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On annual reports submitted by institutions to the Seimas, the accounting by the Prosecutor General to the Seimas, and the proposal to release him from duties

Case No. 20/2013-1/2014

 

 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

IN THE NAME OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

 

RULING

ON THE COMPLIANCE OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE OF THE SEIMAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA, THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA’S LAW ON THE PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE SEIMAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA (NO. XII-528) “ON THE 2012 ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE PROSECUTION SERVICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA” OF 1 OCTOBER 2013 WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

 

30 December 2015 No. KT34-N22/2015

Vilnius

 

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, composed of the Justices of the Constitutional Court: Elvyra Baltutytė, Vytautas Greičius, Danutė Jočienė, Pranas Kuconis, Gediminas Mesonis, Vytas Milius, Egidijus Šileikis, Algirdas Taminskas, and Dainius Žalimas

The court reporter—Daiva Pitrėnaitė

Stasys Šedbaras, a member of the Seimas, acting as the representative of the groups of members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the petitioners,

Julius Sabatauskas, the Chair of the Seimas Committee on Legal Affairs, acting as the representative of the Seimas of the Republic of the Lithuania, the party concerned,

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, pursuant to Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, on 1 December 2015, at the Court’s public hearing considered constitutional justice case No. 20/2013-1/2014 subsequent to:

1) the petition (No. 1B-28/2013) of a group of members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, a petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether:

the provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Articles 5, 67, and 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania;

Paragraph 6 (wording of 27 June 2013) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Articles 5, 67, and 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

the provision “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (No. XII-528) On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

2) the petition (No. 1B-36/2013) of a group of members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, a petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

By the Constitutional Court’s decision of 19 November 2015, the aforesaid petitions were joined into one case.

The Constitutional Court

has established:

I

1. The petition (No. 1B-28/2013) of a group of members of the Seimas, a petitioner, is substantiated by the following arguments.

1.1. Under the impugned Paragraph 5 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas, the heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas submit an annual activity report of an institution and the Seimas annually adopts a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution; an annual activity report of an institution is also submitted by those heads of state institutions, who are appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas, and, also in this case, the Seimas annually adopts a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution.

The absolute majority of the heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas, are appointed for a certain period of time. Usually, the grounds and special procedure for their dismissal from office are provided for in the legal acts regulating the legal status of these heads. It is regulated because of the fact that the state institutions, whose heads are appointed by the Seimas or the appointment of whose heads requires the assent of the Seimas, perform the important state functions in defending the human rights, public interests, and in ensuring security; in order such institutions would function, the stability and continuity of their activity is necessary. The impugned legal regulation creates preconditions for changing the heads of the aforementioned institutions each time when the parliamentary majority changes, thus, it does not comply with the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations, as well as it violates the principle of depoliticisation of the law enforcement institutions where the appointment of heads of these institutions requires the assent of the Seimas; in adopting the decisions under their competence, these institutions are not free and independent.

From the provisions of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 of the Constitution, a conclusion should be drawn that every institution of the state power, also including the Seimas, has as many powers as it was granted by the Nation when adopting the Constitution. The competence of the Seimas is established in Article 67 of the Constitution: Paragraph 5 of this article consolidates that the Seimas establishes state institutions provided for by law, and appoints and releases their heads, while Paragraph 9—that the Seimas supervises the activities of the Government and may express no confidence in the Prime Minister or a Minister. Article 75 of the Constitution prescribes that the officials appointed or elected by the Seimas, with the exception of the persons specified in Article 74 of the Constitution, are dismissed from office when the Seimas expresses no confidence in them by a majority vote of all the members of the Seimas. From these provisions of the Constitution, a conclusion should be drawn that certain functions of parliamentary control are granted to the Seimas, however, only in the aspect of those heads of state institutions that are appointed or elected by the Seimas itself. In addition, the parliamentary control of the Seimas is expressed in a way that the Seimas may dismiss from office an official appointed or elected by itself by expressing no confidence in him/her, however, in the Constitution, the dismissal of the head of a state institution upon expressing no confidence in him/her is not linked to the activity report of an institution, its consideration and voting on it. Thus, the provision “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas is in conflict with the provisions of Articles 5, 67, and 75 of the Constitution.

1.2. By having supplemented Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas by Paragraph 6, preconditions were created for such a legal situation that in the case where in the plenary sitting of the Seimas, it does not approve the report of the head of a state institution by the simple majority of votes and on that ground the head of an institution may be dismissed from office (when the head is appointed by the Seimas) or it may be proposed to do that for the President of the Republic (when the head of a state institution is appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas). It has been mentioned that the state institutions whose heads are appointed by the Seimas, or the appointment of whose heads requires the assent of the Seimas, perform important state functions, thus, it is necessary to ensure the independence, continuity and stability of the activity of these institutions. They must perform properly regardless of the change of political power and implement the duties conferred to them continuously. By having consolidated the possibility of the Seimas to initiate the procedure of dismissal of the head of a state institution that is appointed by the Seimas on the grounds of the consideration of the annual activity report of an institution, as well as the possibility of proposing to dismiss the head of a state institution appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas, the balance of the state powers consolidated in Article 5 of the Constitution was violated and the Seimas was granted more powers than it is provided for in Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution.

In addition, by having established the impugned legal regulation in Paragraph 6 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas, it was disregarded that certain legal acts providing the dismissal of the officials appointed by the Seimas establish additional procedures or provide with the exhaustive list of grounds for dismissal. For instance, Article 12 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Bank of Lithuania prescribes that the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, Deputy Chairpersons, and Members thereof may be dismissed prior to the expiry of their term of powers only if they do not fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or they have been found guilty of serious misconduct; whereas the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Central Electoral Commission prescribes that the Seimas may terminate the powers of the chairperson of the this commission and its members only on the grounds defined by this law. Thus, the impugned legal regulation does not meet also the requirements of legal certainty and legal clarity which stem from the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, as well as the requirement that the legal regulation must be clear and harmonious and that legal norms must be formulated precisely and may not contain any ambiguities.

1.3. Under the Constitution and the official constitutional doctrine, prosecutors may properly implement the functions established in Article 118 of the Constitution only when they are independent from the institutions of the state power; the institutions of the state power may not interfere with the activity of prosecutors. Thus, it is not possible to establish such a legal regulation, under which the institutions of the state power would be granted the powers having implemented which preconditions would be created for the restriction of independence of prosecutors, interference with their activity, and for making influence when they are implementing their functions established in the Constitution. It is also not permitted to establish any such a legal regulation that would oblige prosecutors to submit accounts on the activity of the Prosecution Service in performing the functions established in the Constitution to the legislative and (or) executive authorities, whereas the legislative and (or) executive authorities could consider the activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted to it and adopt a decision on whether to approve this report or not to approve it. Thus, Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) violates Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

1.4. By Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013, it was decided not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania. After the voting regarding this resolution, the Seimas also adopted a protocol resolution to commission the Seimas Committee on Legal Affairs to prepare a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding the proposal for the President of the Republic to dismiss the Prosecutor General from office. Under the official constitutional doctrine formulated when interpreting Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, the grounds and procedure for the dismissal of a prosecutor from office must be established in a law; under the Constitution, the legislature may establish only such grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office prior to the expiry of the term of his or her powers due to the nature of which the Prosecutor General may not hold his/her office on the whole. In addition, under the Constitution, the Statute of the Seimas has the power of a law, but it is not a law, therefore, it may not regulate the elements of the procedure for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office. Thus, Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. The petition (No. 1B-36/2013) of a group of members of the Seimas, a petitioner, is substantiated by the following arguments.

The Law on the Prosecution Service provides the grounds for termination of powers of the Prosecutor General and his/her dismissal from office. The impugned provision of Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service that the Prosecutor General may be dismissed upon the proposal of the Seimas does not supplement the aforementioned grounds, but it consolidates such a legal regulation under which the Prosecutor General may be dismissed at any moment and due to any circumstances or reasons, or even when there are no circumstances or reasons, but there is one condition—the proposal of the Seimas to dismiss the Prosecutor General. Such a legal regulation is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution, which consolidates that, while discharging his/her functions, a prosecutor is independent and obeys only the law.

Paragraph 5 of Article 118 of the Constitution provides that the Prosecutor General is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas. Such a constitutional status of the Prosecution Service guarantees the balance of the political will in appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General and at the same time creates preconditions for the Prosecution Service to be as independent as possible of the influence of the political power in adopting procedural decisions, organising and controlling pre-trial investigation, upholding charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases, and defending the public interest under the procedure of civil proceedings. Under the Constitution, the right of initiative in dismissing (as well as in appointing) the Prosecutor General is granted exceptionally to the Head of State. However, by means of the impugned legal regulation, this right is transferred to the Seimas and, thus, the balance of the powers of the Head of State and the representation of the Nation in appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General established in the Constitution, as well as the procedure for dismissing the Prosecutor General consolidated in Paragraph 5 of Article 118 of the Constitution, are violated.

Under the official constitutional doctrine, the provision of the Constitution that the procedure for the appointment of prosecutors, as well as their status are established by law means that the legislature, after he has established the term of powers of the Prosecutor General by means of a law, does not have the right to establish any grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office prior to the expiry of his/her term of powers; under the Constitution, the legislature may establish only such grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office prior to the expiry of his/her term of powers, due to which the Prosecutor General may not hold that office on the whole. By means of the impugned legal regulation, preconditions have been created to dismiss the Prosecutor General from office prior to the expiry of his/her term of powers at any time, without a clear reason and without any legal ground, thus, violating also Paragraph 6 of Article 118 of the Constitution.

II

In the course of the preparation of the case for the Constitutional Court’s hearing, written explanations regarding petitions No. 1B-28/2013 and No. 1B-36/2013 were received from Julius Sabatauskas, Chairperson of the Seimas Committee on Legal Affairs, and Rūta Rutkauskaitė, chief specialist of the Civil Law Unit of the Legal Department of the Office of the Seimas, acting in the capacity of the representatives of the Seimas, the party concerned. In these written explanations, it was asserted that the impugned legal regulation was not in conflict with Constitution.

1. The position of the representatives of the party concerned regarding the compliance of Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas with the Constitution (petition No. 1B-28/2013) is substantiated by the following arguments.

Under the Constitution (Item 5 of Article 67, Article 75, etc.), in implementing its founding function, the Seimas decides what person should be appointed as the head (state official) of a state institution, as well as whether a certain person, who has been proposed to be appointed as the head (state official) of a state institution by the corresponding person or institution under the established procedure is suitable to hold the office. In the area of the legal regulation of activities of state institutions, as well as the heads and officials thereof, the principles of a state under the rule of law are implemented, among other things, by combining trust in the heads of state institutions and other state officials with the public control of their activities and with their responsibility to the public. The trust of the Seimas in the head of a state institution or other state official appointed (elected) to office by the Seimas is a constitutional value. The standards of a state under the rule of law imply that in exercising the public control of activities of the heads of state institutions and other state officials appointed (elected) to office by the Seimas itself and of their responsibility to the public, the Seimas must ensure proper establishment of all the actual circumstances, showing that the head of a state institution or other official appointed (elected) to office by the Seimas does not respect laws, does not fulfil the duties entrusted to him/her properly, raises personal or group interests above the interests of society, discredits state authority or the institution headed by him/her by his/her actions, etc., and the justification of these circumstances on the basis of evidence permitting the Seimas, upon considering and assessing them, to adopt the corresponding decisions, proportionate (adequate) to the nature of violations. Otherwise, the trust of people in the Seimas, as the institution implementing the state power, and in the state itself would be undermined. The Constitution consolidates the principle of responsible governance which must be followed by the Seimas, when it implements the powers established to it in the Constitution and adopts decisions, including the decisions regarding the dismissing of heads (officials) of state institutions appointed (elected) by the Seimas, with the exception of the persons specified in Article 74 of the Constitution, when the Seimas loses its confidence in them. In implementing its constitutional powers, the Seimas, as well as every member of the Seimas, is bound by the Constitution, constitutional laws, laws, and the Statute of the Seimas, which has the force of a law.

The principle of responsibility of the heads (officials) of state institutions appointed (elected) by the Seimas (with the exception of the persons specified in Article 74 of the Constitution) towards the Seimas, which appointed them to office, that is consolidated in Article 75 of the Constitution and the principle of supervision of their activity, ensuring that the office, for entering which the assent of the Seimas is necessary, could not be held by the persons who did not observe laws and did not perform their duties properly, raised personal or group interests above the interests of society, discredited the institution of the state power or the state institution headed by him/her by his/her actions, etc., and, thus, they lost the confidence of the Seimas in them. In a state under the rule of law, the powers of the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, to take measures and dismiss from office the heads of state institutions and other officials (with the exception of the persons specified in Article 74 of the Constitution), who were appointed by the Seimas and who lost the confidence of the Seimas, may not be denied.

Under Article 76 of the Constitution, in the Statute of the Seimas, the Seimas establishes the structure and procedure of its activities, the procedures for submission, consideration and adoption of laws and other legal acts, the competence of the structural subdivisions of the Seimas and the relations among them, as well as it regulates other questions of the functioning of the Seimas. Paragraph 6 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas consolidates the possibility of taking initiative to dismiss from office those officials and heads of state institutions the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of whom depends on two subjects: the President of the Republic and the Seimas. This provision of the Statute of the Seimas consolidates a possibility for the Seimas to propose, by means of its resolution, to dismiss the head of a state institution where his/her assignment requires the assent of the Seimas, which is consolidated in the said provision of the Statute of the Seimas, may not be compared to the powers of the President of the Republic to dismiss the head of a state institution where the assignment of the head concerned requires the assent of the Seimas. The procedure consolidated in Paragraph 6 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas does not mean the dismissal from office of the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas, or the head of a state institution where the assignment of the head concerned requires the assent of the Seimas. In addition, the notion “activity report”, which is used in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas, may not be realised only as reporting for the individual functions of an institution or concrete individual actions, but it includes systematic work of the budgetary institution that implements the state functions.

The provisions of Paragraph 5 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas, which regulate the duty of the heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas or heads of state institutions where the assignment of the them requires the assent of the Seimas to submit, once in a year, an annual activity report of an institution, have been in effect since 1 February 1999, i.e. since coming into force of the Statute of the Seimas of the new wording. By having supplemented Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas by Paragraph 6, the legislature did not establish an essentially new legal regulation, but only finished the regulation of the procedure for consideration at the Seimas of the annual activity reports of institutions submitted by the heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas or heads of the state institutions where their appointment requires the assent of the Seimas.

2. The position of the representatives of the party concerned regarding the compliance of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service, Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013 (petition No. 1B-28/2013), and Paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service (petition No. 1B-36/2013) with the Constitution is substantiated by the following arguments.

The content of the powers and duties of the Prosecutor General prescribed in the Law of the Prosecution Service is related to the proper functioning of the Prosecutor General’s Office, as a state institution. Due to this reason, the Prosecutor General assumes the responsibility for the activity of the Prosecutor General’s Office. The Prosecutor General’s Office not only implements the essential functions consolidated in the Law on the Prosecution Service— directs the territorial prosecution offices and supervises their activities, develops a common practice for the pre-trial investigation of criminal acts and supervision of actions in criminal proceedings, conducts, organises, controls and leads pre-trial investigation and prosecutes on behalf of the State in criminal cases of particular importance, develops a common practice of public prosecution in criminal cases and takes part in the hearing of cases subject to an appeal or under the cassation procedure, coordinates actions of pre-trial investigation bodies in the investigation of criminal acts, defends the public interest in cases of particular importance and develops a common prosecutorial practice in this relation, but also performs other functions of no less importance established in the Law on the Prosecution Service: implements the priorities of the penal policy, organises professional and in-service training of prosecutors and renders them methodological assistance, communicates with foreign state bodies and international institutions in accordance with the procedure established by international treaties, laws and other legal acts, ensures financial provisions and technical supplies for the Prosecution Service and social benefits for prosecutors, analyses the activities of the Prosecution Service and manages data on its activities, performs other functions established by laws and international treaties, solves the problems arising in the activity of the system of the Prosecution Service, and carries out the improvement of the system of the Prosecution Service.

The accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas, as established in Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service, includes the statistical data on the activity of the system of the Prosecution Service, as well as on organising and leading the pre-trial investigation and upholding charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases, and the information of the review nature, but it may not be understood as the concrete data on organising and leading the pre-trial investigation of the concrete criminal cases and on upholding charges on behalf of the state in concrete criminal cases. In analysing the information provided by the Prosecutor General, taking account of the activity report of the Prosecution Service and in response to the data provided, in cases where it is necessary, the Seimas increases the appropriations for the Prosecution Office and, thus, strengthens the system of the Prosecution Service. The necessity to provide the Seimas with the statistical data is implied by the formed penal policy of the state and the reaction to the dynamics of the criminogenic situation. In addition, two subjects participate in the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General: without the assent of the Seimas, the President of the Republic may not appoint or dismiss the Prosecutor General, therefore, it is reasonable that both subjects participating in appointing and dismissing the said official may require the activity report from the Prosecutor General. The prosecutor is independent only insofar, as he/she performs his/her functions—organises and leads the pre-trial investigation, and upholds charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases.

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas are closely related to the provisions of Paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service: the Statute of the Seimas consolidates such a procedure under which the provisions of Paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service are implemented. The provisions of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas are inseparable also from the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service: the Statute of the Seimas, which regulates the procedure (as consolidated in this provision) for accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the Seimas, permits the Seimas, upon adopting a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution, where the appointment of the head concerned requires the assent of the Seimas, may adopt a resolution on the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution and may commission the committee that has considered this report to submit the draft resolution of the Seimas on proposing the President of the Republic to dismiss this head of a state institution from office. The ground for the resolution regarding the proposal for the President of the Republic to dismiss the head of a state institution (where the appointment of the head concerned requires the assent of the Seimas) is the accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service which is prescribed in Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service. Thus, the independence of the Prosecutor General is not restricted by Paragraph 6 of Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service prescribing that the Prosecutor General may be dismissed upon the proposal of the Seimas.

Under the Constitution, the will of the Seimas regarding the adoption of particular decisions may not be expressed otherwise than by vote of members of the Seimas at a sitting of the Seimas and by the adoption of a particular legal act, therefore, Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013, whereby the Seimas did not approve the activity report of the Prosecution Service, did not restrict the independence of the Prosecutor General.

III

1. At the Constitutional Court’s hearing, Seimas member S. Šedbaras, a representative of the petitioners—groups of members of the Seimas—virtually reiterated the arguments set out in the petitions and answered the questions.

2. At the Constitutional Court’s hearing, Julius Sabatauskas, the Chair of the Seimas Committee on Legal Affairs, acting as the representative of the Seimas, the party concerned, virtually reiterated the arguments set out in the written explanations and answered the questions.

The Constitutional Court

holds that:

I

1. In its petition No. 1B-28/2013, a group of members of the Seimas, a petitioner, requests an investigation into whether:

the provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Articles 5, 67, and 75 of the Constitution;

Paragraph 6 (wording of 27 June 2013) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Articles 5, 67, and 75 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

the provision “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activities of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

1.1. Although in this petition the Constitutional Court is requested to investigate the compliance of the specified provisions of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with, inter alia, Article 5 of the Constitution, it is obvious from the arguments set out in the petition that the petitioner requests an investigation into the compliance of the said provisions of the Statute of the Seimas with, inter alia, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 of the Constitution.

Although the petitioner requests an investigation into the compliance of the indicated provisions of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) and Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013 with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution, it does not specify the wording of the said paragraph of the Constitution, nevertheless, the arguments set out in the petition make it clear that the petitioner requests an investigation into the compliance of the said provisions with, inter alia, Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

1.2. In the aforementioned petition, the Constitutional Court is requested an investigation into, inter alia:

the compliance of the provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution;

the compliance of Paragraph 6 (wording of 27 June 2013) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

It should be noted that the arguments set out in the petition make it clear that the petitioner doubts on the compliance of the provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with the Constitution only to the extent that the said provision provides that the Seimas adopts a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution, and it does not request to investigate the compliance of this provision with the Constitution to the extent that it provides that the Seimas adopts a resolution regarding the activity of an institution.

It should also be noted that Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) was subsequently supplemented by the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on Amending and Supplementing Articles 44, 441, 46, 48, 49, 52, 61, 68, and 206 and Sections Twenty-Seven1 and Twenty-Eight of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and Recognising Article 56 thereof as no Longer Valid, which was adopted on 27 June 2013.

Thus, the petition should be regarded as the petition requesting an investigation into, inter alia:

the compliance of the provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution;

the compliance of Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5, Articles 67, and 75 of the Constitution, and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

1.3. In the aforementioned petition, the petitioner requests an investigation, inter alia, into the compliance of the provision “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) prescribes: “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service which shall also be published on the website of the Prosecution Service.”

It should be noted that the entirety of arguments set out in the petition makes it clear that the petitioner doubts whether the legal regulation that is consolidated in the quoted paragraph of the article and whereby the accounting by the Prosecutor General namely to the Seimas and namely in the form of an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service is established is in conflict with the Constitution. Thus, the petition should be considered as a petition requesting to investigate into the compliance of the provisions “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activities of the Prosecution Service to […] the Seimas. He/she shall report to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service […]” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the Constitution.

It should also be noted that the petitioner does not provide with any concrete legal arguments on the compliance of the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law. Thus, the petition should be considered as a petition requesting to investigate into the compliance of the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

2. In its petition No. 1B-36/2013, a group of members of the Seimas, a petitioner, requests an investigation into whether Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

3. Thus, subsequent to the petitions, in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court will investigate into whether:

the provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution;

Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution, and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law;

the provision “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activities of the Prosecution Service to […] the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service […]” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution;

Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution;

Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

II

1. In the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court investigates, inter alia, the compliance of Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with the Constitution.

2. On 17 February 1994, the Seimas adopted the Statute of the Seimas which was amended and set out in a new wording by the Statute “On Amending the Statute” that was adopted by the Seimas on 22 December 1998.

3. Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) was subsequently amended or supplemented by the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on Amending Articles 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 44, 48, 54, 55, 77, 79, 81, 83, 88, 89, 90, 93, 115, 119, 121, 126, 127, 130, 136, 138, 139, 155, 172, 180, 187, 188, 206, 209, 214, 219, 225, and the Titles of Sections Six and Thirty of the Statute of the Seimas which was adopted on 10 October 2000 and which also amended Paragraph 5 of the aforementioned article, as well as by the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on Amending and Supplementing Articles 44, 441, 46, 48, 49, 52, 61, 68, and 206 and Sections Twenty-Seven1 and Twenty-Eight of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and Recognising Article 56 thereof as no Longer Valid, which was adopted on 27 June 2013 and which supplemented the aforementioned article by Paragraph 6.

4. Article 206 “Reports by Members of the Government and Heads of State Institutions” (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) established:

1. Upon the request of the Seimas, the Government or individual Ministers must account for their activities to the Seimas.

2. The above shall also apply to heads of other state institutions who are either appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas, with the exception of courts.

3. Invited persons shall answer the questions posed by the members of the Seimas and shall furnish other information concerning their own activities and the activities of the institutions subordinate to them.

4. When drawing up a weekly agenda of Seimas sittings, it shall be established which head of state institutions shall answer the questions or inquiries of the members of the Seimas that week.

5. The heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas shall submit (usually by March 1) an annual activity report of the institution. Upon receipt of such a report, the Speaker of the Seimas shall notify the Seimas about this and the latter shall decide on the committee to be assigned with consideration of the submitted report. Having considered the report, the committee shall prepare a conclusion and a draft resolution to be debated at a Seimas sitting along with the report by the head of a state institution. The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of the institution.

6. Having adopted a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas, the Seimas may assign to the committee which has considered the above report to submit a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding the no confidence in the head of that institution at the next sitting of the Seimas. In this case, voting shall be held at the next sitting of the Seimas with respect to dismissal from office of the head of a state institution. Having adopted a resolution not to approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of that state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas, the Seimas may assign to the committee which has considered the above report to submit a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding a proposal to the President of the Republic to dismiss from office this head of the institution. Decisions on dismissal from office of heads of state institutions and on a proposal to the President of the Republic to dismiss from office heads of state institutions shall be adopted by secret ballot by a majority vote of more than half of all the members of the Seimas.”

Thus, Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) consolidates, inter alia, the grounds for the accounting to the Seimas by the heads of state institutions, who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas. Under the legal regulation prescribed in the said article, these heads of state institutions must provide the Seimas with information, inter alia, in the form of an annual activity report of an institution.

It should be noted that under Paragraph 2 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), the heads of courts who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas do not have the duty to account for their activity to the Seimas.

4.1. It should be noted that Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) consolidates the right of the Seimas to receive annual activity reports of institutions from the heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas and, respectively, the duty of these heads of state institutions to submit such reports.

It should also be noted that when interpreting Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) in conjunction with Paragraph 2 of this article, it should be held that the heads of courts who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas do not have the duty to account for their activity to the Seimas.

4.2. The impugned provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) should be interpreted in the context of other provisions of this article and the provisions of other articles of the Statute of the Seimas.

When interpreted in conjunction with the first provision “The heads of state institutions […] shall submit […] an annual activity report of an institution” of Paragraph 5 of this article and with the provisions “Having adopted a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas […]. Having adopted a resolution not to approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas […]” of Paragraph 6 of this article, the provision of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas, inter alia, its formula “regarding the report of the head of an institution” means that by its resolution the Seimas expresses its will, inter alia, regarding the annual activity report of an institution which is submitted by the head of that state institution.

In this context, it should be noted that, when interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), i.e.: “A resolution shall be a non-regulatory act of the Seimas adopted to confirm in writing the opinion of the Seimas on any issue of national importance” (Paragraph 1 of Article 182), “Other non-regulatory acts of the Seimas (appeals, declarations, non-regulatory resolutions, etc.) shall be adopted in the same manner as resolutions” (Paragraph 2 of Article 182), which are significant for the understanding of the resolutions of the Seimas as acts, the impugned provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) implies that the Seimas adopts such a non-regulatory act, whereby the Seimas expresses its opinion in writing on an issue of national importance (“report of the head”).

It should also be noted that the provision “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), which is related to another regulation established in this paragraph (“Upon receipt of such a report, the Speaker of the Seimas shall notify the Seimas about this and the latter shall decide on the committee to be assigned with consideration of the submitted report. Having considered the report, the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution”) implies that in all the cases when the annual activity report of an institution is received at the Seimas, upon the decision of the Seimas, the corresponding committee of the Seimas is empowered to prepare a draft resolution on this report.

4.3. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should also be emphasised that when interpreted, inter alia, in the context of the provisions “Having adopted a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas […]. Having adopted a resolution not to approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas” of Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), the provisions The committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of the same article mean that under these provisions the Seimas has the powers to adopt a resolution, inter alia, on either approving or not approving an annual activity report submitted by the head of a state institution.

It should also be noted that neither Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), nor other articles of the Statute of the Seimas include the provisions which would expressis verbis regulate the concrete content or extent of the annual activity report of an institution to be submitted to the Seimas and which would, inter alia, consolidate explicit requirements on the exhaustiveness and meaningfulness of the data submitted in the report. However, the character (nature) and purpose of the annual activity report of an institution imply in itself that its content (inter alia, structure) and extent must ensure a sufficient exhaustiveness, i.e. the greatest possible meaningfulness of the information (inter alia, actual data) on the fact how the institution fulfils the functions (tasks) attributed to it by laws or other legal acts which is provided in the report.

4.4. As mentioned before, by the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on Amending and Supplementing Articles 44, 441, 46, 48, 49, 52, 61, 68, and 206 and Sections Twenty-Seven1 and Twenty-Eight of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and Recognising Article 56 thereof as no Longer Valid which was adopted on 27 June 2013, Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) was supplemented by Paragraph 6 that established the following:

Having adopted a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas, the Seimas may assign to the committee which has considered the above report to submit a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding the no confidence in the head of that institution at the next sitting of the Seimas. In this case, voting shall be held at the next sitting of the Seimas with respect to dismissal from office of the head of a state institution. Having adopted a resolution not to approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas, the Seimas may assign to the committee which has considered the above report to submit a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding a proposal to the President of the Republic to dismiss this head of an institution from office. Decisions on dismissal of the heads of state institutions from office and on a proposal to the President of the Republic to dismiss the heads of state institutions from office shall be adopted by secret ballot by a majority vote of more than half of all the members of the Seimas”.

Thus, the impugned Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) supplemented the legal regulation of the annual activity report (its submission and consideration) of an institution—it established the consequences that may arise when the Seimas does not approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas itself and when the Seimas does not approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas.

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) consolidates the right of the Seimas to express its will on the further activity of the head of the institution who submitted the annual activity report of an institution in the aspect that:

The non-approval of the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of the state institution who is appointed by the Seimas itself expressed by means of the Seimas resolution may serve as a ground for the Seimas to consider and adopt a resolution on expressing no confidence in such a head of a state institution, by, at the same time, dismissing him/her from office;

The non-approval for the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas may serve as a ground for the Seimas to consider and adopt a resolution on proposing the President of the Republic to dismiss such a head of a state institution from office, thus, seeking to initiate the procedure for the dismissal of this head of a state institution from office.

5. In the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court is also investigating into the compliance of certain provisions of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the Constitution.

5.1. On 13 April 1994, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecution Service which was amended and set out in its new wording by means of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending the Law on the Prosecution Service adopted by the Seimas on 22 April 2003.

5.2. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, the legal regulation concerning the accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service established in the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) should be revealed first.

5.3. Article 4 “Control of the Activity of the Prosecution Service” of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) prescribed:

1. The Prosecution Service shall be headed by the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Prosecutor General). He/she shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania.

2. Operational priorities of the Prosecution Service shall be set and parliamentary control of the Prosecution Service shall be exercised by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania.

3. Procedural actions of prosecutors shall be controlled by their senior prosecutor and the court. The senior prosecutor and the court shall establish violations of procedural laws committed by prosecutors and reverse unlawful decisions.

4. The economic and financial activities of the Prosecutor General’s Office and regional prosecutor’s offices shall be controlled by the Prosecutor General (prosecutors authorised by him/her), the National Audit Office of Lithuania and other authorised state institutions.

5. The Prosecutor General shall provide information about the activity of the Prosecution Service to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and society.”

Thus, Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) consolidated the accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas.

It should be noted that neither Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), nor other articles of this law prescribed the concrete forms of this accounting.

5.4. Subsequently, Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) was amended and set out in a new wording by the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending and Supplementing Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 47, 52 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, Supplementing the Law with Articles 341 and 391 and Recognising Article 38 thereof as no Longer Valid, which was adopted by the Seimas on 30 June 2011.

Article 4 “Interaction between the Prosecution Service and Other State Institutions” (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), the compliance of Paragraph 3 of which with the Constitution is under investigation in this constitutional justice case, prescribes:

1. Operational priorities of the Prosecution Service shall be set and parliamentary control of non-procedural actions of the Prosecution Service shall be exercised by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the Seimas) in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Statute of the Seimas.

2. Procedural actions of prosecutors shall be controlled by their senior prosecutor and the court. The senior prosecutor and the court shall establish violations of procedural laws committed by prosecutors and reverse unlawful decisions.

3. The Prosecutor General shall be accountable for activities of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service which shall also be published on the website of the Prosecution Service.

[...]

5. The Prosecutor General shall provide information about non-procedural actions of the Prosecution Service to the Government.

6. The economic and financial activities of the Prosecutor General’s Office and regional prosecutor’s offices shall be controlled by the National Audit Office of Lithuania and other authorised state institutions.”

Having compared the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the one prescribed in Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of this law, it is obvious that the legal regulation did not change in the aspect that it consolidated the accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas; also is the legal regulation supplemented, inter alia, in the aspect that the concrete form—the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service—of the accounting by the Prosecutor General to the Seimas for the activity of the Prosecution Service was prescribed.

5.5. The legal regulation of appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General which is prescribed in Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is also significant for the constitutional justice case at issue.

It should be noted that Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) has been amended and supplemented more than once, inter alia, by the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending and Supplementing Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service which was adopted by the Seimas on 27 May 2010; this law amended the aforementioned article and set it out in a new wording.

5.6. Article 22 (wording of 27 May 2010) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), inter alia, prescribed:

2. The Prosecutor General shall be appointed for a term of five years and dismissed from office by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas. The Prosecutor General may be appointed to the same office for not more than two successive terms.

[...]

5. The powers of the Prosecutor General shall terminate in the following cases:

1) expiry of the term of powers or the Prosecutor General’s attaining the age of 65 years;

2) death of the Prosecutor General;

3) election of the Prosecutor General to another office or his/her transfer to another job subject to his/her consent.

