December 2011, amended, inter alia, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors whose entry into force was temporarily postponed by Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, i.e. the coefficients of the positional salaries that had to be applied once again after the application of the reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors had ended; thus, the amended legal regulation consolidated now coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors that had been established upon the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office and whose entry into force had been postponed.

The explanatory note to the draft of the said law makes it clear that it was drafted in order to successfully implement the restructuring of the Republic of Lithuania’s prosecutor’s office in view of the amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and, for this purpose, to diminish the split in the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors and to increase the motivation of prosecutors, also seeking to pay for their work in a more efficient and fairer manner and to implement the principle of the equality of persons before the law.

2.4. To summarise the above from the aspect relevant in the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be held that, upon the restructuring of the Republic of Lithuania’s prosecutor’s office, not only the structure of the prosecutor’s office was changed and new positions of prosecutors were established, but also, in view of such restructuring, Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials established new coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, whilst the impugned Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, in view of the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors that had been established upon the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office.

2.5. In the table presented below it is evident how the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors changed in view of the amendment of the legal regulation governing the work pay of prosecutors in view of the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office:

Positions until 31 December 2011 (in view of, inter alia, Article 6 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office (wording of 22 April 2003))

Coefficients of the positional salary until the application of the measures reducing them (Chapter III of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Coefficients of the positional salary as from 1 August 2009 (Chapter III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials

Positions as from 1 January 2012 (in view of, inter alia, Article 6 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office (wording of 22 April 2003))

Coefficients of the positional salary as from 1 May 2012 (Chapter III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) to the Appendix of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Coefficients of the positional salary as from 1 January 2014 (Chapter III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 January 2014) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salary from 1 May 2012 (in percentage terms, in comparison with Chapter III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 January 2014) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Office of the Prosecutor General

Prosecutor General

16.7

13.6

Prosecutor General

13.6

16.7

18.56

Deputy Prosecutor General

15.2

12.38

Deputy Prosecutor General

12.38

15.2

18.55

Chief prosecutor of a department

14.7

11.97

Chief prosecutor of a department

11.97

14.7

18.57

Chief prosecutor of a division

14.5

11.8

Chief prosecutor of a division

11.8

14.5

18.62

Chief deputy prosecutor of a department

14.3

11.64

Chief deputy prosecutor of a department, chief deputy prosecutor of a division of a department

11.64

14.3

18.6

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

14.1

11.47

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

11.47

14.1

18.65

 

 

 

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division of a department

11.39

14.0

18.64

Prosecutor of the OCCI Department

13.8

11.23

Prosecutor of the OCCI

11.23

13.8

18.62

Prosecutor of a department

13.1

10.67

Prosecutor of a department, prosecutor of a division of a department, prosecutor of a division, prosecutor

10.67

 

 

Prosecutor of a division

13.0

10.58

13.1

18.55

Prosecutor

12.9

10.5

 

 

Regional prosecutors’ offices (the local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices that emerged upon the restructuring non-inclusive)

Chief prosecutor

11.8

10.92

Chief prosecutor

11.97

14.7

18.57

Chief deputy prosecutor

10.8

10.1

Chief deputy prosecutor

11.64

14.3

18.6

Chief prosecutor of a division

10.4

9.72

Chief prosecutor of a specialised division

9.72

10.4

6.54

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

10.1

9.54

Chief deputy prosecutor of a specialised division

9.54

10.1

5.54

Prosecutor of the OCCI

10.0

9.45

Prosecutor of a specialised division

9.45

10.0

5.5

Local prosecutors’ offices (upon the restructuring—local prosecutors’ offices of regional prosecutors’ offices)

Local prosecutors’ offices

Local prosecutors’ offices of regional prosecutors’ offices

Chief prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda

9.8

9.26

Chief prosecutor

9.72

11.97

18.8

Chief prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys

9.7

9.22

Chief prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns)

9.3

8.88

 

 

Chief deputy prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda

9.3

8.88

Chief deputy prosecutor

9.54

11.64

18.04

Chief deputy prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys

9.2

8.79

Chief deputy prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns)

8.8

8.45

 

 

Chief prosecutors of divisions of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda

8.5

8.2

Chief prosecutor of a division

9.45

9.72

2.78

Chief prosecutors of divisions of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys

8.5

8.2

 

 

Chief deputy prosecutors of divisions of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda

8.4

8.11

Chief deputy prosecutor of a division

9.3

9.62

3.33

Chief deputy prosecutors of divisions of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys

8.4

8.11

 

 

Prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda

8.3

8.01

Prosecutor

9.03

9.5

4.95

Prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Šiauliai and Panevėžys

8.3

8.01

Prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns)

8

7.76

2.6. Thus, as regards the impugned legal regulation established in Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors are consolidated, which were established upon the reorganisation of the prosecutor’s office, it can be stated that:

the coefficients of the positional salaries of a part of the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General (the Prosecutor General, the Deputy Prosecutor General, the chief prosecutor of a department, the chief deputy prosecutor of a division, the chief deputy prosecutor of a department, the chief deputy prosecutor of a division of a department, the chief deputy prosecutor of a division, a prosecutor of the OCCI), and a part of the prosecutors (the chief prosecutor of a specialised division (prior to the restructuring—the chief prosecutor of a division), the chief deputy prosecutor of a specialised division (prior to the restructuring—the chief deputy prosecutor of a division), a prosecutor of a specialised division (prior to the restructuring—a prosecutor of the OCCI)) of regional prosecutors’ offices (the local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices that emerged upon the restructuring non-inclusive) remained unchanged, i.e., the same as established by Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials before the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration and were in force until 30 April 2012; the new coefficients of the positional salary established for these prosecutors, which must have come into force after stopping the application of the reduced coefficients of the positional salary, in comparison with the coefficients of their positional salaries established prior to the reduction of the coefficients (prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office), which were meant to be applied again after the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration ended, also remained unchanged;

somewhat bigger coefficients of the positional salaries were established for a part of the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General in comparison with the reduced coefficients of the official salaries of prosecutors which had been established prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office: after the legal regulation governing the work pay of prosecutors categorised the formerly established positions of a prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, a prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General, and a prosecutor of the Office of the Prosecutor General as belonging to a single group, i.e. upon the establishment of the same size of the coefficient of the positional salary for all these prosecutors, one slightly increased the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General (by 0.85 percent, in comparison with the reduced coefficient of their positional salaries that came into force in 1 August 2009) and those of prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General (by 1.62 percent, in comparison with the reduced coefficient of their positional salaries that came into force in 1 August 2009) in comparison with the coefficients established prior to 30 April 2012; one also slightly increased the new coefficients of the positional salary established for these prosecutors, which must have come into force after stopping the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration after the legal regulation governing the work pay had categorised the aforesaid prosecutors as belonging to a single group, in comparison with the coefficients of their positional salaries established prior to the reduction of the coefficients (prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office), which were meant to be applied again after the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration ended;

substantially bigger coefficients of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors and chief deputy prosecutors of the regional prosecutors’ offices were established in comparison not only with the coefficients of their positional salaries established until then, but also with the coefficients established prior to the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration with respect to them, thus equating their positional salaries with the positional salaries of the chief prosecutor of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General and his deputy respectively; substantially bigger coefficients of the positional salaries were also established for these prosecutors, which must have come into force after stopping the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration, in comparison with the coefficients of their positional salaries established prior to the reduction of the coefficients (prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office), which were meant to be applied again after the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration ended;

