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On the interpretation of the provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 related to the formation of Seimas provisional investigation commissions

Case No. 24/05-04/06

 

 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

 

DECISION

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A PROVISION OF ITEM 6.3. OF CHAPTER II OF THE REASONING PART OF THE RULING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA “ON THE COMPLIANCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 (WORDING OF 22 DECEMBER 1998) OF ARTICLE 73 OF THE STATUTE OF THE SEIMAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA” OF 4 APRIL 2006

 

21 November 2006

Vilnius

 

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, composed of the Justices of the Constitutional Court: Armanas Abramavičius, Toma Birmontienė, Egidijus Kūris, Kęstutis Lapinskas, Zenonas Namavičius, Ramutė Ruškytė, Vytautas Sinkevičius, Stasys Stačiokas, and Romualdas Kęstutis Urbaitis

The court reporter—Daiva Pitrėnaitė

Česlovas Atkočaitis and Milda Vainiutė, advisors to the President of the Republic on legal issues, acting as the representatives of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, the petitioner, who submitted the petition requesting the construction of a certain provision of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania,

Seimas member Česlovas Juršėnas (who represented both petitioners—the group of members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania), Seimas member Julius Sabatauskas (who represented the group of members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, a petitioner), and Antanas Jatkevičius, senior advisor to the Legal Department of the Office of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (who represented the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, a petitioner), acting as the representatives of a group of members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the petitioners in constitutional justice case No. 24/05-04/06

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, pursuant to Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, on 20 November 2006, in a public hearing of the Court, considered the petition set forth in the Decree of the President of the Republic of Lithuania (No. 778) “On Applying to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania Requesting the Construction of a Certain Provision of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania ‘On the Compliance of Paragraph 3 (Wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania’ of 4 April 2006” of 16 October 2006 requesting the construction of whether the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania “On the Compliance of Paragraph 3 (Wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania” of 4 April 2006 means that

the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania does not have any powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters related with the organisation of work of other state institutions, provided decision of these issues is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, as, for instance, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution;

the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania cannot commission a Seimas provisional investigation commission with an investigation into the matters, which would in themselves mean that their investigation will require only the material of pre-trial, operational or other investigation conducted by the state institution, on the basis of which the final conclusions of the provisional investigation commission would be formulated, while the disclosure of such material could harm the pre-trial, operational or other investigation.

The Constitutional Court

has established:

I

1. In constitutional justice case No. 24/05-04/06, subsequent to the 23 November 2005 petition of a group of members of the Seimas, the petitioner, requesting an investigation into whether the provision “If a group of at least 1/4 of the members of Seimas submits a written demand to form a provisional control or investigation commission, the Seimas must form such a commission in the course of its nearest sitting” of Paragraph 3 (wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania was not in conflict with the principle of a free mandate of a member of the Seimas, which, according to the petitioner, was entrenched in Paragraph 4 of Article 59 of the Constitution and the principle of a state under the rule of law, which, according to the petitioner, was entrenched in the Preamble of the Constitution, subsequent to the petition set forth in the Resolution of the Seimas (No. X-455) “On an Application to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania with the Petition Requesting an Investigation into whether Paragraph 3 of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania is not in Conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania” of 20 December 2005 requesting the Constitutional Court to investigate whether the provision “If a group of at least 1/4 of the members of Seimas submits a written demand to form a provisional control or investigation commission, the Seimas must form such a commission in the course of its nearest sitting” of Paragraph 3 (wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania was not in conflict with the principle of a free mandate of a member of the Seimas, which, according to the petitioner, was entrenched in Paragraph 4 of Article 59 of the Constitution, on 4 April 2006, the Constitutional Court adopted the Ruling “On the Compliance of Paragraph 3 (Wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania” (hereinafter also referred to as the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006).

2. By his Decree (No. 778) “On Applying to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania Requesting the Construction of a Certain Provision of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania ‘On the Compliance of Paragraph 3 (Wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania’ of 4 April 2006” of 16 October 2006 (hereinafter also referred to as the Decree of the President of the Republic of 16 October 2006), the President of the Republic requests that the Constitutional Court construe whether the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s Ruling “On the Compliance of Paragraph 3 (Wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania” of 4 April 2006 means that

the Seimas does not have any powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters related with the organisation of work of other state institutions, provided decision of these issues is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, as, for instance, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution;

the Seimas cannot commission a Seimas provisional investigation commission with an investigation into the matters, which would in themselves mean that their investigation will require only the material of pre-trial, operational or other investigation conducted by the state institution, on the basis of which the final conclusions of the provisional investigation commission would be formulated, while the disclosure of such material could harm the pre-trial, operational or other investigation.