[...]

7. The Prosecutor General and a Deputy Prosecutor General shall be dismissed from office in the following cases:

1) their resignation;

2) their being incapable of discharging their duties for health reasons;

3) loss of the citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania;

4) breach of oath by their conduct;

5) becoming of a court judgment or their conviction effective.”

Thus, Article 22 (wording of 27 May 2010) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), inter alia, prescribed the grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office.

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that neither Article 22 (wording of 27 May 2010) of the Law on the Prosecution Service, nor other articles of this law established such grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office which would be directly related to the accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the Seimas.

5.7. On 10 December 2013, the Seimas adopted the Republic of Lithuania’s Law Amending and Supplementing Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service.

Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), the compliance of Paragraph 6 of which with the Constitution is under investigation in this constitutional justice case, inter alia, prescribed:

2. The Prosecutor General shall be appointed for a term of five years and dismissed from office by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas. The Prosecutor General may be appointed to the same office for not more than two successive terms.

[...]

5. The powers of the Prosecutor General shall terminate in the following cases:

1) expiry of the term of powers or the Prosecutor General’s attaining the age of 65 years;

2) death of the Prosecutor General;

3) election of the Prosecutor General to another office or his/her transfer to another job subject to his/her consent.

6. The Prosecutor General may be dismissed upon the proposal of the Seimas.

<...>

8. The Prosecutor General and a Deputy Prosecutor General shall be dismissed from office in the following cases:

1) their resignation;

2) their being incapable of discharging their duties for health reasons;

3) loss of the citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania;

4) breach of oath by their conduct;

5) becoming of a court judgment or their conviction effective.”

Having compared the legal regulation prescribed in Article 22 (wording of 27 May 2010) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the legal regulation prescribed in Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of this law, it is obvious that the legal regulation was supplemented in the aspect that Paragraph 6 of this article (wording of 10 December 2013) provided a possibility to dismiss the Prosecutor General when the Seimas proposes to do so.

5.8. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is to be interpreted together with Paragraph 8 of this article that establishes, inter alia, the grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office.

It should also be noted that the list of the grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office consolidated in Paragraph 8 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is exhaustive. In addition, having compared the legal regulation prescribed in Article 22 (wording of 27 May 2010) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the legal regulation prescribed in Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of this law, it is obvious that the list of the grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office has not been supplemented by any new grounds.

Consequently, the powers of the Seimas to propose to dismiss the Prosecutor General, which are prescribed in Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), mean that the Seimas may propose to dismiss the Prosecutor General on the grounds consolidated in Paragraph 8 of this article.

5.9. In this context, it should be noted that the travaux préparatoires of the said Law Amending and Supplementing Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service make it clear that the purpose of this law was to regulate such a legal situation when, under the procedure prescribed in the Statute of the Seimas, the Seimas does not approve the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General to the Seimas.

Thus, the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) should be interpreted also in conjunction with the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998).

As mentioned before, under the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), the non-approval of the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas may serve as a ground for the Seimas to consider and adopt a resolution on proposing the President of the Republic to dismiss such a head of a state institution from office, thus, seeking to initiate the procedure for the dismissal of this head of a state institution from office.

Consequently, when interpreted in conjunction with the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 8 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), which, as mentioned before, consolidates the exhaustive list of the grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office, and with the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas, the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 6 (“The Prosecutor General may be dismissed upon the proposal of the Seimas”) of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) implies that, as adopted on the grounds of the resolution of the Seimas on refusing to approve the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General (appointed to the office upon the assent of the Seimas), the resolution of the Seimas on proposing the President of the Republic to dismiss such a Prosecutor General from office is an incentive for the President of the Republic to assess the activity of the Prosecutor General in heading the Prosecution Service and decide on the possibility to dismiss him/her from office upon the assent of the Seimas on the grounds consolidated in Paragraph 8 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003).

6. In the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court, inter alia, investigates the compliance of Article 1 of the Seimas Resolution (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 with the Constitution.

It should be noted that the preamble to this resolution of the Seimas specifies that the Seimas has adopted it after it has considered the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania and in accordance with Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas and Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service.

By the impugned Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013, it was ruled:

In view of the fact that the data and the assessment provided in the 2012 Annual Report are declaratory and do not reflect the real situation when the prosecution institution performs the functions commissioned by the state, not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania”.

Thus, Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013, which was adopted in accordance with the provisions (of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas and Article 4 of the Law on Prosecution Service) the compliance of which with the Constitution is also under investigation in the constitutional justice case at issue, expresses the will of the Seimas not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania, which was submitted to the Seimas, at its will, by the Prosecutor General and considered at the Seimas, namely due to the data, which, according to the Seimas, was provided in a declaratory manner and do not reflect the real situation of the Prosecution Service when it performs the functions commissioned by the state.

It should be mentioned that Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013 does not include the provisions expressing the will of the Seimas regarding the personal activity of the Prosecutor General, who submitted the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania to the Seimas, in heading the Prosecution Service (when the Prosecution Service is performing the functions commissioned to it by the state).

III

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, also the legal regulation on submitting, inter alia, to the Seimas, the information concerning the activity of the institution (official) possessed by the heads (officials) of those institutions prescribed in certain laws defining the legal situation of the corresponding state institutions (officials) should be revealed.

1. First of all, consideration should be given to the legal regulation prescribed in certain laws that consolidates the submission of information (inter alia, in the form of reports) on the activity of an institution (official) possessed by the heads (officials) of state institutions appointed by the Seimas, inter alia, to the Seimas.

1.1. For instance, the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Seimas Ombudsmen (wording of 4 November 2004 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “[…] The Seimas Ombudsmen shall be accountable for their activities to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania” (Item 3 of Article 4); “The Seimas Ombudsmen shall every year by the 15th day of March submit to the Seimas an annual report for the preceding calendar year. The report, with the exception of its part pertaining to activities of intelligence institutions, shall be considered at the Seimas […]” (Paragraph 1 of Article 11 (wording of 17 October 2012)); “That part of a report of the Seimas Ombudsmen which pertains to activities of intelligence institutions shall be considered in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Statute of the Seimas at the committee of the Seimas specified by the Statute of the Seimas and the said part of the report of the Seimas Ombudsmen shall not be made available to the public” (Paragraph 2 of Article 11 (wording of 17 October 2012)).

1.2. The Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the State Control (wording of 13 December 2001 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “The State Control shall be a supreme government audit institution, accountable to the Seimas” (Paragraph 1 of Article 3); “The State Control shall annually submit to the Seimas: […] 6) annual report on the performance of the State Control” (Paragraph 3 (wording of 3 December 2013) of Article 9); “Auditor General shall […] 6) present to the Seimas the Annual Report of the State Control […] (Article 10 (wording of 22 December 2005)).

1.3. The Law on the Bank of Lithuania (wording of 13 March 2001 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall twice a year present reports to the Seimas on the implementation of the primary objective of the Bank, the situation of the financial market and the performance of its functions” (Article 52 (wording of 17 November 2011)); “The Bank of Lithuania shall announce its annual report and issue it as a separate publication. The annual report shall provide information on basic tasks regarding monetary policy and their implementation, monetary policy operations, activities while supervising financial market, conducting macro-prudential policy and discharging other functions established by laws, as well as information on the national macroeconomic situation, such as analysis of the developments in the national economy and financial markets, and on the financial position of the Bank and the results of its activities” (Article 51 (wording of 18 August 2014)).

Thus, the Law the on Bank of Lithuania (wording of 13 March 2001 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed different procedure for the submission of information on the activity of the Bank of Lithuania, inter alia, to the Seimas than it is established in Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas.

1.4. The Law on the Central Electoral Commission (with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “The Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission shall: […] 10) present to the Seimas an activity report of the Central Electoral Commission after each election, not later than 120 days after the proclamation of the final election results […]” (Paragraph 1 of Article 13).

1.5. The Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “Each year, by the 15th of March, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson shall submit to the Seimas a report for the preceding calendar year about the activities of the Office of Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson, which is to be considered at the Seimas. This independent report shall cover the activity report of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson, a survey of the situation, conclusions and recommendations. The complete report must be published on the website of the Office of Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson, and, if possible, – made public through the media” (Article 27 (wording of 18 December 2007)).

1.6. The Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Ombudsman for Children (wording of 18 December 2007 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “[…] The Seimas Ombudsman for Children shall be accountable for its activities to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania” (Item 4 of Article 3); “Each year, the Ombudsman for Children shall, by 1 April, submit, in writing, a report on activities of the Ombudsman for Children for the previous calendar year” (Paragraph 1 of Article 10); “The Seimas shall, pursuant to the Statute of the Seimas, adopt a decision concerning the report of the Ombudsman for Children and the activities of this Office” (Paragraph 2 of Article 10); “The complete report on activities of the Ombudsman for Children must be published on the website of the Office of the Ombudsman for Children, and, if possible, – made public through the media” (Paragraph 3 of Article 10).

1.7. The Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Energy (wording of 22 December 2011 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “The following bodies shall, within their respective remit, be in charge of management, regulation, supervision and control of energy activities in the Republic of Lithuania […] 5) the National Control Commission for Prices and Energy (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”)(Paragraph 2 of Article 4); The activities of entities in the energy sector shall be regulated and state supervision thereof shall be exercised by the Commission. The Commission shall be the national regulatory authority provided for in the legal acts of the European Union regulating public relations in the energy sector” (Paragraph 1 of Article 8); “The Commission shall consist of five members. The chair and four members of the Commission shall be appointed and dismissed by the Seimas on the recommendation of the President of the Republic for the term of five years. […]” (Paragraph 3 (wording of 7 November 2013) of Article 8); “After the close of a calendar year, the Commission shall, within four months, prepare a report on its activities for the previous year, publish it on its website and submit to the President of the Republic, the Seimas, and the Government. […]” (Paragraph 13 (wording of 7 November 2013) of Article 8).

2. The consideration should also be given to the legal regulation prescribed in certain laws under which information on the activity of an institution available to the respective heads of state institutions appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas must be submitted (inter alia, in the form of reports), inter alia, to the Seimas.

2.1. For instance, under the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Intelligence (wording of 17 October 2012 with subsequent amendments and supplements), the State Security Department is one of the institutions of Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania (Article 27); the Director of this Department shall be appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas (Item 1 of Paragraph 2 of Article 31).

This law prescribes: “Parliamentary control of intelligence institutions shall be exercised by a Seimas committee specified by the Statute of the Seimas in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Statute of the Seimas” (Paragraph 1 of Article 21); “The head of an intelligence institution shall annually submit a report on activities of the institution directed by him/her in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Statute of the Seimas” (Paragraph 4 of Article 21).

In this context, the related provision of Article 63 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) should be mentioned: The remit of the Committee on National Security and Defence shall be: […] 4) to exercise parliamentary control of national defence […], to present proposals and recommendations on the improvement of […] activities […]”.

Thus, the Law on Intelligence (wording of 17 October 2012 with subsequent amendments and supplements) and Article 63 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) prescribe a different procedure for the submission of information on the activity of State Security Department to the Seimas than the procedure prescribed in Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas.

2.2. The Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Special investigation Service (with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “The Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania […] is a state law enforcement agency functioning on the statutory basis, accountable to the President of the Republic and the Seimas, which detects and investigates corruption related criminal acts, as well as develops and implements corruption prevention measures” (Paragraph 1 of Article 2 (wording of 1 April 2003)); “A candidate to the post of the Director of the Special Investigations Service shall be nominated to the Seimas by the President of the Republic of Lithuania who shall also appoint and dismiss the Director of the Service, upon the assent of the Seimas […]” (Paragraph 1 of Article 11 (wording of 19 May 2011)); “The Special Investigation Service shall […] 7) report in writing, at least twice a year, to the President of the Republic and the Chairman of the Seimas about the results of the Service’s activities and submit its proposals how to make the activities more effective” (Item 7 of Article 8).

3. The consideration should also be given to the legal regulation prescribed in certain laws concerning the submission of information, inter alia, to the Seimas, available to the heads (of state institutions or the institutions they head) appointed by the President of the Republic (without the participation of the Seimas in the appointment procedure) on the activity of the respective institution.

3.1. For instance, the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Competition (wording of 22 March 2012 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “The Competition Council shall be an individual state institution, which is accountable to the Seimas, implementing the state competition policy and supervising compliance with this Law. When performing its statutory functions, the Competition Council shall be free and independent in its decision making” (Paragraph 1 of Article 17); The Competition Council shall consist of the chair and four members. The chair and members of the Competition Council shall be appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania. […] (Paragraph 1 of Article 19); “The chair of the Competition Council shall […] 4) submit annual activity reports of the Competition Council to the Seimas and the Government […]” (Paragraph 1 of Article 20).

3.2. The Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Public Procurement (wording of 22 December 2005 with subsequent amendments and supplements) prescribed the following: “At the end of each calendar year, the Public Procurement Office shall, within 4 months, prepare the annual activity report and submit it to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as shall make it public” (Paragraph 4 of Article 8 (wording of 29 September 2011)); “The Public Procurement Office shall be headed by the Director. The Director of the Public Procurement Office shall be a state official who shall be appointed to office for the period of 4 years and dismissed from office by the President of the Republic upon the proposal of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania. […]” (Paragraph 1 of Article 81 (wording of 29 September 2011)).

4. In summing up the legal regulation prescribed in the specified laws, in the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that law-making carried out by the Lithuanian legislature is characterised by the fact that the laws determining the legal situation of the corresponding state institutions consolidate both the submission, (inter alia, to the Seimas), of information on the activity of an institution possessed by the heads (officials) of state institutions appointed by the Seimas under a certain procedure (inter alia, upon the proposal of the President of the Republic), as well as of the information possessed by the heads of state institutions appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas or without such an assent.

Such a legal regulation concerning the submission of information to the Seimas is not even. For instance, the specified laws provide various forms (report, notification, information) for submission of data on the activity of institutions possessed by the heads (officials) of state institutions, regularity (annually, twice a years (not less than twice a year), etc.), deadlines (until 15 March, until 1 April, within four months after the close of a calendar year), the subject receiving this information (the Seimas, a committee of the Seimas, the Chairperson of the Seimas, etc.), and the object or nature of information (activity of an institution, fulfilment of the main objective and implementation of functions, results of activity, proposals, etc.).

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that a few laws from those specified explicitly establish that the information (report) is submitted to the Seimas (or the submitted report is considered, analysed at the Seimas) under the procedure prescribed in the Statute of the Seimas.

It should also be noted that one of the specified laws—the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men expressis verbis specifies the requirements of the contents (structure) of the information (in the form of a report) to be submitted to the Seimas: a report of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson must cover “the activity report, a survey of the situation, conclusions and recommendations”. Other specified laws do not include explicit formulation of the same or similar requirements.

It should be emphasised that one of the specified laws—the Law on the Ombudsman for Children (wording of 18 December 2007 with subsequent amendments and supplements) expressis verbis establishes that the Seimas must adopt a decision concerning the received report (and the activity of this institution). As mentioned before, Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of this law prescribes that the Seimas shall, pursuant to the Statute of the Seimas, adopt a decision concerning the report of the Ombudsman for Children and the activities of this Office. Other aforementioned laws do not include the same or similar provision, whereby it would be explicitly required to express the opinion of the Seimas concerning the received report by means of a resolution of the Seimas.

5. In this context, it should be noted that the regulation concerning the submission of information on the activity of an institution possessed by the corresponding heads (officials) of state institutions to the Seimas, which is consolidated in the provisions of the specified laws, is not a matter of investigation in the constitutional justice case at issue.

IV

1. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, the examples of application in practice of the provision “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), as well as of Paragraph 6 of this article, should be noted.

2. It should be noted that under the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), the annual activity reports of institutions shall be submitted to the Seimas both by the heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas, as well as by the heads of state institutions whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas.

3. First of all, certain examples of application of the provision “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) should be noted, when the Seimas would adopt resolutions upon consideration of annual activity reports of the state institutions whose heads are appointed by the Seimas.

3.1. For instance, under Articles 9 and 10 (with subsequent amendments and supplements) of the Law on the State Control (wording of 13 December 2001), the Auditor General shall submit the Annual Activity Report of the State Control to the Seimas.