after local prosecutors’ offices had been joined with regional prosecutors’ offices and after the positions and the coefficients of positional salaries were equalised in all local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices (prior to the restructuring—local prosecutors’ offices), substantially bigger coefficients of the positional salaries were established essentially for all prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices (prior to the restructuring—local prosecutors’ offices) in comparison not only with the coefficients reduced prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office, but also with the coefficients established prior to the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration with respect to them; only the coefficient of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices of the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda (after the restructuring—the chief prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices) that used to exist prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office became slightly reduced (it decreased by 0.08) in comparison with the one established prior to the reduction of the coefficient of their positional salary (the coefficient before the reduction of the coefficient of the positional salary was 9.8; after the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration this coefficient was 9.26, whilst after the restructuring it became 9.72); substantially bigger new coefficients of the positional salary were also established for all prosecutors of the local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices, which must have come into force after stopping the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration, in comparison with the coefficients of their positional salaries established prior to the reduction of the coefficients (prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office), which were meant to be applied again after the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the work remuneration ended;

if assessed in percentage terms, the new coefficients of the positional salary established for prosecutors were reduced to a different extent (the new coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established after carrying out the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office in comparison with the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established after carrying out the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office): from by 2.78 percent for the chief prosecutors of divisions of local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices until by 18.8 percent for the chief prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices; if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of all prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, as well as the chief prosecutors and deputy chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices—the prosecutors holding the highest positions at regional prosecutors’ offices—saw the biggest reduction;

the different extent of the reduction of the positional salaries of prosecutors, if assessed in percentage terms, depended on the level of a prosecutor’s office for which a concrete position was assigned and on the size of the coefficient of the positional salary established for that position: if assessed in percentage terms, bigger coefficients of positional salaries were reduced to a greater extent than smaller coefficients of positional salaries; thus, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors holding higher positions for which higher qualification, more experience and more responsibility are necessary (holding higher positions in the prosecutor’s office of the same level or, inter alia, positions in prosecutors’ offices of higher levels requiring higher qualification) were reduced to a greater extent than those of the prosecutors holding lower positions essentially requiring lesser qualification, less experience, and less responsibility.

3. It should be noted that Article 1 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Article 2 of the Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 20 December 2012 extended the validity of the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established through Article 2 of the Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials.

It should also be noted that Paragraph 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009 provided that the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established in Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of this law must be applied, i.e., the new coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established upon carrying out the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office, however, the time of the entry into force of this legal regulation was postponed by Article 1 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials that was adopted on 20 December 2012.

4. As mentioned before, on 1 January 2014, the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established in Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, came into force.

V

1. It has been mentioned that, in the constitutional justice case at issue, subsequent to the petition of the petitioner, the Constitutional Court investigates, inter alia, the compliance of Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, with the Constitution.

2. Section IV “Positional Salaries of State Officials” of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials indicates certain positions of state officials and the coefficients of positional salaries corresponding to the said positions.

2.1. In this context, it should be noted that Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 22 April 2003) of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials provides that the work remuneration of state officials (except prosecutors) shall consist of the positional salary, the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania, and a one-off extra pay.

According to Article 4 of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, the positional salaries of state officials are calculated by applying the basic size (Paragraph 1 (wording of 19 July 2006)); the positional salary is calculated by multiplying the corresponding coefficient of the positional salary, which is set in the Appendix to this law, by the basic size (Paragraph 2 (wording of 19 July 2006)); according to Article 5 of the same law, additional pay is paid for state officials for the years served for the State of Lithuania, as from 11 March 1990, while holding the positions specified in Paragraphs 1–4 and Items 1–4 of Paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Law on the State Service (Paragraph 1 (wording of 6 November 2008)); the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania shall be three percent for each three years of the positional salary of a state politician or state official, however, the size of the additional pay must not exceed 30 percent of the positional salary (Paragraph 3 (wording of 6 November 2008)); according to Article 6 (wording of 5 July 2002) of the same law, for overtime work and work during days off and on holidays, state officials are paid a one-off extra pay whose size does not exceed that of their positional salary (Paragraph 1).

2.2. Thus, according to the legal regulation established in the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, the positional salary of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix comprises the main part of their work remuneration; the size of the positional salary is calculated by applying the coefficients of the positional salary established for particular positions of state officials in Section IV of the Appendix to this law; the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania is also a part of the work remuneration of these state officials and is calculated on the size of the positional salary, i.e., the size of such additional pay directly depends on the size of the positional salary: in case the coefficient of the positional salary is changed, the monetary expression of the granted additional pay also changes, i.e., if assessed in percentage terms, it changes to the same extent; a one-off extra pay for overtime work and work during days off and on holidays, whose size does not exceed that of the positional salary, is also a part of the work remuneration of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix.

3. As mentioned before, upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, several measures of the reduction of the work remuneration (remuneration) of, inter alia, state officials (the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, a group of state officials that is relevant in the constitutional justice case at issue, inclusive) had been applied; first of all, the basic size applied to the calculation of the work remuneration of those persons was reduced; upon the reduction of the basic size, the positional salaries of state politicians, judges of courts of general jurisdiction and of specialised courts, state officials, and state servants, the remuneration of justices of the Constitutional Court and the service remuneration of servicemen, if assessed in percentage terms (where no account is taken of the changes in the other sizes), were reduced to the same extent (in a proportionate manner) by 8.16 percent, if compared with the positional salaries (remuneration) established according the basic size in 2008 prior to the occurrence of the especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state and for the same period.

4. The impugned legal regulation consolidated in Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials established an additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration of the state officials listed in the said Section IV, which was the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries and was applied twice.

In this context, it should be noted that, when the impugned legal regulation was amending the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, the procedure of the calculation of the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania and a one-off extra pay for overtime work and work during days off and on holidays—other constituent parts of their remuneration—was not changed. As mentioned before, the additional pay for the years served for the State of Lithuania, which is a part of the work remuneration of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, is calculated on the size of the positional salary, i.e., the size of such additional pay directly depends on the size of the positional salary: in case the coefficient of the positional salary is changed, the monetary expression of the granted additional pay also changes, i.e., if assessed in percentage terms, it changes to the same extent; the size of the one-off extra pay for overtime work and work during days off and on holidays, which is a part of the work remuneration of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, depends, inter alia, on the size of the positional salary. Thus, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, the monetary expression of the work remuneration (remuneration) of these state officials decreased to the same extent if assessed in percentage terms.

4.1. Until the application of the aforementioned additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration, i.e., until 30 April 2009, Section IV (wording of 6 November 2008) of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials was in force, in which the following coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in the said section were established:

Title of position

Coefficient of positional salary

National Audit Office:

Auditor General

15.5

Deputy Auditors General

13.8

Seimas ombudsmen:

head of the establishment

15.5

Seimas ombudsmen

14.5

Equal Opportunities Ombudsman

13

Ombudsman for Children’s Rights

13

Inspector of Journalist Ethics

12

Chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, and members of the institutions appointed by the Seimas, the Speaker of the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister—the Competition Council, the National Commission for Energy Control and Prices, the State Gaming Control Commission, the State Securities Commission, the Central Electoral Commission and the Chief Official Ethics Commission:

chairpersons

12

deputy chairpersons

11

members

9.5

Chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, and members of state (standing) commissions and councils, who are appointed under special laws by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, and others:

chairpersons

9

deputy chairpersons

7.3

members

7

Other heads and officials of institutions and establishments funded from the state budget, appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic:

heads

8

officials

7

Chairperson and members of the Commission on Tax Disputes under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Chief Administrative Disputes Commission:

chairperson

12

members

9.5

Insurance Supervisory Commission of the Republic of Lithuania:

chairperson

12

deputy chairpersons

11

members

9.5

Director General of the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania

12

4.2. On 23 April 2009, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials through Article 1 whereof, that came into force on 1 May 2009, it amended the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, inter alia, Section IV thereof, thus reducing the coefficients of the positional salaries for the first time.