II

1. At the Constitutional Court’s hearing M. Vainiutė and Č. Atkočaitis, acting as the representatives of the President of the Republic, the petitioner, who submitted the petition requesting the construction of a provision of the ruling of the Constitutional Court, presented their explanations.

2. At the Constitutional Court’s hearing, Seimas member Č. Juršėnas (who represented both petitioners—the group of members of the Seimas and the Seimas), Seimas member J. Sabatauskas (who represented the group of members of the Seimas, a petitioner), and A. Jatkevičius, (who represented the Seimas, a petitioner), acting as the representatives of a group of members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the petitioners in constitutional justice case No. 24/05-04/06, made speeches.

The Constitutional Court

holds that:

I

1. Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court consolidates the Constitutional Court powers to officially construe its rulings.

While construing Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court has held that the Constitutional Court has the powers also to officially construe its other final acts (the Constitutional Court’s decisions of 6 April 2004 and 14 March 2006 (Case No. 13/2000-14/2000-20/2000-21/2000-22/2000-25/2000-31/2000-35/2000-39/2000-8/01-31/01)).

2. The Constitutional Court officially construes its ruling at the request of the parties to the case, of other institutions or persons to whom it was sent, or on its own initiative (Paragraph 1 of Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court). Under Paragraph 2 of Article 60 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a ruling of the Constitutional Court shall be sent, inter alia, to the President of the Republic.

3. A ruling of the Constitutional Court is integral, its operative part is based upon the arguments of the part of reasoning. While construing its ruling, the Constitutional Court is bound both by the content of the operative part and that of reasoning of its ruling. The decision adopted concerning the construction of a ruling of the Constitutional Court is inseparable from the Constitutional Court’s ruling (the Constitutional Court’s decisions of 12 January 2000, 11 February 2004, 13 February 2004, 10 February 2005, and 14 March 2006 (Case No. 13/2000-14/2000-20/2000-21/2000-22/2000-25/2000-31/2000-35/2000-39/2000-8/01-31/01) and its ruling of 28 March 2006).

It needs to be emphasised that the consideration (subsequent to the request of the parties to the case, of other institutions or persons to whom it was sent, or on its own initiative) of a petition requesting the construction of a ruling or another final act of the Constitutional Court does not imply a new constitutional justice case. The decision (specified in Paragraph 2 of Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court) on the construction of a ruling of the Constitutional Court is marked by the same number as the Constitutional Court’s ruling (other final act) which is construed, i.e. by the number of the corresponding constitutional justice case.

4. The Constitutional Court has held: “the formula ‘shall be final and not subject to appeal’ of Paragraph 2 of Article 107 of the Constitution, in which, <…> it is prescribed that the decisions of the Constitutional Court on issues assigned to its competence by the Constitution shall be final and not subject to appeal, means that the Constitutional Court’s rulings, conclusions and decisions by which a constitutional justice case is finished, i.e. final acts of the Constitutional Court, are obligatory to all State institutions, courts, all enterprises, establishments and organisations, as well as officials and citizens, including the Constitutional Court itself: final acts of the Constitutional Court are obligatory to the Constitutional Court itself, they restrict the Constitutional Court in the aspect that it may not change them or review them if there are no constitutional grounds for that” (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 28 March 2006).

5. Under Paragraph 3 of Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court must construe its ruling without changing its content.

The provision of Paragraph 3 of Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court that the Constitutional Court must construe its ruling without changing its content means, among other things, that while construing its ruling, the Constitutional Court may not construe its content so that the meaning of the provisions of the ruling would be changed, inter alia, the entirety of the meaning of the elements composing the content of the ruling, as well as the arguments and reasons on which the Constitutional Court’s ruling is based. The specified provision of Paragraph 3 of Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court also means that the Constitutional Court may not construe what it did not investigate in the constitutional justice case in which the construed ruling was adopted (the Constitutional Court’s decision of 14 March 2006 (Case No. 13/2000-14/2000-20/2000-21/2000-22/2000-25/2000-31/2000-35/2000-39/2000-8/01-31/01) and its ruling of 28 March 2006).