By the Seimas Resolution (No. IX-1179) “On the 2001 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 5 November 2002, the Resolution (No. IX-1823) “On the 2002 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 11 November 2003, the Resolution (No. IX-2464) “On the 2003 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 28 September 2004, the Resolution (No. X-221) “On the 2004 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 24 May 2005, the Resolution (No. X-601) “On the 2005 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 9 May 2006, the Resolution (X-1568) “On the 2007 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 3 June 2008, the Resolution (XI-282) “On the 2008 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 9 June 2009, the Resolution (No. XI-1043) “On the 2009 Annual Activity Report of the State Control” of 28 September 2010, and the Resolution (XII-356) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the State Control of the Republic of Lithuania” of 11 June 2013, it was decided to approve the activity reports of the State Control of the corresponding years.

It should be mentioned that these resolutions of the Seimas also included the formulated proposals for the State Control concerning its further activity (inter alia, Article 2 of Seimas resolution No. X-601 of 9 May 2006, Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of resolution No. XII-356 of 11 June 2013), concrete assignments, obligations to it (Article 3 of Seimas resolution No. IX-1179 of 5 November 2002, Article 5 of resolution No. X-1568 of 3 June 2008); in the said resolutions the consideration was given to the shortcomings in the activity of the State Control that were held by the Seimas (inter alia, Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of Seimas resolution No. XII-356 of 11 June 2013), and the proposals related to the activity of the State Control for other state institutions, inter alia, the Government, were set out (inter alia, Article 3 of Seimas resolution No. X-601 of 9 May 2006, Article 2 of resolution No. X-1568 of 3 June 2008, and Article 2 of resolution No. XI-282 of 9 June 2009).

3.2. Pursuant to Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas, by means of Seimas resolutions, also the annual activity reports of other state institutions, the heads of which are appointed by the Seimas, were approved. The said institutions were the Chief Official Ethics Commission (inter alia, the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XI-439) “On the 2008 Annual Activity Report of the Chief Official Ethics Commission” of 13 October 2009 and the Resolution (No. XII-626) “On the 2008 Annual Activity Report of the Chief Official Ethics Commission” of 26 November 2013), the National Commission for Energy Control and Prices of the Republic of Lithuania (the Seimas Resolution (No. XII-529) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the National Commission for Energy Control and Prices ” of 1 October 2013), etc.

4. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, consideration should be given also to the cases of application of the provision “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), when the Seimas would adopt resolutions upon consideration of the annual activity reports of the state institutions the heads of which are appointed upon the assent of the Seimas.

4.1. For instance, the activity reports of the Prosecution Service of corresponding years were approved by the following resolutions: the Resolution of the Seimas (No. IX-909) “On the 2001 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 28 May 2002, the Resolution (No. IX-2219) “On the 2003 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania and the Priorities of Activity for the year 2004” of 4 May 2004, the Resolution (No. X-265) “On the 2004 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania and the Priorities of Activity for the years 2005-2006” of 21 June 2005, the Resolution (X-1053) “On the 2005 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 15 March 2007, the Resolution (No. X-1181) “On the 2006 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 12 June 2007, the Resolution (No. X-1539) “On the 2007 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 13 May 2008, the Resolution (No. XI-245) “On the 2008 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 5 May 2009, and the Resolution (No. XI-890) “On the 2009 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 8 June 2010.

It should be noted that, by means of the aforementioned resolutions, the Seimas also approved the priorities of the activity (priority areas of activity) of the Prosecution Service (inter alia, Article 2 of Seimas resolution No. IX-909 of 28 May 2002, Article 2 of resolution No. IX-2219 of 4 May 2004, Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of resolution No. X-1539 of 13 May 2008, and Article 2 of resolution No. XI-890 of 8 June 2010), formulated the proposals concerning the activity of the Prosecution Service and gave its consideration to certain problematic aspects of its activity (inter alia, Article 3 of Seimas resolution No. IX-909 of 28 May 2002, Article 3 of resolution No. IX-2219 of 4 May 2004, Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of resolution No. X-1539 of 13 May 2008, and Article 2 of resolution No. XI-245 of 5 May 2009), as well as set out the proposals related to the activity of the Prosecution Service and other state institutions, inter alia, the Government (inter alia, Article 4 of Seimas resolution No. IX-909 of 28 May 2002, Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of resolution No. X-1181 of 12 June 2007, and Article 3 of resolution No. XI-890 of 8 June 2010).

4.2. It should be emphasised that, as mentioned before, pursuant to Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas and Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service, by Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013, which is impugned in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Seimas decided not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania.

In this context, it should be noted that by its assignment of 1 October 2013, pursuant to Paragraph 6 (“Having adopted a resolution not to approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas, the Seimas may assign to the committee which has considered the above report to submit a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding a proposal to the President of the Republic to dismiss from office this head of the institution”) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas, on 9 October 2013, the Seimas Committee on Legal Affairs submitted draft No. XIIP-1077 of the Resolution of the Seimas “On a Proposal to the President of the Republic to Dismiss Prosecutor General Dalius Valys from Office” for the registration.

In Article 1 of this draft, it was proposed to the Seimas, after it has not approved the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania and pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas, to decide on proposing the President of the Republic to dismiss Prosecutor General Dalius Valys from office. It should be mentioned that the draft was withdrawn on 16 June 2015.

4.3. It should be noted that the President of the Republic also appoints the Director of the Special Investigations Service upon the assent of the Seimas (Paragraph 1 of Article 11 (with subsequent amendments and supplements) of the Law on the Special Investigation Service).

The activity reports of the corresponding years of this service were considered at the Seimas and they were approved by the following resolutions: the Resolution of the Seimas (No. IX-1335) “On the 2001 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 28 January 2003, the Resolution (No. IX-1573) “On the 2002 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 20 May 2003, the Resolution (X-267) “On the 2004 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 21 June 2005, the Resolution (No. 703) “On the 2005 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 20 June 2006, the Resolution (X-1632) “On the 2007 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 19 June 2008, the Resolution (No. XI-298) “On the 2008 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 16 June 2009, the Resolution (No. XI-889) “On the 2009 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 8 June 2010, and the Resolution (No. XII-357) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 11 June 2013.

These resolutions of the Seimas also formulated the proposals for the Special Investigation Service (inter alia, Article 3 of Seimas resolution No. IX-1335 of 28 January 2003, Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of resolution No. X-267 of 21 June 2005, and Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of resolution No. XII-357 of 11 June 2013) concerning its activity, as well as for other state institutions, inter alia, the Government and the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania (inter alia, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 4 of Seimas resolution No. IX-1573 of 20 May 2003, Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of resolution No. X-1632 of 19 June 2008, and Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of resolution No. XII-357 of 11 June 2013); in these resolutions, certain aspects of the activity of the Special Investigation Service were assessed positively (inter alia, Article 2 of Seimas resolution No. IX-1573 of 20 May 2003) or negatively (inter alia, Article 3 of Seimas resolution No. IX-1573 of 20 May 2003 and Article 3 of resolution No. X-703 of 20 June 2006), as well as other facts significant for its activity and for the assessment of its activity were held (Article 2 of Seimas resolution No. XI-889 of 8 June 2010 and Article 2 of resolution No. XII-357 of 11 June 2013).

It should be mentioned that the Resolution of the Seimas (No. X-1230) “On the 2006 Annual Activity Report of the Special Investigation Service” of 27 June 2007 confined only to the assessment of the activity of this service and the proposals to this and other state institutions, however, it did not contain any decision whether or not to approve the report.

5. To sum up, it should be noted that although the concrete content (its possible versions) of the resolution of the Seimas regarding the annual report of the institution submitted by the head of an institution and the activity of an institution provided in the provision “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution and the activity of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) was not revealed, the practice of application of this provision makes it clear that, by its resolution regarding the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of that state institution and the activity of an institution, the Seimas, inter alia, would decide on approving or not approving the report, as well as the Seimas would adopt a resolution, inter alia, on approving or not approving the annual activity reports of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General. By a resolution regarding the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of that institution and the activity of an institution, in certain cases, the Seimas would express its opinion also concerning other aspects of activity of the corresponding institution, inter alia, by submitting proposals on such an activity.

V

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that the obligation for certain state institutions (heads thereof) or state officials to submit reports and the information concerning the activity of these institutions and their officials to the parliament is consolidated also in the law of foreign states, such as Germany, Latvia, and Poland.

1. First, the legal regulation prescribed in the legal acts of Poland, whereby the said obligation is consolidated on the constitutional, as well as on the ordinary level, should be revealed.

1.1. It should be noted that under Paragraph 1 of Article 205, Paragraph 1 of Article 209, and Paragraph 3 of Article 227 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and under Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Standing Orders of the Sejm, the President of the Supreme Chamber of Control, the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights and the President of the National Bank of Poland is appointed by the Sejm. Under Paragraph 1 of Article 29 of the Standing Orders of the Sejm, the Sejm also appoints the Ombudsman for Children.

Paragraph 2 of Article 204 of the Constitution prescribes that the Supreme Chamber of Control presents an annual report on its activities to the Sejm. Under Paragraph 4 of Article 126 of the Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, the annual activity report of the Supreme Audit Office submitted by its President, is considered by the Sejm.

Article 212 of the Constitution consolidates that the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights annually informs the Sejm and the Senate about his/her activities and reports on the degree of respect accorded to the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens. Under Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 124 of the Standing Orders of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, the Sejm takes cognizance of the said annual information provided by the Human Rights Defender.

Under Items 5 and 6 of Paragraph 1 of Article 124 of these standing orders, the Sejm also takes cognizance of annual information from the Ombudsman for Children about his/her activity and also of comments on the situation with the respect accorded to the rights of the child and annual report submitted by the President of the National Bank of Poland on its activity.

It should be noted that, under Paragraph 3 of Article 124 and Paragraph 5 of Article 126 of the Standing Orders of the Sejm, taking cognizance by the Sejm of the previously referred information and reports occur not later than within 3 months following the day of their delivery to the Deputies.

1.2. In the context of this case, also the legal regulation linked to the accountability of the Prosecutor General established in the Polish legal acts should be mentioned.

In this context, it should be noted that although the Public Prosecutor General is mentioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Article 191), his/her guarantees of independence and the procedure of his/her appointments and dismissal are not regulated.

Under Article 10e of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Poland, the Prosecutor General submits the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service to the Council of Ministers not later than by the end of the first quarter of the following year; the Minister of Justice presents his/her opinion on the report of the Prosecutor General in writing; the President of the Council of Ministers approves the said report or rejects it having regard to the fact, how the tasks are fulfilled in the sphere of supervision of law enforcement and criminal investigation; after he/she has rejected the report of the Prosecutor General, the President of the Council of Ministers may address the Sejm with the proposal to dismiss the Prosecutor General prior to the expiry of his/her term of office; the Sejm dismisses the Prosecutor General by its resolution adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies.

It should also be noted that under the aforementioned article of the Law on the Prosecution Service, irrespective of the annual report, the President of the Council of Ministers may require the Prosecutor general to provide with the information on a certain topic related to the supervision of law enforcement and criminal investigation; no information may be required on the stage of the procedure in a concrete case; the President of the Council of Ministers may require that the Prosecutor General supplement the provided information within three months.

2. Article 51 (wording of 15 May 2008) of the Rules of Procedure of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia provides the duty of the Ombudsman to submit the annual report in writing on the work of the Ombudsman’s Office and Article 54 (wording of 16 October 2014) of these rules—the duty of the Auditor General to submit to the Saeima a written annual report on the functioning of the State Audit Office. It should be noted that the said articles also provide that these reports are considered at the Saeima and establish the terms for the consideration of the received reports.

In this context, it should be mentioned that both the Ombudsman (Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Ombudsman Law of the Republic of Latvia) and the Auditor General (Paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Law on the State Audit Office of the Republic of Latvia) are appointed by the Saeima. It should also be mentioned that under Paragraph 1 of Section 15 of the Ombudsman Law, the Ombudsman once a year provides the Saeima, as well as the State President with a written report regarding the activities of the Ombudsman’s Office.

3. Also certain laws of the Federal Republic of Germany providing the submission of activity reports of the state institutions should be mentioned.

Article 53 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (wording of 26 June 2013) prescribes that every two years, the Bundeskartellamt publishes a report on its activities and on the situation and development in its field of responsibilities; the report must include the administrative principles of this institution; the Federal Government, without delay, submits the report of the Bundeskartellamt to the Bundestag.

Section 26 of the Federal Data Protection Act (wording of 14 January 2003) prescribes that the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information submits an activity report to the German Bundestag every two years; the report must inform the German Bundestag and the public about important developments in the field of data protection; at the request of the German Bundestag or the Federal Government, the Federal Commissioner must draft expert opinions and provide reports; at the request of the German Bundestag, the Petitions Committee, the Bundestag’s Committee on Internal Affairs or the Federal Government, the Federal Commissioner also investigates data protection matters and provides with explanations.

Section 121 of the Telecommunications Act (wording of 22 June 2004) prescribes that the Regulatory Authority submits to the federal legislative bodies along with the general report on its activities and on the situation in and development of the telecommunications sector.

Section 2 of the Law on the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (wording of 5 February 2009) prescribed that the Commissioner submits to the Bundestag a written overall report for the calendar year (Annual Report); he may, at any time, submit individual reports to the Bundestag or the Defence Committee.

It should also be mentioned that under Paragraph 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag, the Petitions Committee submits to the Bundestag an annual written report on its work.

4. In summing up the discussed legal regulation established in the German, Latvian, and Polish legal acts, it should be noted that the constitutional or ordinary law of these foreign states establish the obligation for certain state institutions (heads thereof) or state officials to submit reports and information to the parliament about the activity of these institutions and their officials; in the specified cases, with the exception of the legal regulation on the reports submitted by the Prosecutor General of Poland, familiarisation with information is not directly related to approval or non-approval of the submitted reports (information), as well as to the dismissal of the heads (officials) of state institutions from office. It should also be noted that under the specified legal regulation of the foreign states, the duty of the parliament to familiarise with the information and to consider reports is related to certain terms for implementing this action.

It should also be noted that the legal regulation established in the Polish legal acts consolidates the powers of the President of the Council of Ministers, to whom the Prosecutor General submits the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service, to approve it or to reject it; it also consolidates the right of the President of the Council of Ministers, upon the rejection of the report, to initiate the dismissal of the Prosecutor General at the Sejm. It should also be emphasised that the guarantees of independence of the Polish Prosecutor General, as well as the procedure of his/her appointment and dismissal, are consolidated not at the constitutional level, but at the legal level, which makes an essential difference between the legal regulation prescribed in the Polish legal acts and the one established in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

Thus, the submission of reports of the heads of state institutions to the parliament (as well as the method of their accountability and submission of information to the Representation of the Nation) is not a novel in the Lithuanian legal system in general.

VI

1. In the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court investigates, inter alia, the compliance of the provisions of the Statute of the Seimas linked to the duty of the heads of state institutions to submit annual activity reports of an institution to the Seimas with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. The Constitutional Court has held on more than one occasion that the principle of the separation of powers is consolidated in Article 5 of the Constitution (as well as in other articles of the Constitution establishing the powers of state institutions exercising state power) (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 26 February 2010, 13 May 2010, and 3 April 2015).

2.1. The constitutional principle of the separation of powers means that that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers must be separated and must be sufficiently independent but there must also be a balance among them (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 14 January 2002, 13 May 2010, and 26 May 2015). The model of reciprocity among state powers consolidated in the Constitution is also described by the reciprocal control and balance of state powers (institutions thereof), which does not allow for one state power to dominate in respect of the other (others), and by their cooperation, of course, without overstepping the limits established by the Constitution—without interfering in the implementation of powers of other state power (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 9 May 2006 and 13 May 2010).

In this context, it should be noted that, under the Constitution, a court, which is investigating a case, is the judicial power—one of the branches of state power (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 16 January 2006); the activity of courts, as noted in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 21 December 1999, is not and may not be the sphere of management attributed to any institution of the executive power.

2.2. In its ruling of 13 December 2004, the Constitutional Court noted that other state institutions that are not attributed to the legislative, the executive, or the judicial powers under Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution, are specified in the Constitution as well. For instance, under the Constitution, such institutions and/or officials are the Seimas Ombudsmen (Paragraph 1 of Article 73, the Office of the Prosecutor General and territorial prosecutor’s offices (Article 118), the National Audit Office (Chapter XII), the Bank of Lithuania (Articles 125 and 126), the Security Service (Item 14 of Article 84), the Commander of the Armed Forces (Item 14 of Article 84 and Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 140), and the Central Electoral Commission (Item 13 of Article 67).