From the explanatory note to the draft of this law it is clear that the said draft law was prepared at the time when the economic and financial situation of this country was deteriorating, and in an attempt to implement the Crisis Management Plan provided for in Part II of the Programme of the 15th Government that was approved by the Seimas resolution No. XI-52 of 9 December 2008. Through the Crisis Management Plan attempts were made to reduce the state budget allocations for the work remuneration and to stabilise the financial system of the state, as well as to use state funds in a more rational manner.

By this law, the coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix were reduced: for example, the coefficient of the positional salary of the Auditor General and the Head of the Seimas Ombudsman’s Office was reduced from 15.5 down to 13.64, the Deputy Auditor General—from 13.8 down to 12.14, Seimas ombudsmen—from 14.5 down to 12.76, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman—from 13 down to 11.44, the Inspector of Journalist Ethics—from 12 down to 10.8, chairpersons of the institutions appointed by the Seimas, the Speaker of the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister—the Competition Council, the National Commission for Energy Control and Prices, the State Gaming Control Commission, the State Securities Commission, the Central Electoral Commission and the Chief Official Ethics Commission—from 12 down to 10.8, deputy chairpersons of such institutions—from 11 down to 9.99, and members of such institutions—from 9.5 down to 8.93. The coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials were not reduced by the said law: the coefficients of the positional salaries of deputy chairpersons (the coefficient of the positional salary—7.3) and members (the coefficient of the positional salary—7) of state (standing) commissions and councils, who are appointed under special laws by the Seimas or the President of the Republic, and the coefficients of the positional salaries other officials (the coefficient of the positional salary—7) of institutions and establishments appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic remained unchanged. Thus, the said law did not reduce the coefficients of positional salaries for those state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, to whom lesser coefficients (lesser than 8) of the positional salaries had been established by the legal regulation valid until then in comparison with the coefficients established for other state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix.

4.3. On 17 July 2009, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials through Article 1 whereof, that came into force on 1 August 2009, it amended the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, inter alia, Section IV thereof, thus reducing the coefficients of the positional salaries for the second time.

It is clear from the explanatory note to the draft of this law, that this draft law was prepared in view of a difficult situation of the state budget and because of the necessity of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of state politicians and state officials; the coefficients of the positional salaries of state officials were reduced to the maximum—by 7.5 percent—for the state officials who received the biggest positional salary.

By this law, the coefficients of the positional salaries of all the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix were reduced: for example, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries for the second time, the coefficient of the positional salary of the Auditor General was reduced from 13.64 down to 12.62, the Deputy Auditor General—from 12.14 down to 11.23, Seimas ombudsmen—from 12.76 down to 11.80, chairpersons of the institutions appointed by the Seimas, the Speaker of the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister—the Competition Council, the National Commission for Energy Control and Prices, the State Gaming Control Commission, the State Securities Commission, the Central Electoral Commission and the Chief Official Ethics Commission—from 10.8 down to 10.10, deputy chairpersons of such institutions—from 9.99 down to 9.44, and members of such institutions—from 8.93 down to 8.57.

As mentioned before, when the coefficients of the positional salaries were reduced for the first time, they were reduced not for all state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix—they were not reduced for those state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, to whom the coefficient of the positional salaries lesser than 8 had been established by the legal regulation valid until then, whilst the aforesaid law reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries for them as well: for deputy chairpersons of state (standing) commissions and councils, who are appointed under special laws by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, and others—from 7.3 down to 7.12, for members of such commissions and councils—from 7 down to 6.86, and for other heads and officials of institutions and establishments funded from the state budget, appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic—from 7 down to 6.86.

4.4. In the table presented below it is evident how the coefficients of the positional salaries of state officials established in Section IV (wording of 6 November 2008) of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials were reduced on 23 April 2009 and 17 July 2009 upon the adoption of the respective laws amending the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials:

 

Positions

Coefficients of the positional salary until the application of the measures reducing them (Chapter IV (wording of 6 November 2008) of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Coefficients of the positional salary as from 1 May 2009 (Chapter IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries as from 1 May 2009 (in percentage terms, in comparison with Chapter IV (wording of 6 November 2008) to the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

Coefficients of positional salaries as from 1 August 2009 (Chapter IV of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries as from 1 August 2009 (in percentage terms, in comparison with Chapter IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The general extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries (in coefficient units, in comparison with Chapter IV (wording of 6 November 2008) of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

The general extent of the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries (in percentage terms, in comparison with Chapter IV (wording of 6 November 2008) of the Appendix (wording of 19 July 2006) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials)

National Audit Office

Auditor General

15.5

13.64

12

12.62

7.48

2.88

18.58

Deputy Auditors General

13.8

12.14

12.02

11.23

7.50

2.57

18.62

Seimas ombudsmen

head of the establishment

15.5

13.64

12

12.62

7.48

2.88

18.58

Seimas ombudsmen

14.5

12.76

12

11.80

7.52

2.7

18.62

Equal Opportunities Ombudsman

13

11.44

12

10.58

7.52

2.42

18.62

Ombudsman for Children’s Rights

13

11.44

12

10.58

7.52

2.42

18.62

Inspector of Journalist Ethics

12

10.8

10

10.10

6.48

1.9

15.83

Chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, and members of the institutions appointed by the Seimas, the Speaker of the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister—the Competition Council, the National Commission for Energy Control and Prices, the State Gaming Control Commission, the State Securities Commission, the Central Electoral Commission and the Chief Official Ethics Commission

chairpersons

12

10.8

10

10.10

6.48

1.9

15.83

deputy chairpersons

11

9.99

9.18

9.44

5.51

1.56

14.18

members

9.5

8.93

6

8.57

4.03

0.93

9.79

Chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, and members of state (standing) commissions and councils, who are appointed under special laws by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, and others:

chairpersons

9

8.5

5.56

8.20

3.53

0.8

8.89

deputy chairpersons

7.3

7.3

Not reduced

7.12

2.47

0.18

2.47

members

7

7

Not reduced

6.86

2

0.14

2

Other heads and officials of institutions and establishments appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic:

heads

8

7.7

3.75

7.51

2.47

0.49

6.13

officials

7

7

Not reduced

6.86

2

0.14

2

Chairpersons and members of the Commission on Tax Disputes under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Chief Administrative Disputes Commission:

chairperson

12

10.8

10

10.10

6.48

1.9

15.83

members

9.5

8.93

6

8.57

4.03

0.93

9.79

Chairperson, deputy chairpersons, and members Insurance Supervisory Commission of the Republic of Lithuania:

chairperson

12

10.8

10

10.10

6.48

1.9

15.83

deputy chairpersons

11

9.99

9.18

9.44

5.51

1.56

14.18

members

9.5

8.93

6

8.57

4.03

0.93

9.79

Director General of the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania

12

10.8

10

10.10

6.48

1.9

15.83

4.5. Thus, by the legal regulation consolidated in Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials listed in it are established, and in Section IV of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in it are established:

the coefficients of the positional salaries of all the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix were reduced;

the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries—was applied differently with regard to the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix: the coefficients for the state officials, for whom the established coefficient of the positional salary was less than 8, were reduced once, whilst with regard of the other state officials this measure was applied twice;

if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix were reduced to a different extent: such coefficients were reduced from by 2 percent for members of state (standing) commissions and councils, who are appointed under special laws by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, and others, and the other officials of institutions and establishments appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic, until by 18.62 percent for Deputy Auditors General, Seimas ombudsmen, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman for Children’s Rights;

the different extent of the reduction of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, if assessed in percentage terms, depended on the established size of the coefficient of the positional salary: if assessed in percentage terms, bigger coefficients of positional salaries were reduced to a greater extent than established smaller coefficients of positional salaries.