6. The Constitutional Court has held that the purpose of the institute of construction of Constitutional Court’s rulings and other final acts is to disclose the contents and meaning of the corresponding rulings or other final acts of the Constitutional Court more broadly and in more detail if it is necessary in order to ensure the proper execution of that ruling or other final act of the Constitutional Court so that the said ruling or other final act of the Constitutional Court would be followed (the Constitutional Court’s decision of 14 March 2006 (Case No. 13/2000-14/2000-20/2000-21/2000-22/2000-25/2000-31/2000-35/2000-39/2000-8/01-31/01)).

Thus, in the course of the construction of rulings and other final acts of the Constitutional Court, the official constitutional doctrine is developed.

7. The formation and development of the constitutional doctrine is a function of constitutional justice (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 28 March 2006; also, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 30 May 2003, 1 July 2004, and 13 December 2004; its decision of 20 September 2005; its rulings of 14 March 2006, 9 May 2006, and 6 June 2006; its decision of 8 August 2006). The official constitutional doctrine formed by the Constitutional Court, in which the provisions (principles, norms) of the Constitution are construed, constitutes a whole.

The formation of the official constitutional doctrine (both as a whole and on every individual issue of the constitutional legal regulation) is not a one-off act but a gradual and consecutive process. This process is uninterrupted and is never fully finished. The development of the constitutional jurisprudence and the official doctrine formulated therein is characteristic of the fact that the official constitutional doctrine is not formulated all “at once” on any issue of the constitutional legal regulation, but “case by case”, by supplementing the elements (fragments) of the said doctrine, disclosed in the previous constitutional justice cases, adopted in the acts of the Constitutional Court with others, which are disclosed in the acts of the Constitutional Court adopted in new cases of constitutional justice. While construing the norms and principles of the Constitution, explicitly and implicitly entrenched in the text of the Constitution, there is always a possibility of formulating the official constitutional doctrinal provisions (i.e. disclosing such aspects of constitutional legal regulation) which have not been formulated in the previous constitutional justice cases adopted in the acts of the Constitutional Court if it is necessary because of the logic of a considered constitutional justice case. When the Constitutional Court considers new constitutional justice cases every time subsequent to petitions of petitioners, the official constitutional doctrine formulated in the previous acts of the Constitutional Court (on every individual issue on the constitutional legal regulation, which is important to a particular case) is every time supplemented with new fragments. Thus, by formulating new official constitutional doctrinal provisions, the diversity and completeness of the legal regulation entrenched in the Constitution—the supreme legal act—is disclosed (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 28 March 2006 and 9 May 2006; its decision of 8 August 2006; also, the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 30 May 2003, 1 July 2004 and 13 December 2004; its decision of 20 September 2005; and its ruling of 14 March 2006).

8. In its acts, the Constitutional Court has held more than once that the principle of a state under the rule of law entrenched in the Constitution implies the continuity of jurisprudence. It needs to be emphasised that not only courts of general jurisdiction, but also specialised courts (which are established under Paragraph 2 of Article 111 of the Constitution) must ensure the continuity of jurisprudence (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 14 March 2006, 28 March 2006, and 9 May 2006).

9. On the other hand, the continuity of constitutional jurisprudence does not mean that the official constitutional doctrine cannot be corrected or that its provisions cannot be reinterpreted (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 14 March 2006). It needs to be emphasised that such correction and reinterpretation is possible only in cases after corresponding amendments to the Constitution have been made.