2.3. The constitutional principle of the separation of powers is not identical to the constitutional principle of the accountability of executive bodies to the representation. The separation of powers in the Constitution also implies the accountability of the Government, a collegial institution of the executive, to the legislative power, the representation of the Nation (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 24 December 2002).

2.4. The Constitutional Court has held that if the legal regulation is established whereby the powers of the state institution specified in Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution or those of any other state institution are broadened in a constitutionally unreasonable manner, it should be held that the provision of Paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the Constitution that the scope of power shall be limited by the Constitution, is violated (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 24 December 2002 and 23 August 2005).

3. Under Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution, state power in Lithuania is executed, inter alia, by the Seimas. The Constitutional Court has held the following on more than one occasion: the constitutional nature of the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, determines its special place in the system of the institutions of the branches of state power, its functions, and its powers necessary to perform these functions; while implementing its constitutional powers, the Seimas performs the classical functions of the parliament of a democratic state under the rule of law: it passes laws (the legislative function), carries out the parliamentary control over executive and other state institutions (save courts) (the control function), establishes state institutions, appoints and dismisses their heads and other state officials (the founding function), approves the state budget and supervises its execution (the budgetary function), etc. (inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2004 and 4 April 2006 and its conclusion of 3 June 2014).

3.1. The Constitutional Court has also noted that the Constitution consolidates the parliamentary democracy; however, parliamentary democracy is not a system where the parliament directly organises the work of other state or municipal institutions or may, at any time, interfere with the activities of any state or municipal institutions (their officials), which implement public power; nor is parliamentary democracy a system where the parliament may, at the slightest pretext, exert control over any decisions of the said institutions (their officials) or initiate the application of sanctions against certain persons. The model of parliamentary democracy consolidated in the Constitution is rational and moderate; it is not exclusively based upon the control exercised by the parliament or upon inter-institutional checks and balances; in parliamentary democracy, inter-functional partnership, which is based upon, inter alia, trust, plays a role of no less importance. A different interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution that consolidate the control function performed by the Seimas would unavoidably deny the constitutional principles of responsible governance, the separation of powers, a state under the rule of law, and those of democracy, as well as the striving for an open, harmonious, and just civil society, which is proclaimed in the Preamble to the Constitution, and it would create preconditions for instability in the governance of the state and in the management of public affairs, as well as preconditions for the violation of the rights and freedoms as well as the legitimate interests and legitimate expectations or the person and other values consolidated in and defended and protected by the Constitution (the Constitutional Court’s decisions of 21 November 2006 and 16 January 2014).

3.2. The constitutional powers of the Seimas are consolidated in Article 67 of the Constitution. This article, as it is stated in the arguments of the petitioner, also prescribes that the Seimas establishes the state institutions provided for by a law, as well as appoints and releases their heads (Item 5) and supervises the activities of the Government (Item 9).

When interpreting Item 5 of Article 67 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held that the Seimas has the powers to provide for the state institutions in the law, the heads of which are appointed and dismissed by the Seimas itself, also, that the Seimas enjoys the powers to appoint and dismiss the heads of such institutions. Under Item 5 of Article 67 of the Constitution, the Seimas may dismiss the heads of the state institutions which are provided for in laws only on the grounds of dismissal established in the Constitution and/or laws and following the dismissal procedure established in the Constitution and/or laws. While dismissing the heads of the state institutions provided for in the laws, whom it appointed itself, the Seimas must base itself on the grounds established in laws and follow the procedure established in laws, which are not in conflict with the Constitution. Otherwise, Item 5 of Article 67 of the Constitution would be violated (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 24 January 2003).

3.3. As the Constitutional Court has noted, the list of the constitutional powers of the Seimas consolidated in Article 67 of the Seimas is not final—more powers of the Seimas are established in different articles (paragraphs thereof) of the Constitution (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 and its conclusion of 3 June 2014). For instance, according to Article 75 of the Constitution, officials appointed or elected by the Seimas, with the exception of the persons specified in Article 74 of the Constitution, are dismissed from office when the Seimas expresses no confidence in them by majority vote of all members of the Seimas.

The Constitutional Court has held that Article 75 of the Constitution consolidates the right of the Seimas to dismiss from office those officials who have been appointed or elected by the Seimas, with the exception of the persons specified in Article 74 of the Constitution; this is done by following a special parliamentary procedure entailing the submission of a motion of no confidence; no confidence is expressed by a majority vote of all the members of the Seimas; the institute of an expression of no confidence is not only one of the means of the parliamentary control carried out by the Seimas but also an important guarantee of the activity of the officials appointed or elected by the Seimas, since such officials, provided there are no grounds due to which they may not hold office on the whole, may be dismissed from office prior to the expiry of the term of their powers in the cases where more than half of all the members of the Seimas vote in favour of no confidence; a motion of no confidence is a ground for the dismissal of an official appointed or elected by the Seimas from office, which must be linked to the assessment of the activity of the official concerned; therefore, the regulation of the procedure for the parliamentary expression of no confidence must be such that would ensure a proper legal process, which, inter alia, means that officials against whom no confidence is expressed should have a real opportunity to present to the Seimas their explanations and to counter, at the sitting of the Seimas, all the arguments upon which the no confidence is grounded (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 24 January 2003 and 20 February 2013 and its decision of 16 January 2014).

3.4. In this context, also the provisions of the official constitutional doctrine regarding the dismissal of the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, inter alia, upon expressing no confidence in him/her are to be noted. In the said Constitutional Court’s ruling, it has been held that:

the provisions of Item 11 of Article 67 and Item 13 of Article 84 of the Constitution presuppose the procedure of the appointment and dismissal of the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania according to which the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania is appointed and dismissed by the Seimas on the proposal of the President of the Republic; – having regard to Article 1 of the Constitutional Act “On Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union” on the basis of which the Republic of Lithuania participates, inter alia, in the economic and monetary union, shares with or confers on the European Union the competences of its state institutions, inter alia, in the area of economic and monetary policy, it should be noted that the constitutional status of the Bank of Lithuania is to be defined as the status of the central bank of the Republic of Lithuania whose competence is partly conferred on the European Central Bank and which is an integral part of the European System of Central Banks; having regard to such a constitutional status of the Bank of Lithuania and the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, the powers of the President of the Republic established in Item 13 of Article 84 of the Constitution to propose to the Seimas to express no confidence in the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania should only be related to the possibility of expressing no confidence in the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania under such circumstances the nature of which prevent the Chairperson of the Board from performing his or her duties in general;

according to the Constitution, the legislature, when regulating the activities of the Bank of Lithuania, inter alia, defining the grounds and procedure for the dismissal of the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, must regard the constitutional status and the respective independence guarantees of the Bank of Lithuania, as of the integral part of the European System of Central Banks; it, inter alia, means that it is not possible to establish such a legal regulation, whereby the preconditions would be created for the legislative or the executive powers to exert influence on the Bank of Lithuania, inter alia, an obligation would be created for the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania to submit reports on the performance of his or her functions subject to the approval by the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Government; it should be noted that the constitutional provision that state institutions serve the people implies the obligation of the legislature to establish the legal regulation to the effect that the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania would have an obligation to inform the public, the Seimas, the President of the Republic, and the Government about the activities of the Bank of Lithuania; it is also not possible to prescribe such a legal regulation that would established such grounds for the dismissal of the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania before the expiration of the term of his or her powers established by law, which would not be related to the non-fulfilment of the law-established conditions required for the performance of his or her duties or to the fact that he or she has been guilty of serious misconduct.

3.5. It should be noted that under the Constitution, only the Seimas has the right to express no confidence in the officials appointed or elected by itself by, at the same time, dismissing them. Under the Constitution, such a right of expressing no confidence in the officials appointed by himself/herself that would determine their dismissal from office is not possessed by the President of the Republic.

3.6. The Constitutional Court has also noted that, under the Constitution, the powers of the Seimas may be established and are established not only in the Constitution but also in laws. In some cases, the fact that certain powers of the Seimas consolidated in the Constitution may be specified in laws in a more concrete manner is directly indicated in the Constitution; the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, has the right to establish, by laws, also such of its powers that are not expressis verbis indicated in the Constitution, which, however, are designed for the implementation of the constitutional functions of the Seimas; and when implementing its right directly established in the Constitution to particularise its certain constitutional powers by means of laws, as well as establishing, by means of laws, its powers that are not expressis verbis indicated in the Constitution, the Seimas is bound by the Constitution (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2004 and 4 June 2006), thus, also by the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

4. The Constitutional Court has also noted that legal certainty and legal clarity are among the essential elements of the principle of a state under the rule of law, which is consolidated in the Constitution; the imperative of legal certainty and legal clarity implies that any legal regulation must meet certain additional obligatory requirements: it must be clear and harmonious, legal norms must be formulated precisely, they may not contain ambiguities; the legislator, while regulating relations related with appointment and dismissal from office of persons, inter alia, state officials, must establish clear and harmonious legal regulation so that it would not be interpreted in a varied manner (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2010 and 20 February 2013).

The Constitutional Court has also noted that, in a democratic state under the rule of law, officials and institutions must follow law in their activities; carrying out the functions that are important to society and the state, state institutions and officials must not face any threat if they fulfil their duties without violations of laws. The constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law requires that jurisdictional and other institutions which apply law be impartial and independent, that they seek to establish the objective truth and that they adopt their decisions only on the grounds of law (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 11 May 1999 and 24 January 2003 and its decision of 16 January 2014). Where state officials perform their functions while observing the Constitution and law and acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, they must be protected against any pressure and unjustified interference with their activities, and, where they conscientiously perform their duties, they must not be subject to any threats directed against their person, rights, or freedoms (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 25 May 2004, 1 July 2004, and 13 December 2004).

The Constitutional Court has also held that, in the area of the legal regulation of the activities of state institutions and officials, the principles of a state under the rule of law are implemented, among other things, by combining trust in state officials with the public control of their activities and with their responsibility to the public; the legal system must provide for the possibility of removing from office those state officials who violate laws, who raise personal or group interests above the interests of society, or who discredit state authority by their actions; the responsibility of the authorities to society is a principle of a state under the rule of law, which is established in the Constitution, by providing that state institutions serve the people, while citizens have the right to govern the country either directly or through democratically elected representatives, to criticise the work of state institutions or that of their officials, and to lodge complaints against their decisions (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 11 May 1999).

5. The Constitutional Court has also noted that legal acts must provide for such a structure of the Seimas and procedure for its work, define such relations of the Seimas with other state institutions, and consolidate such a legal status of a member of the Seimas that would enable the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, to perform its constitutional functions and would make it possible for the members of the Seimas, as the representatives of the Nation, while they are in office and follow the Constitution, the interests of the state, and their own consciences, to execute their constitutional powers in an uninterrupted manner without being restricted by any mandates; in the course of making laws and performing other functions, the Seimas, as well as any member of the Seimas, is bound by the Constitution, constitutional laws, and laws, in addition to the Statute of the Seimas, which has the power of law (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006);

As the Constitutional Court has held, in order that it might properly discharge its parliamentary functions and implement its constitutional powers, the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, must have exhaustive and objective information about the processes taking place in the state and society, as well as about the situation in various areas of the life of the state and society and problems arising therein; the availability of such information is a necessary precondition for the effective activity of the Seimas in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, as well as for the proper fulfilment of its constitutional duty (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2004 and 4 April 2006). Under the Constitution, the Seimas is obliged to establish such a legal regulation that would create legal preconditions for receiving the information necessary to perform its constitutional powers (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006).

6. The Constitution, inter alia, Item 18 of Article 84 thereof, which consolidates that the President of the Republic makes annual reports at the Seimas, inter alia, on the situation in Lithuania, Paragraph 1 of Article 101 thereof providing that at the request of the Seimas, the Government or individual Ministers must give an account of their activities to the Seimas, and Paragraph 2 of Article 134 thereof, under which the Auditor General submits a conclusion to the Seimas concerning the report on the annual execution of the budget, implies that the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, is provided with different information about the life of the state and society, as well as the activity of various state institutions. The receipt of such information is linked with the striving for an open society, consolidated in the Preamble to the Constitution, also with the principle, laid down in Article 1 of the Constitution, that the State of Lithuania is a republic, as well as with the principles of parliamentary democracy established in various provisions of the Constitution.

7. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that the constitutional separation and interaction of the state powers and their interaction, as well as the function of parliamentary control and budgetary function implemented by the Seimas, imply the possibilities of the legislature to regulate the information, inter alia, the annual activity report of an institution, which is submitted to the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, for having access to and considering the information submitted in proper ways and under the corresponding procedure not only by the heads of the Government and other executive authorities, but also by the heads of those institutions which, under Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution, are not classified as either the executive or the legislative powers. When doing that, the legislature is bound by the Constitution. The principle of the separation of powers, as consolidated in Article 5 (Paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof) and other articles of the Constitution, and the functions of the Seimas, as reflected in the whole of the powers conferred on the Seimas under Article 67, do not imply, inter alia, with regard to information and, thus, also activity reports, to be submitted by state institutions to the Seimas, any such a legal regulation under which, after the head of a state institution submits the appropriate information in the form of a report, the procedure of accounting to the Seimas by the institution (or its head) would be considered not completed until the Seimas has approved the submitted report, i.e. under which it would be required that the Seimas not only becomes acquainted with and considers the information provided in the report, but also adopts a special resolution on approving the submitted report.

As mentioned before, in a democratic state under the rule of law, officials and their institutions must observe laws and follow law in their activities; while carrying out the functions that are important to society and the state, state institutions and officials must not face any threat if they fulfil their duties without violations of laws. It has also been mentioned that, where state officials perform their functions while observing the Constitution and law and acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, they must be protected against any pressure and unjustified interference with their activities, and, where they conscientiously perform their duties, they must not be subject to any threats directed against their person, rights, or freedoms. When interpreting Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution, inter alia, in the context of the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, it should be noted that if the Seimas were vested with the powers to adopt a resolution on giving or not giving its approval to annual activity reports submitted by the heads of state institutions, these heads would be not protected against the possible pressure or unjustified interference with their activities, despite the fact that they would perform their functions in observance of the Constitution and law and while acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania; such a legal regulation would be incompatible with the Constitution, inter alia, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 thereof; and the establishment of such a legal regulation would unreasonably expand the constitutional powers of the Seimas.

8. It should also be emphasised that under Article 76 of the Constitution, the structure and procedure of the activities of the Seimas is determined by the Statute of the Seimas, which has the power of a law.

In its ruling of 13 May 2004, the Constitutional Court held that it is impossible to interpret the provision “the structure and procedure of activities of the Seimas shall be established by the Statute of the Seimas” of Article 76 of the Constitution only linguistically, i.e. as meaning that the powers of the structural subunits of the Seimas may be established only in the Statute of the Seimas; for instance, in order that it could properly discharge its constitutional functions, the Seimas may require to form also such structural subunits, which would enjoy powers with regard to various state and municipal institutions, their officials, and other persons; such powers may also be related with reception of information from state or municipal institutions, their officials and other persons about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various spheres of life of the state and society and the arising problems; reception of this information cannot be dependent upon the fact whether or not corresponding institutions and other persons are accountable to the Seimas: in order to receive exhaustive and objective information necessary to adopt corresponding decisions, the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, has to have an opportunity to receive information not only from institutions, other persons that are accountable to it, but also from the persons that are not accountable to it; where it is necessary to establish authoritative empowerments of a structural subunit of the Seimas in regard of institutions, their officials and other persons that are not accountable to the Seimas (including the right to demand the information the submission whereof is regulated by law), then such powers of the structural subunit of the Seimas must be established by means of a law; when such powers are being established, the norms and principles of the Constitution must be regarded.

Thus, it is impossible to interpret Article 76 of the Constitution only linguistically, i.e. as meaning that it is enough that only the Statute of the Seimas consolidates the powers of Seimas or its structural subunits (inter alia, committees) that are significant to its work to receive regularly or upon request the information from the state institutions (with the exception of courts), inter alia, the state officials appointed by the Seimas or the President of the Republic or their headed institutions, concerning their activity, inter alia, in the form of a report, as well as establishes (explicitly or partially implicitly) the obligations for these officials or the institutions headed by them to provide the information, inter alia, in the form of a report, to the Seimas on a regular basis or upon request. Such powers and obligations of the Seimas, inter alia, related to the form of reports, their submission and receipt, are applicable to the officials who, according to their functions or the functions fulfilled by the institutions they head and thus having the guarantees of independence, must be independent, should be established not only in the Statute of the Seimas, but also by the law consolidating the legal situation of the corresponding state institution.