4.6. In this context, it should be noted that, upon the application of the aforesaid measures reducing the work remuneration, the legal regulation establishing the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix was amended and/or supplemented on more than one occasion.

It should be mentioned that, by subsequent amendments, a group of state officials was singled out for whom the coefficient of their positional salaries was increased in comparison with the one established before the general reduction: through the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section IV of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials that was adopted on 29 June 2012 and came into force on 1 August 2012, the Seimas increased, from 10.10 up to 12.3, the coefficient of the positional salaries of, inter alia, the Chairpersons and Directors of the Competition Council, the Public Procurement Office, the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy, the Central Electoral Commission, and the Chief Official Ethics Commission; coefficient 12.3 is bigger than coefficient 12 that was established for the same officials before the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials. In addition, by the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials that was adopted by the Seimas on 29 June 2012 and came into force on 1 August 2012, the coefficient of the positional salary established for the said group of state officials, which should have come into force after the application of the additional measures of the reduction of the coefficients of the work remuneration had ended, was amended and the new coefficient of the positional salary became 12.3.

Thus, when the legal regulation that had reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix had been in force, a certain group of the state officials had been singled out in respect of which the coefficient of the positional salary had not only been increased, but it had also become bigger than that established prior to the application of the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries; in addition, by the amended legal regulation, the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salary—was no longer applied to the specified state officials, i.e. the non-reduced coefficients were established for the specified state officials, although the legal regulation that had reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the other state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix continued to be in force; this, among other things, has contributed to the distortion of the proportions of the work remuneration of state officials that existed prior to the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries.

5. It should be noted that Articles 1 of the laws amending Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, 21 December 2011, and 20 December 2012, extended the validity of the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix established through Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009.

It should also be noted that Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009 provided that the non-reduced (i.e., with certain exceptions, valid prior to 30 April 2009) coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, established in Article 2 (with subsequent amendments) of this law, must be applied again, however, the entry into force of this legal regulation was postponed by means of Articles 1 of the laws amending Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012.

In this context, it should also be noted that Article 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009 and 21 December 2011) of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, which established, inter alia, the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix that were in force prior to the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries, was amended and/or supplemented on more than one occasion, inter alia, by removing some of the positions of state officials from Section IV of the Appendix that are mentioned therein, or by supplementing the list of such positions, however, as regards the relevant-in-the-constitutional-justice-case aspect of the proportionality of the reduction of the remuneration for work of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, this legal regulation has essentially remained unchanged.

6. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that, on 1 January 2014, the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, which were established in Article 2 (with subsequent amendments) of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, came into force.

VI

1. In the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court is investigating the compliance of the legal provisions that, inter alia, established the reduced remuneration of prosecutors and some other state officials in an extremely difficult economic and financial situation in the state with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work”.

2.1. In construing Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has noted that, under the Constitution, a right appears in regard to the person who has completed a commissioned task to demand that the whole work remuneration (remuneration) which is due according to the legal acts be paid to them, and that such work remuneration be paid within the established time (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 December 2004, 11 December 2009, 14 February 2011, and 30 April 2013).

In its 1 July 2013 ruling, the Constitutional Court noted that the right to receive fair pay for work as consolidated in Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution is related to the constitutional principle of justice and means the right of a person to receive the payment for work that would be fair in view of, inter alia, the peculiarity of the work, the complexity and amount of the work functions, the responsibility for carrying out those functions, the individualities of the held positions, and the professional level and qualification of a person; under the Constitution, there is no tolerance for any such legal regulation that would establish a unified or substantially the same size of remuneration for the persons who hold the positions that are different according to the complexity and amount of the performed functions and the responsibility that falls upon them, who are of different professional level and qualification, and who are remunerated from the funds of the state or municipal budget.

The constitutional requirements for the fair pay for work that should be applied for state politicians, judges, state officials, and servicemen do not differ essentially from those that should be applied to the fair pay for work of state servants (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 20 March 2007 and 30 April 2013).

2.2. The Constitutional Court has also held that the legislature may change the legal regulation governing the salaries to various persons and may consolidate the legal regulation on the salaries that would be less favourable to these persons if it is necessary in order to ensure the vital interests of society and the state and to protect other constitutional values; however, also in such cases the legislature must keep the balance between the rights and legitimate interests of the persons for whom the less favourable legal regulation is established on the one hand and the interests of society and the state on the other hand, i.e. the legislature must pay heed to the requirements of the principle of proportionality (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 28 March 2006 and 1 July 2013);

In this context, it should be noted that, as it has been held by the Constitutional Court on more than one occasion, the principle of proportionality, as one of the elements of the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, means that the measures provided for in legal acts must be in line with the legitimate objectives that are important to society, and that these measures must be necessary in order to reach the said objectives and must not restrain the rights and freedoms of the person clearly more than necessary in order to reach the said objectives (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 31 October 2012, 15 February 2013, and 1 July 2013).

2.3. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, one should mention the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine connected with the reduction of remuneration for the persons who are remunerated from the funds of the state or municipal budget upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

2.3.1. In construing the right to receive fair pay for work consolidated in Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution in the context of the principle of proportionality, the Constitutional Court has noted that the remuneration of state servants may be reduced on a temporary basis when a particularly difficult economic and financial situation occurs in the state, however, in such a case one must heed the requirements of the principle of proportionality; the constitutional principle of proportionality is inseparable from other norms and principles of the Constitution, inter alia, the constitutional principles of the equality of rights and justice (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 11 December 2009, its decision of 20 April 2010, and its ruling of 1 July 2013).

In its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court noted that upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, and when, due to this, the state is incapable of fulfilling to the full extent its obligations undertaken to members of society, the constitutional principle of social solidarity implies a proportionate distribution of the incurred losses among members of society; the constitutional principle of social solidarity, when construed in the context of other constitutional principles (inter alia, those of proportionality and justice), does not imply any social egalitarianism, inter alia, it does not deny the requirement for the differentiation of the sizes of remuneration paid from the funds of the state or municipal budget, where one takes into consideration the peculiarity of the functions performed by the persons that receive it, the complexity and amount of the performed functions, the responsibility that falls upon them for performing those functions, the peculiarities of the position held, as well as the professional level and qualification of the persons holding those positions; one must also heed this requirement in establishing the measures of the reduction for the pay for work when there occurs an extremely difficult economic and financial situation. The constitutional principle of social solidarity, if construed in the context of the constitutional principle of the equality of rights of persons, implies a duty of the legislature to establish a non-discriminatory extent of the reduction of remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget. Such a non-discriminatory extent of the reduction means that the remuneration is reduced in a proportionate manner for all categories of those persons regardless of where (in which state or municipal institutions) they work and which positions they hold.