The Constitutional Court has held that the conceptions of the provisions of the Constitution and further construction and development of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions formulated on the basis of the said provisions in the acts of the Constitutional Court adopted in new constitutional justice cases under certain circumstances may imply not only the disclosure of new aspects of the constitutional legal regulation necessary for the investigation of the said constitutional justice cases and the supplement of the conception of the provisions of the Constitution provided in the acts of the Constitutional Court adopted in the previous constitutional justice cases with new elements (fragments), but also reinterpretation of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions formulated previously when the official constitutional doctrine is corrected. Such reinterpretation of the conception of the provisions of the Constitution and the official constitutional doctrinal provisions when the official constitutional doctrine is corrected is an exclusive competence of the Constitutional Court. However, when no amendments to the Constitution are made, due to which it is necessary to reinterpret certain official constitutional doctrinal provisions so that the official constitutional doctrine would be corrected, this may be done only if the necessity to diverge from the existing precedent and to create a new one arises from the Constitution; in this field, the Constitutional Court is not completely free, it is bound by precedents that it itself created and by the official constitutional doctrine that it itself formed, on which the said precedents are based. The creation of new court precedents and arguing (grounding) the court precedents may not be rationally legally unreasoned volitional acts; the Constitutional Court, referring to its already formed constitutional doctrine and precedents, must ensure the continuity of the constitutional jurisprudence (its consecution, consistency) and the predictability of its decisions. It may be possible to deviate from the precedents created by the Constitutional Court while adopting decisions in cases of constitutional justice and new precedents may be created only in the cases when it is unavoidably and objectively necessary, constitutionally grounded and reasoned; also, the official constitutional doctrinal provisions on which the precedents of the Constitutional Court are based may not be reinterpreted so that the official constitutional doctrine would be corrected when it is not unavoidably and objectively necessary, constitutionally grounded and reasoned; any change in the precedents of the Constitutional Court or correction of the official constitutional doctrine may not be determined by accidental (in the aspect of law) factors (for instance, the correction of the official constitutional doctrine may not be determined only by a change in the composition of the Constitutional Court). The said necessity to reinterpret certain official constitutional doctrinal provisions so that the official constitutional doctrine would be corrected may be determined only by the circumstances as the necessity to increase possibilities for implementing the innate and acquired rights of persons and their legitimate interests, the necessity to better defend and protect the values enshrined in the Constitution, the need to create better conditions in order to reach the aims of the Lithuanian Nation declared in the Constitution on which the Constitution itself is based, the necessity to expand the possibilities of the constitutional control in this country in order to guarantee constitutional justice and to ensure that no legal act (part thereof) which is in conflict with legal acts of greater power, would have the immunity from being removed from the legal system. In addition, it is impossible and constitutionally impermissible to reinterpret the official constitutional doctrine so that the official constitutional doctrine would be corrected, if by doing so the system of values entrenched in the Constitution is changed, their compatibility is denied, the protection guarantees of the supremacy of the Constitution in the legal system are reduced, the concept of the Constitution as a single act and harmonious system is denied, the guarantees of rights and freedoms of the person entrenched in the Constitution are reduced and the model of the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution is changed. Every case of such reinterpretation of the official constitutional doctrine when the official constitutional doctrine is corrected has to be properly (clearly and rationally) argued in the corresponding act of the Constitutional Court. However, under the Constitution, no development of the official constitutional doctrine—neither the supplement of the conception of the provisions of the Constitution provided in the acts of the Constitutional Court adopted in the previous constitutional justice cases with new elements (fragments) nor the reinterpretation of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions formulated previously when the official constitutional doctrine is corrected—may be or is the grounds for reviewing the rulings, conclusions or decisions or their argumentation (substantiation), which were adopted in the previous constitutional justice cases by which the corresponding constitutional justice cases were finished (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 28 March 2006; its decision of 8 August 2006).

10. The uniformity and continuity of the official constitutional doctrine implies a necessity to construe each construed provision of a ruling or another final act of the Constitutional Court by taking account of the entire official constitutional doctrinal context, also of other provisions (explicit and implicit) of the Constitution, which are related with the provision (provisions) of the Constitution in the course of construction of which in a ruling or another final act of the Constitutional Court the corresponding official constitutional doctrine was formulated. No official constitutional doctrinal provision of a ruling or another final act of the Constitutional Court may be construed in isolation, by ignoring its meaning and systemic links with the other official constitutional doctrinal provisions set forth in that ruling or other final act of the Constitutional Court, in other acts of the Constitutional Court, as well as with other provisions (explicit and implicit) of the Constitution.

11. It needs to be emphasised that the official constitutional doctrinal provisions set forth in this decision of the Constitutional Court as regards correction (it goes without saying, the correction which is always constitutionally substantiated and explicitly reasoned in the corresponding act of the Constitutional Court) of the official constitutional doctrine should be related with consideration of new constitutional justice cases and new creation of precedents of the Constitutional Court in such cases, but not with the official construction of rulings or other final acts of the Constitutional Court. As mentioned before, the Constitutional Court must construe its ruling or other final act without changing its content.

II

1. By his decree of 16 October 2006, the President of the Republic requests that the Constitutional Court construe whether the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 means that

the Seimas does not have any powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters related with the organisation of work of other state institutions, provided decision of these issues is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, as, for instance, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution;

the Seimas cannot commission a Seimas provisional investigation commission with an investigation into the matters, which would in themselves mean that their investigation will require only the material of pre-trial, operational or other investigation conducted by the state institution, on the basis of which the final conclusions of the provisional investigation commission would be formulated, while the disclosure of such material could harm the pre-trial, operational or other investigation.