9. In the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court also investigates the compliance of the provisions of the Law on the Prosecution Service regulating the accountability and dismissal of the Prosecutor General with Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

9.1. Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution provides that, while discharging their functions, prosecutors are independent and obey only the law.

Thus, as it was noted in the Constitutional Court’s decision of 16 January 2014, “Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution expressis verbis consolidates the principle of the independence of prosecutors. Under the Constitution, prosecutors, when performing their functions, are independent and obey only the law. Consequently, prosecutors, while performing their functions, act independently, and the institutions of the legislative and executive power, inter alia, the Seimas and the President of the Republic, who participate in the process of appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, may not interfere with the performance of the functions of prosecutors, give prosecutors any obligatory instructions as to the performance of their functions, or control the work of prosecutors while they are performing their functions”.

9.2. It should also be noted that, as held in the Constitutional Court’s decision of 16 January 2014 and in its ruling of 6 December 1995, while interpreting the provisions of Article 118 (wording of 25 October 1992) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held that, under the Constitution, the prosecutors were a constituent part of the judiciary, therefore, the principles defining the independence of courts were equally applicable to them, but only with due consideration of the approach specified in the Constitution; the principal functions of prosecutors and interrogators were prescribed in Chapter IX “The Court” of the Constitution, where prosecutors and interrogators were treated as a constituent part of the judiciary; thus, the guarantees of the independence of the judiciary established by law applied to them when they were conducting legal proceedings; prosecutors or interrogators were independent, and they acted independently in upholding public charges, carrying out criminal prosecution, controlling the activities of the interrogative bodies, and conducting preliminary interrogations; while making decisions in the said cases, prosecutors or interrogators obeyed only the law, and there could be no interference with their activities.

However, as it was specified in the Constitutional Court’s decision of 16 January 2014 and in its ruling of 13 May 2004, while interpreting the provisions of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court pointed out that, upon the entry into force of the Law on Altering Article 118 of the Constitution, Article 118 of the Constitution provides for an essentially different constitutional institute of the prosecutor if compared to the one previously valid: it has consolidated the constitutional status of prosecutors that is different from the one previously established; it has consolidated an institution—the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania—that was not identified in the Constitution previously; it has established the system of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania, composed of the Office of the Prosecutor General and territorial prosecutor’s offices; it has consolidated the office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Lithuania, the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of this official, etc.; it is no longer permitted to invoke the constitutional doctrinal provision, as consolidated in Article 118 of the Constitution in its previous wording, that prosecutors must be regarded as a constituent part of the judicial power.

9.3. Therefore, the principle of independence of the prosecutor in performing his/her functions, which is consolidated in Paragraph 3 (wording of 20 March 2003) of Article 118 of the Constitution, is not identical with the principle of independence of a judge and court in administering justice, which is consolidated in Paragraph 2 of Article 109 of the Constitution.

9.4. In this context, it should be noted that in the aforementioned Constitutional Court’s decision of 16 January 2014, the Constitutional Court interpreted, inter alia, the provisions of the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 24 January 2003 and 13 May 2004, inter alia, in the aspect of the accounting of the Prosecutor General to the institutions of the state power significant in the constitutional justice case at issue.

In the said Constitutional Court’s decision, it is noted that directing the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania as well as organising its activity is a constitutional function of the Prosecutor General.

It should be emphasised that in its decision of 16 January 2014, the Constitutional Court, inter alia, interpreted that the provisions “To discharge their functions properly, prosecutors must have sufficient independence guarantees, which must be provided for in the law. The legislative or executive powers as well as their officials, have no right to interfere with the activities of prosecutors when they discharge their functions established in the Constitution” of the second paragraph of Item 4 of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 24 January 2003, as well as the provisions “the independence of prosecutors in organising pre-trial investigation and being in charge of it as well as in upholding charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases is a constitutional value; under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any such a legal regulation whereby this constitutional value would be denied or the independence of prosecutors would otherwise be restricted when they organise pre-trial investigation and direct it and when they uphold charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases” of the sixth paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 and of the third paragraph of Item 15.3 of Section I of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 16 January 2006, inter alia, may be interpreted as meaning that it is not permitted to establish that the Prosecutor General is under a duty to account for the implementation of their constitutional functions to the legislative and executive powers, inter alia, that the Prosecutor General would be obliged to submit such reports on the activity of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania that should be approved by the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Government, since the establishment of such a duty would mean interference with the activities of prosecutors, who perform the functions provided for in the Constitution, as well as that, once the said duty were established, the independence of prosecutors in performing their functions provided for in the Constitution would be restricted.

It should also be emphasised that, as it was held in the Constitutional Court’s decision of 16 January 2014, the principle of the balance of the values consolidated in the Constitution and the duty of the legislature to reconcile different interests, as well as to ensure the balance of constitutional values, oblige the legislature to align the constitutional provision that state institutions serve the people with the constitutional principle of the independence of prosecutors. The alignment of these constitutional values would be ensured if the Prosecutor General were obliged by a law to submit to society, as well as the Seimas and the President of the Republic, who participate in the process of the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General, information (public reports) about the implementation of the priorities of the penal policy, the defence of the public interest, the organisation of the work of the Prosecution Service, the directions of the activity of the Prosecution Service, the organisation of cooperation between the Lithuanian and foreign establishments of pre-trial investigation or other institutions, time limits for the investigation of criminal acts, certain problems arising in the course of the work of the Prosecution Service, etc.

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be noted that such information (public reports) may be submitted, inter alia, in the form of an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service.

Consequently, under the Constitution, when implementing the possibility implied by the Constitution to regulate, by means of a law, the regular obtaining of information from a state institution (except for the courts), inter alia, in the form of reports, which is significant for the implementation of its functions, the Seimas may establish that the Prosecutor General regularly, under the general procedure, submits the information on the activity of the Prosecution Service, inter alia, the annual activity report, to the Seimas; however, it may not establish such a legal regulation, under which the Prosecutor General would be obliged to provide the Seimas or the President of the Republic with the information not on the summarised aspects of the Prosecution Service as a whole, but namely on the fact how the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General and the territorial prosecutor’s offices implement their constitutional functions.

9.5. Paragraph 5 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution prescribes that the Prosecutor General is appointed and released by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas, whereas Paragraph 6 thereof—that the procedure for the appointment and release of prosecutors, as well as their status, is established by law. In addition, Article 84 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that the President of the Republic “shall, upon the assent of the Seimas, appoint and release the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Lithuania” (Item 11 (wording of 20 March 2003)).

The Constitutional Court has held that the legislature, while implementing its constitutional powers to establish the entities who appoint and dismiss prosecutors, also to establish the length of the term of the powers of prosecutors, the procedure for their appointment and dismissal, and the grounds for their dismissal, is bound by the Constitution, thus, also by the principle of a state under the rule of law entrenched therein, which implies legal certainty, stability, and the protection of legitimate expectations; after having established the term of the powers of the Prosecutor General, the legislature does not have the right to provide for any grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office before the expiry of the term of the powers of the Prosecutor General; under the Constitution, the legislature may establish only such grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office before the expiry of his or her powers due to which the Prosecutor General may not hold office on the whole (e.g., due to such legal facts as the age provided for in the law, transference to another place of work, or the loss of the citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania)(the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 24 January 2003).

9.6. It should be noted that in the aforementioned Constitutional Court’s decision of 16 January 2014, the Constitutional Court also interpreted the provisions of the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 30 March 2000 and 24 January 2003 linked to the legal regulation of dismissal of prosecutors.

In its decision of 16 January 2014, the Constitutional Court noted the following:

Paragraph 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution stipulates that the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of prosecutors and their status are established by means of a law; consequently, under the Constitution, the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General may be established exclusively in a law;

Paragraph 5 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution provides that the Prosecutor General is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas; the law establishing the procedure for the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General must provide that the sole subject appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General is the President of the Republic, who may act so upon the assent of the Seimas;

under Article 76 of the Constitution, the Seimas has the right to establish, by itself, its structure and the procedure for its work; the Seimas, while referring to the Constitution, has the right to decide, by itself, the questions of the formation of its structural subunits and those of their competence and organisation of their work; no other state institution may interfere with these constitutional powers of the Seimas; consequently, the Statute of the Seimas must establish the procedure under which the Seimas decides on whether or not to give its assent to the proposal of the President of the Republic to appoint or dismiss the Prosecutor General; when establishing, in the Statute of the Seimas, under what procedure the Seimas gives, or does not give, its assent to the proposal of the President of the Republic to appoint or dismiss the Prosecutor General, the Seimas may not provide for any grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office, since, as mentioned before, the grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office may be established exclusively in a law;

the Prosecutor General is not an official appointed or elected by the Seimas; the Prosecutor General is appointed to office and dismissed from office by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas; consequently, the procedure for dismissing an official upon a motion of no confidence, which is provided for in Article 75 of the Constitution and is related to the assessment of the activity of the official concerned, may not be applied to the Prosecutor General.

In its decision of 16 January 2014, the Constitutional Court interpreted that the provisions “[…] the legislature has the powers […] to establish the term of the powers of prosecutors as well as the grounds and procedure for their dismissal from office. While establishing this, the Seimas is bound by the Constitution, thus, also by the principle of a state under the rule of law, consolidated therein, which implies the legal certainty, stability, and the protection of legitimate expectations. After having established the term of the powers of the Prosecutor General, the legislature does not have the right to provide for any grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office before the expiry of the term of the powers of the Prosecutor General. Under the Constitution, the legislature may establish only such grounds for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General from office before the expiry of his or her powers due to which the Prosecutor General may not hold office on the whole (e.g., due to such legal facts as the age provided for in the law, transference to another place of work, or the loss of the citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania)” of the first paragraph of Item 6 of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 24 January 2003, as well as the provisions of Item 7 of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 30 March 2000, that Article 76 of the Constitution, under which the structure and procedure of the activities of the Seimas are established by the Statute of the Seimas and the Statute of the Seimas has the power of law, lays down “A blanket norm […] which permits the Seimas to establish, by itself, its structure, the procedure of its activities, procedures for the presentation of draft laws and other draft legal acts, their deliberation and adoption, as well as the competence of other structural subunits of the Seimas and their interrelations, and to regulate other issues of the functioning of the Seimas”, inter alia, mean that the grounds and procedure for the dismissal of the Prosecutor General must be established exclusively in a law; the Statute of the Seimas may establish, inter alia, the procedure under which the Seimas adopts a decision on whether or not to give its assent to the proposal of the President of the Republic to appoint or dismiss the Prosecutor General. The Statute of the Seimas may establish, inter alia, the procedure under which the Seimas adopts a decision on whether or not to give its assent to the proposal of the President of the Republic to appoint or dismiss the Prosecutor General.

VII

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, certain provisions of international documents concerning the activity of the Prosecution Service relevant for the case should also be noted.

1. On 6 October 2000, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system. This document sets out the principles that member states are recommended to use as underlying their lawmaking and practice, inter alia, in the sphere of the relations between the executive and the legislative powers.

States should take appropriate measures to ensure that public prosecutors are able to perform their professional duties and responsibilities without unjustified interference or unjustified exposure to civil, penal or other liability. However, the public prosecution should account periodically and publicly for its activities as a whole and, in particular, the way in which its priorities were carried out (Item 11).

In countries where the public prosecution is independent of the government, the state should take effective measures to guarantee that the nature and the scope of the independence of the public prosecution is established by law (Item 14). In order to promote the fairness and effectiveness of crime policy, public prosecutors should co-operate with government agencies and institutions in so far as this is in accordance with the law (Item 15).

2. Also some other documents adopted by the Consultative Council of European Judges (Le Conseil consultatif de juges européens, CCJE), which is an advisory body of the Council of Europe on issues related to the independence, impartiality and competence of judges, and the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (Le Conseil consultatif de procureurs européens, CCPE), which is a consultative body to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on issues related to the prosecution service, should be noted.

2.1. On 18 November 2009, these institutions jointly adopted Opinion No. 12 (2009) of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) and Opinion No. 4 (2009) of the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) on the relations between judges and prosecutors in a democratic society containing the so-called Bordeaux Declaration and the Explanatory Note.

As it is specified in the Bordeaux Declaration, the enforcement of the law and, where applicable, the discretionary powers by the prosecution at the pre-trial stage require that the status of public prosecutors be guaranteed by law, at the highest possible level, in a manner similar to that of judges; they shall be independent and autonomous in their decision-making and carry out their functions fairly, objectively and impartially (Item 6). The CCJE and the CCPE refer to the consistent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to Articles 5 Paragraph 3 and 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights; in particular, they refer to the decisions whereby the European Court of Human Rights recognised the requirement of independence from the executive power and the parties (Item 7).

In the Explanatory Note of the Bordeaux Declaration, it is noted that in democratic states neither the parliament nor any governmental body should seek to influence unduly a particular decision taken by public prosecutors in relation to individual cases in order to determine how a prosecution in any particular case should be conducted, or force public prosecutors to change their decisions (Item 26). The independence of public prosecutors is indispensable for enabling them to carry out their mission; it strengthens their role in a state of law and in society and it is also a guarantee that the justice system will operate fairly and effectively; akin to the independence secured to judges, the independence of prosecutors is not a prerogative or privilege conferred in the interest of the public prosecutors, but a guarantee in the interest of fair, impartial and effective administration of justice (Item 27). Whether they are under a hierarchical authority or not, to enable accountability and in order to prevent proceedings being instituted in an arbitrary or inconsistent manner, public prosecutors must provide clear and transparent guidelines as regards prosecution (Item 29).

It is also noted that respect for the above principles implies that the status of prosecutors be guaranteed by law at the highest possible level in a manner analogous to that of judges; the proximity and complementary nature of the missions of judges and prosecutors create similar requirements and guarantees in terms of their status and conditions of service, namely regarding recruitment, training, career development, discipline, transfer only according to the law or by consent, remuneration, termination of functions and freedom to create professional associations (Item 37).

2.2. On 17 December 2014, Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) adopted Opinion No. 9 (2014) on European norms and principles concerning prosecutors, containing the so-called Rome Charter and its Explanatory Note.

In the Rome Charter, it is noted that the independence and autonomy of the prosecution services constitute an indispensable corollary to the independence of the judiciary; therefore, the general tendency to enhance the independence and effective autonomy of the prosecution services should be encouraged (Item 4); prosecutors should be autonomous in their decision-making and should perform their duties free from external pressure or interference, having regard to the principles of separation of powers and accountability (Item 5). In the Explanatory Note of this Charter it is noted that the European Court of Human Rights emphasised that “in a democratic society both the courts and the investigation authorities must remain free from political pressure”; it follows that prosecutors should be autonomous in their decision making and, while cooperating with other institutions, should perform their respective duties free from external pressures or interferences from the executive power or the parliament, having regard to the principles of separation of powers and accountability (Item 34).

In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should be emphasised that, as it is stated in the Explanatory Note of the said charter, given their important role and function, the dismissal of prosecutors should be subject to strict requirements, which should not undermine the independent and impartial performance of their activities (Item 72). The independence of prosecutors is their protection from arbitrary or politically motivated dismissal; this is particularly relevant with reference to the Prosecutors General and the law should clearly define the conditions of their pre-term dismissal (Item 73).

3. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should also be noted that at its 85th plenary session on 17—18 December 2010, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), which acts as the advisory body of the Council of Europe on constitutional matters and provides legal advice to the Member States of the Council of Europe wishing to bring their legal and institutional structures into line with European standards and international experience in the fields of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, adopted Part II “The Prosecution Service” of the Report on European Standards as Regards the Independence of the Judicial System. This part of the report, among other things, covered the standards for appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General, as well as those of public accountability of the Prosecution Service.

In the aforementioned part of the report, it was noted that of necessity, a prosecutor, like a judge, will have on occasion to take unpopular decisions which may be the subject of criticism in the media and may also become the subject of political controversy; for these reasons it is necessary to secure proper tenure and appropriate arrangements for promotion, discipline and dismissal which will ensure that a prosecutor cannot be victimised on account of having taken an unpopular decision (Item 18).