2.3.2. In its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court also noted that, inter alia, the following requirements arise from the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (the provision being construed in conjunction with the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law, the equality of rights, justice, and proportionality) for the legal regulation, established by the legislature, governing the reduction, due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget:

in the course of the establishing of a certain extent of reduction of the remuneration, one should take into consideration the fact that the losses incurred by the society due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation must be distributed among its members in a proportionate manner;

the reduction of the remuneration must be proportionate, inter alia, the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration of different categories of persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget that used to be established prior to the emergence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state must be retained; the size of the remuneration of a person with high qualification, who performs complex work, must not be approximated or even equalised to the size of remuneration of a person with lesser qualification, who performs less complicated work;

the reduction of the remuneration must be non-discriminatory: the remuneration must be reduced in a in a proportionate manner for all categories of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget regardless of where (in which state or municipal institutions) they work and which positions they hold;

the requirement for establishing the proportionate and non-discriminatory reduction of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget implies, inter alia, the fact that the proportionate reduction of the remuneration must retain the proportions, which used to be established prior to the emergence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, of the sizes of the remuneration of the persons of the same category (as, for instance, state servants and judges) who hold different positions.

These provisions of the official constitutional doctrine are also applicable mutatis mutandis in the course of establishing the legal regulation by which the remuneration of prosecutors and other state officials are reduced due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

3. In this context, it should be noted that, as it has been held by the Constitutional Court on more than one occasion, the principle of the equality of rights of persons is consolidated in the Constitution, inter alia, in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 thereof (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 30 June 2008 and 3 July 2012).

In construing the provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held on more than one occasion that the constitutional principle of the equality of persons, which must be followed both in the passage of laws and in their application, obligates one to legally assess homogeneous facts in the same manner and prohibits any arbitrary assessment of essentially the same facts in a varied manner.

4. The Constitutional Court has held that the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law integrates various values entrenched in and protected and defended by the Constitution, and that the entire Lithuanian legal system and the Constitution itself are based upon this principle; this principle is especially capacious and it comprises a wide range of various interrelated imperatives; this principle must be followed in the process of both making and implementing law.

4.1. The constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law is inseparable from the principle of justice, and vice versa. Justice may be implemented when a certain balance of interests is ensured, and when fortuity and arbitrariness, instability of social life and conflict of interests are avoided.

4.2. The constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law is also inseparable from the principle of the equality of rights of persons consolidated in the Constitution, inter alia, in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 thereof. A violation of the constitutional principle of the equality of rights of persons is, at the same time, a violation of the constitutional imperatives of justice and harmonious society, thus, it is also a violation of the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 6 February 2012, 14 December 2012, and 30 April 2013).

VII

On the compliance of Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials and Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the same law with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law

1. It has been mentioned that, in the constitutional justice case at issue, subsequent to the petitions of the petitioner, the Constitutional Court investigates the compliance of, inter alia, Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials and Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials insofar as, according to the petitioner, they established a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. As mentioned before, inter alia, the following requirements arise from the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (the provision being construed in conjunction with the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law, the equality of rights, justice, and proportionality) for the legal regulation, established by the legislature, governing the reduction, due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget:

in the course of the establishing of a certain extent of reduction of the remuneration, one should take into consideration the fact that the losses incurred by the society due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation must be distributed among its members in a proportionate manner; the reduction of the remuneration must be proportionate, inter alia, the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration of different categories of persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget that used to be established prior to the emergence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state must be retained; the size of the remuneration of a person with high qualification, who performs complex work, must not be approximated or even equalised to the size of remuneration of a person with lesser qualification, who performs less complicated work; the reduction of the remuneration must be non-discriminatory: the remuneration must be reduced in a in a proportionate manner for all categories of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget regardless of where (in which state or municipal institutions) they work and which positions they hold;

the requirement for establishing the proportionate and non-discriminatory reduction of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget implies, inter alia, the fact that the proportionate reduction of the remuneration must retain the proportions, which used to be established prior to the emergence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, of the sizes of the remuneration of the persons of the same category who hold different positions.

These provisions of the official constitutional doctrine are also applicable mutatis mutandis in the course of establishing the legal regulation by which the remuneration of, inter alia, prosecutors are reduced due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

3. It has been mentioned that the principle of the equality of persons is consolidated in the Constitution, inter alia, in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 thereof.

It has also been mentioned that the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law integrates various values entrenched in and protected and defended by the Constitution, and that the entire Lithuanian legal system and the Constitution itself are based upon this principle. The constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law is inseparable from the principle of justice, and vice versa.

The constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law is also inseparable from the principle of the equality of rights of persons consolidated in the Constitution, inter alia, in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 thereof; any violation of the constitutional principle of the equality of the rights of persons is, at the same time, a violation of the constitutional imperatives of justice and harmonious society, and, thus, also a violation of the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

4. It has been mentioned that, by means of the impugned legal regulation consolidated in Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials and in Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to this law, in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors had been established:

the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries—was applied differently with regard to prosecutors: the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of regional and local prosecutors’ offices were reduced once, whilst this measure was applied twice for prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, i.e. for prosecutors holding the positions for which higher qualification, more experience and more responsibility are necessary;

if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors were reduced to a different extent: from by 3 percent—for prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices of other districts (towns) to by 18.65 percent—for the chief deputy prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General;

the different extent of the reduction of the positional salaries of prosecutors, if assessed in percentage terms, essentially depended on the level of a prosecutor’s office for which a concrete position was assigned and on the size of the coefficient of the positional salary established for that position: if assessed in percentage terms, bigger coefficients of positional salaries were reduced to a greater extent than smaller coefficients of positional salaries; thus, if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors holding higher positions for which higher qualification, more experience and more responsibility are necessary (holding higher positions in the prosecutor’s office of the same level or, inter alia, positions in prosecutors’ offices of higher levels requiring higher qualification) were reduced to a greater extent than those of the prosecutors holding lower positions requiring lesser qualification, less experience, and less responsibility;

after the legislature had reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries for the second time (i.e. after the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General had been reduced for the second time, and after the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of prosecutors’ offices of other levels had been reduced for the first time), the established coefficient of the positional salaries of the chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices was bigger than the established coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors of a department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, prosecutors of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General, and prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, i.e., bigger than the established coefficients of the positional salaries of some prosecutors for whom bigger coefficients of the positional salaries had been established in comparison with the coefficient established for the chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices; the coefficients of the positional salaries of the chief deputy prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices and the chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices were approximated, inter alia, to the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of a division of the Office of the Prosecutor General and to the coefficient of the positional salary of a prosecutor of the Office of the Prosecutor, i.e. they were approximated to the positional salaries of those prosecutors for whom substantially bigger coefficients of the positional salaries had been established in comparison with the coefficient established for chief deputy prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices and for the chief prosecutors of divisions of regional prosecutors’ offices; thus, such legal regulation distorted the proportions of the sizes of the work remuneration of prosecutors established prior to the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state: the positional salaries of some prosecutors who had received bigger work remuneration before the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries not only were approximated to the positional salaries of the prosecutors that had received smaller positional salaries, but for some of the latter prosecutors bigger coefficients of positional salaries were established in comparison with the coefficients established for the prosecutors who had received bigger positional salaries prior to the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries.