2. It needs to be noted that the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, whose construction is requested by the President of the Republic, is a part of a bigger text. The entire Item 6 (and Items 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 that constitute it) of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which contains this provision, is set forth as follows:

6. It needs to be noted that, under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any exhaustive (final) list of questions, for the investigation of which the Seimas may form provisional investigation commissions: since the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation and the institution of legislation (performing, as mentioned before, not only the legislative but also various other functions), may pass laws and other legal acts regulating most varied social relations, it can virtually form provisional investigation commissions designated for investigation into most varied processes which take place in the state and society.

6.1. The principle of responsible governance is entrenched in the Constitution (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 1 July 2004, 13 December 2004, and 2 June 2005). The Constitution does not imply any such activities of the Seimas, where the Seimas collects all the information necessary for legislation and other functions of the Seimas by itself, by not relying on the information submitted to it by other state institutions, nor when in the activities of the Seimas the formation of provisional or like commissions and investigation performed by them dominate. Quite to the contrary, the Constitution implies the institute of Seimas provisional investigation commissions and the legal regulation of the formation of such commissions and of their activities, where Seimas provisional investigation commissions are formed not in order to investigate any, but only special questions, i.e. those of state importance. The powers of Seimas provisional investigation commissions should be related with the constitutional purpose and functions of the Seimas.

6.2. The Constitution does not imply any possibility of forming any such Seimas provisional investigation commissions that would be commissioned with an investigation into such matters which institutions of public power, under the Constitution, may not investigate at all, as for example, circumstances of personal or family life of a human being, if, by such investigation one would unreasonably interfere with the private life of the human being, which is defended by the Constitution, if the inviolability of private life is violated, etc.

6.3. The conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with. For example, a Seimas provisional investigation commission cannot take over the constitutional powers of courts or otherwise interfere with the implementation of the constitutional competence of courts, nor violate the independence of the judge and courts in the course of administration of justice, let alone administer justice by itself; the Seimas provisional investigation commission may not take over the constitutional powers of prosecutors or otherwise interfere with the implementation of the constitutional competence of prosecutors, nor violate the independence of the prosecutor when he organises pre-trial investigation and pursues charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases <…> [the Constitutional Court’s Ruling “On the Compliance of Items 1, 2 and 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (Wording of 3 April 2003) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions With the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as on the Petition of a Group of Members of the Seimas, the Petitioner, Requesting an Investigation into Whether the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (No. IX-1868) ‘On the Conclusion of the Provisional Commission of the Seimas for an Investigation into Possible Threats to Lithuanian National Security’ of 2 December 2003 is not in Conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 3 and 8 (Wording of 3 April 2003) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions” of 13 May 2004 (hereinafter also referred to as the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004)].

However, the fact that Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws would be interfered with, does not mean that Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot have any powers in regard of state or municipal institutions, their officials and other persons at all. Such powers may be established by means of a law, when heed is paid to the Constitution as well.”

Taking account of the official constitutional doctrinal context in which the provision of the first paragraph Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which is requested to be construed, inter alia, of the fact that this provision is immediately construed therein, also by referring to the official constitutional doctrine set forth in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, in the course of the construction of the said provision one must also invoke other acts of the Constitutional Court, inter alia, the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, in which the doctrine of Seimas provisional investigation commissions is set forth.

3. In its ruling of 13 May 2004, the Constitutional Court has formulated a broad official constitutional doctrine of Seimas provisional investigation commissions. The official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the ruling of the Constitutional Court is, for the most part, the continuation and development of the official constitutional doctrine formulated in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004.

It needs to be noted that in the course of the construction of the provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which is requested to be construed (in the aspect specified by the President of the Republic, the petitioner, who submitted the corresponding petition), the following official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 are of importance:

– “Implementing its right directly established in the Constitution to particularise its certain constitutional powers by means of laws, as well as establishing, by means of laws, its powers that are not expressis verbis indicated in the Constitution, the Seimas is bound by the Constitution. The fact that the Seimas, while passing laws, is bound by the Constitution, as well as by the laws that were passed by it, is an essential element of the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law <…>” (the fifth paragraph of Item 2 of Section I of the reasoning part); “<…> the Seimas, while implementing its constitutional powers, discharges the classical functions of the parliament of a democratic state under the rule of law: the Seimas passes laws (the legislative function), conducts the parliamentary control over executive and other state institutions (save courts) (the control function), establishes state institutions, appoints and releases their heads and other state officials (the establishment function) <…>” (the first paragraph of Item 3 of Section I of the reasoning part);