In addition, it was noted that the manner in which the Prosecutor General is appointed and dismissed plays a significant role in the system guaranteeing the correct functioning of the prosecutor’s office. No single, categorical principle can be formulated as to who—the president or Parliament—should appoint the Prosecutor General in a situation when he is not subordinated to the Government. Acceptance of the principle of cooperation amongst state organs seems a good solution as it makes it possible to avoid unilateral political nominations. In such cases, a consensus should be reached. In any case, the right of nominating candidates should be clearly defined. Advice on the professional qualification of candidates should be taken from relevant persons such as representatives of the legal community (including prosecutors) and of civil society (Items 34 and 35).

The law on the prosecutor’s office should clearly define the conditions of the Prosecutor’s pre-term dismissal. The Venice Commission recalled that in its Opinion on the Draft Law of Ukraine amending the Constitutional Provisions on the Procuracy, the Commission had found that the grounds for such a dismissal would have to be prescribed by law. The Venice Commission would prefer to go even further by providing the grounds for a possible dismissal in the Constitution itself; moreover, there should be a mandatory requirement that before any decision is taken, an expert body has to give an opinion whether there are sufficient grounds for dismissal. In the said report it was also noted that in any case, the Prosecutor General should have the right to be heard during the dismissal proceedings, including before Parliament (Items 39 and 40).

The Venice Commission noted that like any state authority, including judges, the prosecutor’s office needs to be accountable to the public. In many systems there is accountability to Parliament, however, accountability to Parliament in individual cases of prosecution or non-prosecution should be ruled out. The decision whether to prosecute or not should be for the prosecution office alone and not for the executive or the legislature. However, the making of prosecution policy (for example giving priority to certain types of cases, time limits, closer cooperation with other agencies etc.) seems to be an issue where the Legislature and the Ministry of Justice or Government can properly have a decisive role (Items 41–43).

The Venice Commission also specified that some specific instruments of accountability seem necessary especially in cases where the prosecutor’s office is independent. The submitting of public reports by the Prosecutor General could be one such instrument. Whether such reports should be submitted to Parliament or the executive authority could depend on the model in force as well as national traditions. When applicable, in such reports the Prosecutor General should give a transparent account of how any general instruction given by the executive have been implemented (Item 44).

4. To summarise, it should be noted that the specified international documents emphasise the significance of the Prosecution Service and prosecutors in a democratic society without at the same time denying their accountability, inter alia, to the parliament, however, this accountability may not be related to prosecution executed in specific cases. In the context of the constitutional justice case at issue, it should also be noted that, as it is obvious from the report of the Venice Commission, one of the guarantees of independence of the Prosecution Service is the consolidation of the grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General in a law; in addition, the legal regulation of the accountability of the Prosecutor General should not create any preconditions to persecute him/her, thus, also to dismiss him/her from office on the grounds of decisions related to specific cases.

VIII

On the compliance of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) and Paragraph of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) with the Constitution

1. As mentioned before, in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court investigates into whether, inter alia, the provision “The Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5, as well as with Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution.

2. It has been mentioned that Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) prescribed the following: “The heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas shall submit (usually by March 1) an annual activity report of the institution. Upon receipt of such a report, the Speaker of the Seimas shall notify the Seimas about this and the latter shall decide on the committee to be assigned with consideration of the submitted report. Having considered the report, the committee shall prepare a conclusion and a draft resolution to be debated at a Seimas sitting along with the report by the head of a state institution.”

Thus, as mentioned before, this legal regulation consolidated the right of the Seimas to receive the annual activity reports of institutions from the heads of state institutions who are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas and, respectively, the duty of these heads of state institutions to submit such reports.

It has also been mentioned that when interpreted in conjunction with the first provision “The heads of state institutions […] shall submit […] an annual activity report of an institution” of Paragraph 5 of this article and with the provisions “Having adopted a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas […]. Having adopted a resolution not to approve the activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas […]” of Paragraph 6 of this article, the provision of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas, inter alia, its formula “regarding the report of the head of an institution” means that by its resolution the Seimas expresses its will, inter alia, regarding the annual activity report of an institution which is submitted by the head of that state institution.

3. In this context, it should be noted that, as mentioned before, the provision “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), which is related to another regulation established in this paragraph (“Upon receipt of such a report, the Speaker of the Seimas shall notify the Seimas about this and the latter shall decide on the committee to be assigned with consideration of the submitted report. Having considered the report, the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution”) implies that in all the cases when the annual activity report of an institution is received at the Seimas, upon the decision of the Seimas, the corresponding committee of the Seimas is empowered to prepare a draft resolution on this report.

Consequently, both provisions of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) providing for the resolution expressing the will of the Seimas concerning the annual activity report of an institution, i.e. the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” should be considered as inseparably related, therefore, their compliance with the Constitution should be investigated in conjunction.

4. The doubts of the petitioner concerning the compliance of the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 5 of Article 26 of the Statute of the Seimas are grounded on the fact that the said legal regulation does not ensure the stability and continuity of the activity of the state institutions, the heads whereof are appointed by the Seimas or whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas, which is necessary for the functioning of the state institutions; the said legal regulation creates preconditions to replace the heads of the said institutions each time when the parliamentary majority changes; it also violates the principle of depoliticisation of the law enforcement institutions where the appointment of heads of these institutions requires the assent of the Seimas; in adopting the decisions under their competence, these institutions are not free and independent; by the provisions of Articles 5, 67, and 75 of the Constitution, certain functions of parliamentary control are granted to the Seimas, however, only with regard to those heads of state institutions who are appointed or elected by the Seimas itself; and the parliamentary control of the Seimas is expressed in a way that the Seimas may dismiss the official appointed or elected by itself by expressing no confidence in him/her, however, in the Constitution, the dismissal of the head of a state institution by expressing no confidence in him/her is not related to the activity report of the institution, its consideration and the voting on this report.

5. While assessing whether the provisions of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) were in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution, it should be noted that, as mentioned before, under the Constitution:

the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, also has the right to establish, by means of a law, such its powers that are not expressis verbis indicated in the Constitution, but which, however, are designed for the implementation of the constitutional functions of the Seimas;

the Seimas—the representation of the Nation—must have exhaustive and objective information about the processes taking place in the state and society, as well as about the situation in various areas of the life of the state and society and problems arising therein; the availability of such information is a necessary precondition for the effective activity of the Seimas in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, as well as for the proper fulfilment of its constitutional duty;

the Seimas is obliged to establish such a legal regulation that would create legal preconditions for receiving the information necessary to perform its constitutional powers.

Thus, under the Constitution, the Seimas may provide for a legal regulation that would create legal preconditions for receiving information about the activities of state institutions whose heads are appointed by the Seimas, or the appointment of whose heads requires the assent of the Seimas, including in cases where such information is submitted by the heads of the said institutions, inter alia, in the form of a report on the annual activities of their respective institutions.

6. It has been mentioned that when interpreted, inter alia, in the context of the provisions “Having adopted a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas […]. Having adopted a resolution not to approve an annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of the state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas […]” of Paragraph of 6 Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of the said article mean that, under these provisions, the Seimas has the powers to adopt a resolution, inter alia, on approving or not approving the annual activity report of a state institution submitted by the head of that institution; as mentioned before, such an interpretation of the legal regulation is also approved by the practice of the application of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas.

7. In deciding whether the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), insofar as these provisions grant the powers to the Seimas to adopt a resolution on either approving or not approving an annual activity report submitted by the head of a state institution, are in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution, it should be noted that, under the Constitution:

The model of reciprocity among state powers consolidated in the Constitution is also described by the reciprocal control and balance of state authorities (institutions thereof), which does not allow for one state authority to dominate in respect of the other (others), and by their cooperation, of course, without overstepping the limits established by the Constitution—without interfering in the implementation of powers of other state authority;

The principle of the separation of powers, as consolidated in Article 5 (Paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof) and other articles of the Constitution, and the functions of the Seimas, as reflected in the whole of the powers conferred on the Seimas under Article 67, do not imply, inter alia, any such a legal regulation concerning the submission of information, thus, also of activity reports, by the state institutions to the Seimas, under which after the head of a state institution, who is appointed by the Seimas or who is appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas, submits the appropriate information in the form of a report, the procedure of departmental, financial or statistical accounting to the Seimas by the institution (or its head) would be considered not completed until the Seimas has approved the submitted report, i.e. under which it would be required that the Seimas not only becomes acquainted with and considers the information provided in the report, but also adopts a special resolution on approving the submitted report;

if the Seimas were vested with the powers to adopt a resolution on giving or not giving its approval to annual activity reports submitted by the heads of state institutions, these heads would be not protected against the possible pressure or unjustified interference with their activities, despite the fact that they would perform their functions in observance of the Constitution and law and while acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania; such a legal regulation would be incompatible with the Constitution, inter alia, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 thereof; and the establishment of such a legal regulation would unreasonably expand the constitutional powers of the Seimas.

Consequently, under the Constitution, the legislature is not prohibited from establishing (in the Statute of the Seimas and laws) such a legal regulation on the regular submission of information, inter alia, in the form of an annual activity report, possessed by state institutions, under which the Seimas, upon receipt the annual activity report of the institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas (and appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas), would consider the said report. On the other hand, the Constitution, inter alia, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 thereof, does not imply the possibilities of the legislature to establish such a legal regulation under which the Seimas, having considered the annual activity report of the institution submitted by the head of the state institution, would adopt a resolution on either approving or not approving it.

Similarly under the Constitution is to be assessed also the legal regulation under which a corresponding committee of the Seimas, by a decision of the Seimas, would be authorised to prepare a draft act expressing the will of the Seimas concerning the annual activity report of an institution for the Seimas to consider and adopt in corpore.

8. It should be noted that the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) consolidate a legal regulation, under which the Seimas has the powers to adopt a resolution on either approving or not approving an annual activity report submitted by the head of a state institution; this legal regulation creates preconditions for the possible pressure on the heads of state institutions who submitted the said reports, as well as for the unjustified interference with their activities, despite the fact that the said heads would perform their functions in observance with the Constitution and law and while acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania; such a legal regulation is incompatible with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution; it unreasonably expands the constitutional powers of the Seimas.

9. In the lights of these arguments, the conclusion should be drawn that the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), insofar as these provisions grant the powers to the Seimas to adopt a resolution on either approving or not approving an annual activity report submitted by the head of a state institution, are in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution.

10. Having held this, the Constitutional Court will no longer investigate whether the said provisions of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) are in conflict with Article 75 of the Constitution.

11. As mentioned before, in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court investigates whether, inter alia, Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

12. It has been mentioned that the impugned Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) prescribed: Having adopted a resolution not to approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution who is appointed by the Seimas, the Seimas may assign to the committee which has considered the above report to submit a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding the no confidence in the head of that institution at the next sitting of the Seimas. In this case, voting shall be held at the next sitting of the Seimas with respect to dismissal from office of the head of a state institution. Having adopted a resolution not to approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas, the Seimas may assign to the committee which has considered the above report to submit a draft resolution of the Seimas regarding a proposal to the President of the Republic to dismiss from office this head of the institution. Decisions on dismissing the heads of state institutions from office and on a proposal to the President of the Republic to dismiss the heads of state institutions from office shall be adopted by secret ballot by a majority vote of more than half of all the members of the Seimas.”

It has also been mentioned that Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) consolidated the right of the Seimas to express its will on further activity of the head of an institution who submitted the annual activity report in the aspect that:

The non-approval of the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of the state institution who is appointed by the Seimas itself expressed by means of the Seimas resolution may serve as a ground for the Seimas to consider and adopt a resolution on expressing no confidence in such a head of a state institution, by, at the same time, dismissing him/her from office;

The non-approval of the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of a state institution whose appointment requires the assent of the Seimas may serve as a ground for the Seimas to consider and adopt a resolution on proposing the President of the Republic to dismiss such a head of a state institution from office, thus, seeking to initiate the procedure for the dismissal of this head of a state institution from office.

13. The doubts of the petitioner concerning the compliance of Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas with the Constitution are grounded on the fact that state institutions, whose heads are appointed by the Seimas, or the appointment of whose heads requires the assent of the Seimas, perform important state functions, therefore, it is necessary to ensure the independence, continuity, and stability of the activity of these institutions; having consolidated the possibility for the Seimas to initiate the procedure for dismissing the head of a state institution, who is appointed by the Seimas, by means of consideration of the annual activity report of an institution, as well as the possibility to propose to dismiss the head of a state institution, who is appointed by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas, the legislature violated the checks and balances, as consolidated in Article 5 of the Constitution, and granted more powers to the Seimas than it is provided in Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution; in addition, the impugned legal regulation does not comply with the requirements of legal certainty and legal clarity that stem from the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, as well as with the requirement that any legal regulation must be clear and harmonious, legal norms must be formulated precisely and may not contain any ambiguities.

14. While deciding whether Paragraph 6 (wording of 27 June 2013) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is not in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Articles 67 and 75 of the Constitution, as well as with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, it should be noted that it has been held in this ruling that the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) consolidate a legal regulation, under which the Seimas has the powers to adopt a resolution on either approving or not approving an annual activity report submitted by the head of a state institution and that this legal regulation creates preconditions for the possible pressure on the heads of state institutions who submitted the said reports, as well as for the unjustified interference with their activities, despite the fact that the said heads would perform their functions in observance with the Constitution and law and while acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania; such a legal regulation is incompatible with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution; it unreasonably expands the constitutional powers of the Seimas.

Having held this, on the grounds of the same arguments, it should also be held that Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas, which establishes the possible consequences of the situation where the Seimas does not approve the annual activity report of an institution submitted by the head of that state institution, is also in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution.

15. In the light of the foregoing arguments, the conclusion should be drawn that Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution.

16. Having held this, the Constitutional Court will no longer investigate whether Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Article 75 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

17. Alongside, it needs to be noted that, as mentioned before, in a democratic state under the rule of law, officials and their institutions must observe laws and follow law in their activities; in the area of the legal regulation of the activities of state institutions and officials, the principles of a state under the rule of law are implemented, among other things, by combining trust in state officials with the public control of their activities and with their responsibility to the public; the legal system must provide for the possibility of removing from office those state officials who violate laws, who raise personal or group interests above the interests of society, or who discredit state authority by their actions. Thus, it needs to be emphasised that, while considering the annual activity report of an institution at the Seimas, or when it transpires from the information submitted in the annual activity report of an institution during its consideration at the Seimas that the head of the state institution, who submitted the said report, may have violated laws and may have raised personal or group interests above the interests of society, the separation of powers in Lithuania (in the aspect of separation and coordination of the powers of the Seimas and the President of the Republic to appoint and dismiss heads (officials) of state institutions, as, inter alia, reflected in Article 67 of the Constitution), as consolidated in the Constitution, inter alia, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 thereof, does not prevent the legislature from establishing also such a legal regulation for dismissing of the heads (officials) of state institutions, who are appointed by the Seimas (as well as by the President of the Republic upon assent of the Seimas), under which the Seimas could in corpore: 1) consider and adopt a resolution on no confidence in such a head of a state institution, as provided for in Article 75 of the Constitution (and in the corresponding provisions of the Statute of the Seimas); 2) by means of an act (statement, declaration, resolution, etc.), provided for in the Statute of the Seimas, on expressing the will of the representation of the Nation concerning the issues significant to the state, to publicly address the President of the Republic and propose that the head of a state institution who was appointed by the President of the Republic upon assent of the Seimas be dismissed from his/her office by applying the appropriate grounds of dismissal provided for by the law (these grounds may not include the application to the President by the Seimas, as this application is not binding on the President of the Republic). However, the sole refusal by the Seimas to approve an annual activity report submitted to the Seimas (or a legitimate refusal by the head of a state institution to submit information requested by the Seimas) may not serve as a ground for the Seimas to consider and adopt a resolution on expressing no confidence in the head of the state institution where the head of a state institution concerned was appointed by the Seimas (or to submit the proposal to the President of the Republic that the head of a state institution be dismissed from office where the head concerned was appointed by the President upon the assent of the Seimas).

IX

On the compliance of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the Constitution

1. As mentioned before, in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court investigates whether, inter alia, the provision “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activities of the Prosecution Service to […] the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service […]” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118(wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

2. It has been mentioned that Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) provides: “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the President of the Republic and the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service which shall also be published on the website of the Prosecution Service.”

Thus, as mentioned before, this legal regulation consolidated the accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service, inter alia, to the Seimas; it also prescribed the concrete form—the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service—of the accounting by the Prosecutor General for the activity of the Prosecution Service to the Seimas.