It has also been mentioned that, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, the monetary expression of the work remuneration (remuneration) of prosecutors decreased to the same extent if assessed in percentage terms.

5. Thus, the impugned legal regulation consolidated in Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials that established the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries only for the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General and consolidated in Section III of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the same law that established the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries for the prosecutors of all levels of prosecutor’s offices, established a disproportionate extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, inter alia, violated the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established for prosecutors before the occurrence of the especially difficult economic situation in the state, approximated the size of the remuneration of a prosecutor of high qualification, who performs a complex job requiring big experience and responsibility, to the remuneration of a prosecutor of lesser qualification, who performs a less complex job requiring less experience and lesser responsibility, or in certain cases even equalised the former remuneration with the latter, thus, even more distorting the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration of prosecutors established before the occurrence of the especially difficult economic situation in the state.

Therefore, it needs to be held that the impugned legal regulation disregarded the requirements arising from the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (the provision being construed in conjunction with the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law, the equality of rights, and proportionality) for the legal regulation through which the remuneration of prosecutors—persons categorised as a certain group of state officials from the point of view of the legal regulation governing work remuneration—is reduced due to the occurrence of a particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state; alongside, the requirements arising both out of Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law were violated.

6. As mentioned before, as regards the impugned legal regulation established in Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors are consolidated, which were established upon the reorganisation of the prosecutor’s office, it can be stated that:

if assessed in percentage terms, the new coefficients of the positional salary established for prosecutors were reduced to a different extent (the new coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established after carrying out the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office in comparison with the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established after carrying out the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office): from by 2.78 percent for the chief prosecutors of divisions of local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices until by 18.8 percent for the chief prosecutors of local prosecutors’ offices under regional prosecutors’ offices; if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of all prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, as well as the chief prosecutors and deputy chief prosecutors of regional prosecutors’ offices—the prosecutors holding the highest positions at regional prosecutors’ offices—saw the biggest reduction;

the different extent of the reduction of the positional salaries of prosecutors, if assessed in percentage terms, depended on the level of a prosecutor’s office for which a concrete position was assigned and on the size of the coefficient of the positional salary established for that position: if assessed in percentage terms, bigger coefficients of positional salaries were reduced to a greater extent than smaller coefficients of positional salaries; thus, the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors holding higher positions for which higher qualification, more experience and more responsibility are necessary (holding higher positions in the prosecutor’s office of the same level or, inter alia, positions in prosecutors’ offices of higher levels requiring higher qualification) were reduced to a greater extent than those of the prosecutors holding lower positions essentially requiring lesser qualification, less experience, and less responsibility.

As mentioned before, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, the monetary expression of the work remuneration (remuneration) of prosecutors decreased to the same extent if assessed in percentage terms.

7. Thus, the impugned legal regulation consolidated in Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials that consolidated the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, which had been laid down upon the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office, established a disproportionate extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, inter alia, violated the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established for prosecutors before the occurrence of the especially difficult economic situation in the state, and approximated the size of the remuneration of a prosecutor of high qualification, who performs a complex job requiring big experience and responsibility, to the remuneration of a prosecutor of lesser qualification.

Therefore, it needs to be held that the impugned legal regulation disregarded the requirements arising from the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (the provision being construed in conjunction with the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law, the equality of rights, and proportionality) for the legal regulation through which the remuneration of prosecutors is reduced due to the occurrence of a particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state; alongside, the requirements arising both out of Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law were violated.

8. In the light of the foregoing arguments, the conclusion should be drawn that Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had consolidated the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, which had been established prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office, were in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

9. It has been mentioned that Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009 provided that the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established in Article 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009 and 21 December 2011) of this law must be applied (i.e., that the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors valid prior to 30 April 2009 had to be applied again before the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office took place, whilst, upon the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office—in view of the already established coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors), however, the entry into force of this legal regulation was postponed by means of Articles 1 of the laws amending Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012.

Having held that Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, on the grounds of the same arguments, it should be held that Paragraph 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009, 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012) of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, insofar as it had established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

10. It has also been mentioned that Articles 1 of the laws amending Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, and 21 December 2011, extended the validity of the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established through Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials (wording of 17 July 2009).

Having held that Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 17 July 2009) of the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, on the grounds of the same arguments, it should be held that Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, and 22 November 2011) and Paragraph 2 of Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011) of the Law Amending the Appendix to Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they had established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which disproportionately reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, were in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

11. It has also been mentioned that Article 1 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Article 2 of the Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 20 December 2012 extended the validity of the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors established through Article 2 of the Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials.

Having held that Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had consolidated the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, which had been established prior to the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, on the grounds of the same arguments, it should be held that Article 2 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of the Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which disproportionately reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

VIII

On the compliance of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 thereof, and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law

1. It has been mentioned that, in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court also investigates the compliance of Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009 and its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as, according to the petitioner, it established a different extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, with Paragraph 1 of Article 29 and the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. As mentioned before, inter alia, the following requirements arise from the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (the provision being construed in conjunction with the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law, the equality of rights, justice, and proportionality) for the legal regulation, established by the legislature, governing the reduction, due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget:

in the course of the establishing of a certain extent of reduction of the remuneration, one should take into consideration the fact that the losses incurred by the society due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation must be distributed among its members in a proportionate manner; the reduction of the remuneration must be proportionate, inter alia, the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration of different categories of persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget that used to be established prior to the emergence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state must be retained; the size of the remuneration of a person with high qualification, who performs complex work, must not be approximated or even equalised to the size of remuneration of a person with lesser qualification, who performs less complicated work; the reduction of the remuneration must be non-discriminatory: the remuneration must be reduced in a in a proportionate manner for all categories of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget regardless of where (in which state or municipal institutions) they work and which positions they hold;

the requirement for establishing the proportionate and non-discriminatory reduction of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget implies, inter alia, the fact that the proportionate reduction of the remuneration must retain the proportions, which used to be established prior to the emergence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, of the sizes of the remuneration of the persons of the same category who hold different positions.

These provisions of the official constitutional doctrine are also applicable mutatis mutandis in the course of establishing the legal regulation by which the remuneration of state officials are reduced due to an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

3. It has been mentioned that the principle of the equality of persons is consolidated in the Constitution, inter alia, in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 thereof.

It has also been mentioned that the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law integrates various values entrenched in and protected and defended by the Constitution, and that the entire Lithuanian legal system and the Constitution itself are based upon this principle. The constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law is inseparable from the principle of justice, and vice versa.

The constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law is also inseparable from the principle of the equality of rights of persons consolidated in the Constitution, inter alia, in Paragraph 1 of Article 29 thereof; any violation of the constitutional principle of the equality of the rights of persons is, at the same time, a violation of the constitutional imperatives of justice and harmonious society, and, thus, also a violation of the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

4. It has been mentioned that, by the legal regulation consolidated in Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials listed in it are established, and by the legal regulation consolidated in Section IV of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in it are established:

the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries—was applied differently with regard to the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix: the coefficients for the state officials, for whom the established coefficient of the positional salary was less than 8, were reduced once, whilst with regard of the other state officials this measure was applied twice;

if assessed in percentage terms, the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix were reduced to a different extent: such coefficients were reduced from by 2 percent for members of state (standing) commissions and councils, who are appointed under special laws by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, and others, and the other officials of institutions and establishments appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic, until by 18.62 percent for Deputy Auditors General, Seimas ombudsmen, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman for Children’s Rights;

the different extent of the reduction of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, if assessed in percentage terms, depended on the established size of the coefficient of the positional salary: if assessed in percentage terms, bigger coefficients of positional salaries were reduced to a greater extent than established smaller coefficients of positional salaries.

As mentioned before, when the legal regulation that had reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix had been in force, a certain group of state officials had been singled out in respect of which the coefficient of the positional salary had not only been increased, but it had also become bigger than that established prior to the application of the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries; in addition, by the amended legal regulation, the additional measure of the reduction of the work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salary—was no longer applied to the specified state officials, i.e. the non-reduced coefficients were established for the specified state officials, although the legal regulation that had reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the other state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix continued to be in force; this, among other things, has contributed to the distortion of the proportions of the work remuneration of state officials that existed prior to the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries.

It has also been mentioned that, upon the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, the monetary expression of the work remuneration (remuneration) of these state officials decreased to the same extent if assessed in percentage terms.

5. Thus, the impugned legal regulation consolidated in Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials listed in it are established, and in Section IV of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, in which the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of all the state officials listed in it are established, inter alia, distorted the proportions of the sizes of the work remuneration of a certain group of state officials established prior to the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state, which, in their turn, were additionally distorted after the application of the additional measures of the reduction of work remuneration—the reduction of the coefficients of positional salaries—with respect to a certain group of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix had ended.

Therefore, it needs to be held that the impugned legal regulation disregarded the requirements arising from the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution (the provision being construed in conjunction with the constitutional principles of a state under the rule of law, the equality of rights, and proportionality) for the legal regulation through which the remuneration of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix—a group of persons categorised as state officials from the point of view of the legal regulation governing work remuneration—is reduced due to the occurrence of a particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state; alongside, the requirements arising both out of Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law were violated.

6. In the light of the foregoing arguments, the conclusion should be drawn that Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials listed in the same section, and Section IV of the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in the same section, were in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

7. It has been mentioned that Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009 provided that the non-reduced (i.e., with certain exceptions, valid prior to 30 April 2009) coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, established in Article 2 (with subsequent amendments) of this law, must be applied again, however, the entry into force of this legal regulation was postponed by means of Articles 1 of the laws amending Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012.

Having held that Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of certain state officials listed in the same section, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, on the grounds of the same arguments, it should be held that Paragraph 2 (wordings of 23 April 2009, 30 June 2010, 22 November 2011, and 20 December 2012) of Article 3 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, insofar as it established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

8. It has also been mentioned that Articles 1 of the laws amending Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 2 July 2010, 22 November 2011, 21 December 2011, and 20 December 2012, extended the validity of the reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix established through Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009.

Having held that Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 17 July 2009) to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in it, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, on the grounds of the same arguments, it should be held that Article 2 (wordings of 17 July 2009, 2 July 2010, and 22 November 2011) and Paragraph 1 (wordings of 21 December 2011 and 20 December 2012) of Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they had established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which disproportionately reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, were in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

IX

1. As mentioned before, in its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court assessed the constitutionality of the provisions of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania adopted at the time when the economic and financial situation in the state was deteriorating, and when, inter alia, when the funds for financing the needs provided for in the state budget law used not to be collected. By means of such provisions, inter alia, the remuneration of state servants and judges was reduced upon the occurrence of an especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state. The Constitutional Court held that such impugned legal regulation had violated the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established for the persons categorised as state servants as well as for the judges holding different positions prior to the occurrence of the especially difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

2. It has been mentioned that, in its ruling of 1 July 2013, the Constitutional Court also noted that when the legislature had been adopting the laws on the disproportionate reduction of the remuneration of state servants and judges that had been ruled to be in conflict with the Constitution by that Constitutional Court’s ruling, it must have been aware of the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine upon which that ruling was grounded, inter alia, the following provisions:

the legislature may change the legal regulation governing the salaries to various persons and may consolidate the legal regulation on the salaries that would be less favourable to these persons if it is necessary in order to ensure the vital interests of society and the state and to protect other constitutional values; however, also in such cases the legislature must keep the balance between the rights and legitimate interests of the persons for whom the less favourable legal regulation is established and the interests of society and the state, i.e. the legislature must pay heed to the requirements of the principle of proportionality (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 28 March 2006);

the constitutional principle of proportionality means, inter alia, that when there is a particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state and when, due to this, there is a necessity for a temporary reduction of the remuneration of state servants in order to secure vitally important interests of society and the state and to protect other constitutional values, the legislature is under obligation to establish a uniform and non-discriminatory scale of the reduction of the remuneration of state servants, according to which, with respect to all categories of state servants (and other employees financed from the funds of the state or municipal budget), the remuneration would be reduced by not violating the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established with regard to different categories of state servants prior to the occurrence of the particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state; the Constitution does not tolerate any such situations where the remuneration of state servants, when there is a difficult economic and financial situation in the state, is reduced in a disproportionate manner, inter alia, by approximating the amount of the remuneration of a state servant of high qualification, who performs a complex job, to the remuneration of a state servant of lesser qualification, who performs a less complex job, or where the former remuneration is equalised with the latter, or where the remuneration of state servants of certain groups is reduced by taking into consideration not the entire work remuneration received, but only individual constituent parts of the work remuneration of state servants, etc.; in such situations not only the constitutional principles of proportionality, the equality of rights and justice are denied, but one also deviates from the constitutional concept of the state service as well as from the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution consolidating the human right to receive fair pay for work (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 11 December 2009 and 20 April 2010);

the provision of the official constitutional doctrine that the reduction of the work remuneration must be temporary may not be construed as meaning that the state, after the legislature has reduced the remuneration of officials of the institutions that are financed from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets (and of other employees who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget) as well as that of state servants, is released from the duty to look for ways of the securing of the accumulation of the funds necessary in order to pay the remuneration in the sizes that had been prior to their reduction; quite to the contrary, if, before the end of the economic crisis, an opportunity occurs to accumulate (receive) the funds necessary to pay the remuneration in the size that had been before the reduction of the remuneration, the legal regulation governing the reduction of the work remuneration of officials of the institutions that are financed from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets (and of other employees who are paid for their work from the funds of the state or municipal budget) as well as that of state servants must be repealed (the Constitutional Court’s decision of 20 April 2010).

It has been mentioned in this ruling of the Constitutional Court that the constitutional requirements for the fair pay for work that are to be applied for state politicians, judges, state officials, and servicemen do not differ essentially from those that should be applied to the fair pay for work of state servants.

3. In its ruling of 1 July 2013, having taken into consideration into, among other things, the overall legal regulation by which the remuneration of all officials and state servants of the institutions exercising state power (legislative power, executive power, and judicial power), i.e., under the then valid legal regulation—the remuneration of state politicians and officials, judges, and state servants, the Constitutional Court also noted that the validity of the laws that were adopted in 2009 and reduced the remuneration of state servants and judges and that were a matter for investigation in the constitutional justice case considered by it had been prolonged three times without any substantial changes in their contents, however, by means of the amendments to other laws (inter alia, the law establishing the sizes of the work remuneration of prosecutors and other state officials and the conditions for its payment), distorting even more the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established with regard to different categories of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budget prior to the occurrence of the particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

In the same ruling, the Constitutional Court held that, after declaring the legal regulation that laid down the disproportionate extent of the reduction of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budget to be in conflict with the provision ‘[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work’ of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, a requirement arises from Article 23 of the Constitution to establish a mechanism of the compensation for the losses incurred by the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets; such a mechanism means the procedure, according to which the state will compensate for such losses within a reasonable time (inter alia, in view of the economic and financial situation of the state and after an assessment of the accumulation (receiving) of the funds required for such compensation) and in a fair manner, to the extent that the incurred losses were disproportionate; such a legal regulation should be established without unreasonable delay.