3. The doubts of the petitioner concerning the compliance of the legal regulation consolidated in Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the Constitution are grounded on the fact that, under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any such a legal regulation that would oblige prosecutors to submit accounts to the legislative and executive authorities on the activity of the Prosecution Service while performing their constitutional functions and under which the legislative and (or) executive authorities could consider the activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General and adopt a decision on whether to approve or not to approve such a report, as such a legal regulation would restrict the independence of prosecutors, and, during the performance of the functions provided for them in the Constitution, their activities would be interfered and influenced.

4. While deciding whether the provisions “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to […] the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) are in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution, it should be noted that, as mentioned before, the Constitution provides that:

The principle of the balance of the values consolidated in the Constitution and the duty of the legislature to reconcile different interests and to ensure the balance of constitutional values oblige the legislature to align the constitutional provision that state institutions serve the people with the constitutional principle of the independence of prosecutors; the alignment of these constitutional values would be ensured if the Prosecutor General were obliged by law to submit to society, as well as the Seimas and the President of the Republic, who participate in the process of the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General, information (public reports) about the implementation of the priorities of the penal policy, the defence of the public interest, the organisation of the work of the Prosecution Service, the directions of the activity of the Prosecution Service, the organisation of cooperation between the Lithuanian and foreign establishments of pre-trial investigation or other institutions, time limits for the investigation of criminal acts, certain problems arising in the course of the work of the Prosecution Service, etc. this information (public reports) can be submitted, inter alia, in the form of an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service;

It is not permitted to establish any such a legal regulation that would oblige prosecutors to submit the accounts of the performance of their constitutional functions to the legislative and executive authorities, inter alia, any such legal regulation that would oblige the Prosecutor General to submit the said accounts of the activity of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania, which would subsequently need to be approved by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government; the establishment of the aforesaid duty would mean interference with the activities of prosecutors, who perform the functions provided for in the Constitution, and the restriction of the independence of prosecutors in performing the functions provided for in the Constitution;

When implementing the possibility implied by the Constitution to regulate by a law the regular obtaining of information from a state institution (except for the courts), inter alia, in the form of reports, which is significant for the implementation of its functions, the Seimas may establish that the Prosecutor General regularly under the general procedure submits the information on the activity of the Prosecution Service, inter alia, the annual activity report, to the Seimas; however, it may not establish such a legal regulation, under which the Prosecutor General would be obliged to provide the Seimas or the President of the Republic with the information not on the summarised aspects of the Prosecution Service as a whole, but namely on the fact how the prosecutors of the Office of the Prosecutor General and the territorial prosecutor’s offices implement their constitutional functions.

Thus, in general, the Constitution permits accounting by the Prosecutor General, as established in Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), for the activity of the Prosecution Service, inter alia, to the Seimas (which participates in the procedure of the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General); the Constitution also permits such a form of accounting to the Seimas as the annual activity report (its submission) of the Prosecution Service. However, the implementation (application) of such established accounting and submission of the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service is grounded on the concrete concept of the procedure (inter alia, its purpose, as well as its outcome or the adoption of an act of the Seimas expressing this outcome) for accounting and submission of the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service may not create preconditions for violating the principle of the independence of prosecutors which is consolidated in Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

4.1. It should be noted that the provision “He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) does not mean in itself that this legal regulation forces or obliges the Prosecutor General to submit such an information composing the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service to the Seimas, which (or the annual activity of the Prosecution Service that forms the basis of the report) would be approved by the Seimas, or which would be assessed negatively (would be disapproved), i.e., the procedure of accounting by the Prosecutor General to the Seimas would be considered incomplete until the Seimas approves the submitted annual activity report of the Prosecution Service.

4.2. It should also be noted that the accounting of the Prosecutor General to the Seimas—the submission of the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service—should be interpreted only as the obligation of the Prosecutor General to submit, to the Seimas, the information, in the form of a report, about the implementation of the priorities pursued under the penal policy, the defence of the public interest, the organisation of the work and the directions of the activity of the Prosecution Service, the organisation of the cooperation between Lithuanian and foreign pre-trial investigation establishments or other institutions, the time limits set for the investigation of criminal acts, particular problems arising in the work of the Prosecution Service, etc., i.e. accounting by the Prosecutor General to the Seimas in the form of an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service should be related only to the obtaining and/or discussion of the information necessary for legislation and the performance of other functions of the Seimas. Only if understood in this way, can this legal regulation consolidated in Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service create no preconditions for the Seimas to interfere with the activity or restrict the independence of prosecutors, who perform the functions provided for in the Constitution.

5. In the light of the foregoing arguments, the conclusion should be drawn that the provisions “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to […] the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) are not in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

X

On the compliance of Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the Constitution

1. As mentioned before, in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court is investigating whether, inter alia, Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

2. It has been mentioned that Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) provided: “The Prosecutor General may be dismissed upon the proposal of the Seimas.”

It has also been mentioned that the travaux préparatoires of the said Law Amending and Supplementing Article 22 of the Law on the Prosecution Service make it clear that the purpose of this law was to regulate such a legal situation when, under the procedure prescribed in the Statute of the Seimas, the Seimas does not approve the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General to the Seimas.

It has also been mentioned that when interpreted in conjunction with the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 8 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003), which consolidates the exhaustive list of the grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office, and with the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas, the legal regulation prescribed in Paragraph 6 (“The Prosecutor General may be dismissed upon the proposal of the Seimas”) of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) implies that as adopted on the grounds of the resolution of the Seimas on refusing to approve the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General (appointed to the office upon assent of the Seimas), the resolution of the Seimas on proposing the President of the Republic to dismiss such a Prosecutor General from office is an incentive for the President of the Republic to assess the activity of the Prosecutor General in heading the Prosecution Service and decide on the possibility to dismiss him/her from office upon the assent of the Seimas on the grounds consolidated in Paragraph 8 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003).

3. The doubts of the petitioner regarding the compliance of Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) with the Constitution are grounded on the fact that this paragraph consolidates such a legal regulation under which the Prosecutor General may be dismissed at any moment and due to any circumstances or reasons, or even when there are no circumstances or reasons, but there is one condition—the proposal of the Seimas to dismiss the Prosecutor General, therefore, such a legal regulation is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution, which consolidates that, when performing their functions, prosecutors are independent and obey only the law, as well as with Paragraph 6 of Article 118 of the Constitution, whose provision that the procedure for the appointment of prosecutors, as well as their status, is established by law means that the legislature does not have the right to establish any grounds for dismissing the Prosecutor General from office prior to the term of termination of his/her office; in addition, under Paragraph 5 of Article 118 of the Constitution, the right of initiative in dismissing the Prosecutor General is granted exceptionally to the President of the Republic; therefore, having transferred, by means of the impugned legal regulation, this right to the Seimas, the procedure for dismissing the Prosecutor General that is consolidated in the said provision of the Constitution has been violated.

4. While deciding whether Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is in conflict with Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution, it should be noted that, under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any such legal regulation that would oblige prosecutors to submit the accounts of the performance of their constitutional functions to the legislative and executive authorities, inter alia, any such legal regulation that would oblige the Prosecutor General to submit the said accounts of the activity of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania, which would subsequently need to be approved by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government; the establishment of the aforesaid duty would mean interference with the activities of prosecutors, who perform the functions provided for in the Constitution, and the restriction of the independence of prosecutors in performing the functions provided for in the Constitution.

Thus, under the constitutional principle of the independence of prosecutors in performing the functions provided for in the Constitution, which is prescribed in the Constitution, inter alia Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) thereof, the legislature is prohibited from establishing such a legal regulation of accounting by the Prosecutor General (inter alia, submission of the annual activity report of the Prosecution Service) to the Seimas under which a resolution of the Seimas on refusing to approve an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service would constitute a ground for the Seimas to decide to put forward the proposal to dismiss the Prosecutor General.

Alongside, it should be noted that in general, under the Constitution, no such a legal regulation is permitted under which the Seimas, who participates in appointing the Prosecutor General and dismissing him/her from office, could propose that the President of the Republic dismiss the Prosecutor General on the grounds provided for in a law.

5. It needs to be emphasised that, as mentioned in the acts of the Constitutional Court, such legal situations are also possible where the elimination of the provisions conflicting with provisions of legal acts of higher power, inter alia, the Constitution, by means of a Constitutional Court’s ruling from the legal system, with respect to application of law, virtually amounts to changing the overall legal regulation, i.e. the establishment of a different, gapless overall legal regulation (the Constitutional Court’s decision of 8 August 2006, and its rulings of 21 September 2006, 20 March 2008, and 22 December 2011).

5.1. In this ruling, it has been held that Paragraph 6 (wording of 27 June 2013) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution.

5.2. It should be held that, having held the unconstitutionality of Paragraph 6 (wording of 27 June 2013) of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998), the legal regulation on dismissing the Prosecutor General upon the proposal of the Seimas established in the impugned Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) no longer includes such a case where a resolution of the Seimas on refusing to approve an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service would constitute a ground for the Seimas to decide to put forward the proposal to dismiss the Prosecutor General. Therefore, if Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is understood as establishing the possibility for the Seimas to propose that the President of the Republic dismiss the Prosecutor General from office on the grounds provided for in the law and not because of the fact that the Seimas did not approve an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service, there are no grounds for stating that by Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) the legislature violates the principle of the independence of prosecutors, which is consolidated in Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution, and the requirements for the legal regulation on dismissing the Prosecutor General that stem from the Constitution, inter alia, Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 118 thereof.

6. In the light of the foregoing arguments, the conclusion should be drawn that Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013) of the Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003) is not in conflict with Paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

XI

On the compliance of Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 with the Constitution

1. As mentioned before, in the constitutional justice case at issue, the Constitutional Court investigates whether, inter alia, Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

2. It has been mentioned that by Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013 it was ruled: In view of the fact that the data and the assessment provided in the 2012 Annual Report are declaratory and do not reflect the real situation when the prosecution institution performs the functions commissioned by the state, not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania”.

Thus, as mentioned before, Article 1 of this resolution of the Seimas, which was adopted in accordance with the provisions (of Article 206 of the Statute of the Seimas and Article 4 of the Law on the Prosecution Service) whose compliance with the Constitution is also investigated in the constitutional justice case at issue, expresses the will of the Seimas not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania, which was submitted to the Seimas, at its will, by the Prosecutor General and considered at the Seimas, namely due to the data, which, according to the Seimas, was provided in a declaratory manner and do not reflect the real situation of the Prosecution Service when it performs the functions commissioned by the state.

3. While deciding whether Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, it should be noted that, as mentioned before, under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any such a legal regulation that would oblige prosecutors to submit the accounts of the performance of their constitutional functions to the legislative and executive authorities, inter alia, any such a legal regulation that would oblige the Prosecutor General to submit the said accounts of the activity of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania, which would subsequently need to be approved by the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government; the establishment of the aforesaid duty would mean interference with the activities of prosecutors, who perform the functions provided for in the Constitution, and the restriction of the independence of prosecutors in performing the functions provided for in the Constitution.

Thus, the prohibition to interfere with the activity or restrict the independence of prosecutors, who perform the functions provided for in the Constitution, which is consolidated in Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution, would also be violated by such an act of application of law (inter alia, having a legal ground at a legal level), whereby the Seimas would decide whether to approve or not to approve an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General.

4. It should be held that Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013, whereby it was decided not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania, which was submitted by the Prosecutor General and considered at the Seimas, is in conflict with Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

5. In the doctrine of the Constitutional Court, it has been held on more than one occasion that, in the cases where the Constitutional Court is investigating, subsequent to a petition, whether the impugned legal act (part thereof) is in conflict with the articles (parts thereof) of the Constitution indicated by the petitioner, the Constitutional Court is at the same time investigating whether this legal act (part thereof) is in conflict with the Constitution—a unified and harmonious system; particular norms set out in the articles (parts thereof) of the Constitution indicated by the petitioner may not be interpreted separately from other norms of the Constitution; the Constitutional Court, having found that the impugned legal act (part thereof) is in conflict with the articles (parts thereof) of the Constitution not indicated by the petitioner, has the powers to state this fact (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 24 December 2002, 30 May 2003, and 10 October 2013).

5.1. In this ruling, it has been held that that the principle of the separation of powers, as consolidated in Article 5 (Paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof) and other articles of the Constitution, and the functions of the Seimas, as reflected in the whole of the powers conferred on the Seimas under Article 67, do not imply, inter alia, with regard to information and, thus, also activity reports, to be submitted by state institutions to the Seimas, any such legal regulation under which, after the head of a state institution, who is appointed by the Seimas (or by the President of the Republic upon the assent of the Seimas) submits the appropriate information in the form of a report, the procedure of departmental, financial or statistical accounting to the Seimas by the institution (or its head) would be considered not completed until the Seimas has approved the submitted report, i.e. under which it would be required that the Seimas not only becomes acquainted with and considers the information provided in the report, but also adopts a special resolution on approving the submitted report; if the Seimas were vested with the powers to adopt a resolution on giving or not giving its approval to annual activity reports submitted by the heads of state institutions, these heads would be not protected against the possible pressure or unjustified interference with their activities, despite the fact that they would perform their functions in observance of the Constitution and law and while acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania; such a legal regulation would be incompatible with the Constitution, inter alia, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 thereof; and the establishment of such a legal regulation would unreasonably expand the constitutional powers of the Seimas.

5.2. In this ruling, it has also been held that the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013) of the Statute of the Seimas (wording of 22 December 1998) consolidate a legal regulation under which the Seimas has the powers to adopt a resolution on either approving or not approving an annual activity report submitted by the head of a state institution and that this legal regulation creates preconditions for the possible pressure on the heads of state institutions who submitted the said reports, as well as for the unjustified interference with their activities, despite the fact that the said heads would perform their functions in observance with the Constitution and law and while acting in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania; such a legal regulation is incompatible with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution; it unreasonably expands the constitutional powers of the Seimas.

5.3. Consequently, also such an act of application of law, which is grounded on the legal regulation (that is in conflict with the Constitution) consolidated in the aforementioned provisions of the Statute of the Seimas, whereby the Seimas decides on approving or not approving an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service submitted by the Prosecutor General, is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution.

6. It should be held that Article 1 of Seimas resolution No. XII-528 of 1 October 2013, by which it was decided not to approve the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania submitted by the Prosecutor General and considered at the Seimas, is also in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution.

7. In the light of the foregoing arguments, the conclusion should be drawn that Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5, Article 67, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution.

8. Having held this, the Constitutional Court will no longer investigate whether Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.

Conforming to Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 1, 53, 54, 55, and 56 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania gives the following

ruling:

1. To recognise that the provisions “the committee shall prepare […] a draft resolution” and “the Seimas shall adopt a resolution regarding the report of the head of an institution” of Paragraph 5 (wording of 10 October 2000; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2000, No. 86-2617) of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2013, No. 71-3581) of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (wording of 22 December 1998; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 1999, No. 5-97), insofar as these provisions grant the powers to the Seimas to adopt a resolution on either approving or not approving an annual activity report submitted by the head of a state institution, are in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

2. To recognise that Paragraph 6 of Article 206 (wording of 27 June 2013; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2013, No. 71-3581) of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (wording of 22 December 1998; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 1999, No. 5-97) is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 and Article 67 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

3. To recognise that the provisions “The Prosecutor General shall account for the activity of the Prosecution Service to […] the Seimas. He/she shall account to the Seimas by submitting an annual activity report of the Prosecution Service […]” of Paragraph 3 of Article 4 (wording of 30 June 2011; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2011, No. 91-4333) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2003, No. 42-1919) is not in conflict with the Constitution.

4. To recognise that Paragraph 6 of Article 22 (wording of 10 December 2013; Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2013, No. 130-6628) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Prosecution Service (wording of 22 April 2003, Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2003, No. 42-1919) is not in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

5. To recognise that Article 1 of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (No. XII-528) “On the 2012 Annual Activity Report of the Prosecution Service of the Republic of Lithuania” (Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2013, No. 106-5194) of 1 October 2013 is in conflict with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5, Article 67, and Paragraph 3 of Article 118 (wording of 20 March 2003) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

This ruling of the Constitutional Court is final and not subject to appeal.

Justices of the Constitutional Court:           Elvyra Baltutytė

                                                                                Vytautas Greičius

                                                                                Danutė Jočienė

                                                                                Pranas Kuconis

                                                                                Gediminas Mesonis

                                                                                Vytas Milius

                                                                                Egidijus Šileikis

                                                                                Algirdas Taminskas

                                                                                Dainius Žalimas