4. In its decision of 16 April 2014, while disclosing the content of the establishment of the mechanism of the compensation for incurred losses within a reasonable time and in a fair manner, the Constitutional Court noted that:

under the Constitution, inter alia, under the constitutional imperative of social harmony, fair compensation for the losses, incurred by the persons who are paid their remuneration for work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets, due to the disproportionate reduction of the remuneration, can only be properly ensured on the grounds of the legislature-established sizes, terms, and other essential elements of the compensation for the incurred losses; the right of the persons who incurred losses due to the disproportionate reduction of remuneration to compensation for such losses should be implemented through a mechanism established by the legislature, which would ensure fair compensation within a reasonable time; the legislature’s duty to establish, within a reasonable time, a fair mechanism of compensation for the losses creates a legitimate expectation for the persons who incurred such losses that their losses will be fairly compensated without unreasonable delay;

the legislature, while following the constitutional principle of responsible governance, may postpone the establishment and/or implementation of the mechanism of compensation for the losses incurred due to the disproportionate reduction of remuneration for a reasonable time that should be determined in view of an assessment of the existing economic and financial situation in the state and in the light of the consequences of an extreme situation and the capabilities of the state, inter alia, various obligations assumed by the state, which, inter alia, are related to financial discipline, thus, also to the imperative of balancing the revenue and expenditure of the state budget; society must be presented with concrete criteria upon which the assessment of the economic and financial situation of the state is based, determining the postponement of the establishment or implementation of a mechanism of compensation for the incurred losses; when an extreme situation in the state is over, the legislature must immediately establish a compensation mechanism by means of passing a legal act (law) so that the legitimate expectations of the persons who incurred these losses would be ensured.

5. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that one not only extended on more than one occasion the validity of the laws that were adopted in 2009, and partly those adopted in 2011, which had, inter alia, reduced the remuneration of prosecutors and the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix, without any substantial changes in their contents, but also, as held in this ruling of the Constitutional Court, the subsequent amendments to these laws distorted even more the proportions of the sizes of the remuneration established with regard to prosecutors and the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix prior to the occurrence of the particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state.

Thus, the legislature, by extending the validity of these laws, failed to take into account the aforementioned provisions of the official constitutional doctrine, which should have been invoked upon the occurrence of a particularly difficult economic and financial situation in the state, when, due to this, there was a necessity for a temporary reduction of the remuneration of the persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets, and did not resort to any measures in order to restore the violated proportions of the sizes of the remuneration that had occurred in the course of the reduction thereof.

Consequently, after the Constitutional Court recognises in the constitutional justice case at issue that the legal regulation that laid down the disproportionate extent of the reduction of the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors and the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix was in conflict with the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution, a duty arises for the legislature from Article 23 of the Constitution to establish, in a fair manner and within a reasonable period, a mechanism of the compensation for the losses incurred by the aforesaid persons who are paid for their work from the funds of the state budget or municipal budgets; such a mechanism means the procedure, according to which the state will compensate for such losses within a reasonable time (inter alia, in view of the economic and financial situation of the state and after an assessment of the accumulation (receiving) of the funds required for such compensation) and in a fair manner, to the extent that the incurred losses were disproportionate; such a legal regulation should be established without unreasonable delay.

It should be noted that, as the Constitutional Court held in its decision of 16 April 2014, the legislature, while following the constitutional principle of responsible governance, may postpone the establishment and/or implementation of the mechanism of compensation for the losses incurred due to the disproportionate reduction of remuneration for a reasonable time that should be determined in view of an assessment of the existing economic and financial situation in the state and in the light of the consequences of an extreme situation and the capabilities of the state, including various obligations assumed by the state, which, inter alia, are related to financial discipline, thus, also to the imperative of balancing the revenue and expenditure of the state budget. When an extreme situation in the state is over, the legislature must immediately establish a compensation mechanism by means of passing a legal act (law) so that the legitimate expectations of the persons who incurred the losses due to the disproportionate reduction of the remuneration would be ensured.

Conforming to Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 1, 53, 531, 54, 55, and 56 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania gives the following

ruling:

1. To recognise that Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 49-1935) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Lithuania, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. To recognise that Paragraph 2 (wording of 23 April 2009, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 49-1935; wording of 30 June 2010, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2010, No. 82-4305; wording of 22 November 2011, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 150-7042; wording of 20 December 2012, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2012, No. 155-7987) of Article 3 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, adopted on 23 April 2009, insofar as it had established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

3. To recognise that Section III of the Appendix (its wording of 17 July 2009, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 91-3916) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

4. To recognise that Article 2 (wording of 17 July 2009, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 91-3916; wording of 2 July 2010, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2010, No. 86-4531; wording of 22 November 2011, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 150-7041) and Paragraph 2 of Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 163-7750) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they had established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which disproportionately reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, were in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

5. To recognise that Section III (its wording of 21 December 2011 that came into force on 1 May 2012, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 163-7747) to the Appendix (wording of 17 July 2009) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials Republic of Lithuania, insofar as they consolidated the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors upon the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

6. To recognise that Article 2 (wording of 21 December 2011, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 163-7747; wording of 20 December 2012, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2012, No. 155-7989) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending Section III of the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which disproportionately reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of prosecutors, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

7. To recognise that Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 23 April 2009 that came into force on 1 May 2009; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 49-1935) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the certain state officials listed in it, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

8. To recognise that Paragraph 2 (wording of 23 April 2009, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 49-1935; wording of 30 June 2010, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2010, No. 82-4305; wording of 22 November 2011, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 150-7042; wording of 20 December 2012, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2012, No. 155-7987) of Article 3 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Appendix to the Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 23 April 2009, insofar as it had established and postponed the entry into force of the legal regulation which provided for the application of the non-reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

9. To recognise that Section IV of the Appendix (its wording of 17 July 2009, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 91-3916) to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, insofar as it had established the disproportionately reduced coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in it, was in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

10. To recognise that Article 2 (wording of 17 July 2009, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2009, No. 91-3916; wording of 2 July 2010, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2010, No. 86-4531; wording of 22 November 2011, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 150-7041) and Paragraph 1 (wording of 21 December 2011, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 163-7750; wording of 20 December 2012, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2012, No. 155-7988) of Article 2 of the Law Amending the Appendix to Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials of 17 July 2009, insofar as they had established and prolonged the validity of the legal regulation which disproportionately reduced the coefficients of the positional salaries of the state officials listed in Section IV of the Appendix to the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Work Pay of State Politicians and State Officials, were in conflict with Paragraph 1 of Article 29, the provision “[e]ach human being <…> shall have the right <…> to receive fair pay for work” of Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

This ruling of the Constitutional Court is final and not subject to appeal.

Justices of the Constitutional Court:     Vytautas Greičius

                                                                          Danutė Jočienė

                                                                          Pranas Kuconis

                                                                          Gediminas Mesonis

                                                                          Vytas Milius

                                                                          Egidijus Šileikis

                                                                          Algirdas Taminskas

                                                                          Dainius Žalimas