– “<…> Under the Constitution, the legislature and other subjects of lawmaking may not establish any such legal regulation whereby the said constitutional functions of the Seimas would be denied or opportunities to discharge them would be restricted, since the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, would thus be hindered from effective actions in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania” (the second paragraph of Item 3 of Section I of the reasoning part);

– “In order that it might properly discharge its parliamentary functions and implement its constitutional powers, the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, has to possess exhaustive and objective information about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various sectors of life of the state and society and the arising problems. The possession of such information is a necessary precondition for the fact that the Seimas might be able to effectively act in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, that it would properly execute its constitutional duty” (the first paragraph of Item 4 of Section I of the reasoning part);

– “The constitutional functions of the Seimas, the powers of the Seimas entrenched in the Constitution presuppose the powers of the Seimas in every case when a necessity occurs to decide a certain question assigned to the constitutional competence of the Seimas, to seek to achieve exhaustive and objective information necessary to adopt corresponding decisions. The necessity to possess such information means that in case of need the Seimas can rely not only on the publicly known information or that presented to it by state institutions and other persons, but also that it can resort to concrete actions so that such exhaustive and objective information could be received. In case of need, the Seimas may conduct investigation by itself so that it could collect exhaustive and objective information about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various sectors of life of the state and society and the arising problems” (the second paragraph of Item 4 of Section I of the reasoning part);

– “<…> the Seimas, enjoying the powers in every case, whenever there occurs a necessity to decide a certain issue within the constitutional competence of the Seimas, to seek to receive exhaustive and objective information needed to adopt corresponding decisions, also enjoys discretion to form such its structural subunits which would be assigned to conduct investigation so that exhaustive and objective information about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various sectors of life of the state and society and the arising problems could be collected” (the third paragraph of Item 5.1 of Section I of the reasoning part);

– “<…> in order that it could properly discharge its constitutional functions, the Seimas may require to form also such structural subunits, which would enjoy powers in regard of various state and municipal institutions, their officials, and other persons. In the context of the case at issue, it needs to be noted that such powers may also be related with reception of exhaustive and objective information from state or municipal institutions, their officials and other persons about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various sectors of life of the state and society and the arising problems. It needs to be emphasised that reception of this information cannot be dependent upon the fact whether or not corresponding institutions and other persons are accountable to the Seimas: in order to receive exhaustive and objective information necessary to adopt corresponding decisions, the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, has to have an opportunity to receive information not only from institutions, other persons that are accountable to it, but also from persons that are not accountable to it. In case one needs to establish authoritative empowerments of a structural subunit of the Seimas in regard of institutions, their officials and other persons that are not accountable to the Seimas (including the right to demand the information the submission whereof is regulated by law), then such powers of the structural subunit of the Seimas must be established by law. When such powers are being established, one must pay heed to the norms and principles of the Constitution” (the second paragraph of Item 5.2 of Section I of the reasoning part);

– “<…> certain questions linked with the formation of structural subunits of the Seimas, establishment of their competence, formation of their composition, formulation of tasks to them, may be decided by substatutory legal acts of the Seimas. Such substatutory legal acts of the Seimas may not be in conflict with laws, as well as the Statute of the Seimas. If a substatutory act of the Seimas sets the powers of a structural subunit of the Seimas in regard of state or municipal institutions, their officials, and other persons, then such provisions of the substatutory act of the Seimas must be grounded on provisions of laws” (the third paragraph of Item 5.2 of Section I of the reasoning part).

4. Most of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions formulated in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 which are cited here (as well as the other official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the same ruling of the Constitutional Court, which, by taking account of the content of the petition requesting the provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2004 are not cited in this ruling of the Constitutional Court) are repeated, and some of them even further developed in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006. It should also be mentioned that the constitutional doctrinal provisions of some other acts of the Constitutional Court which had been adopted in previous constitutional justice cases, inter alia, the constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 1 July 2004, were repeated and developed in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006. The provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which is requested to be construed, cannot be separated from the aforesaid provisions.

From among such constitutional doctrinal provisions which were formulated in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 on the grounds of the constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, as well as other acts of the Constitutional Court adopted in previous constitutional justice cases, inter alia, in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 1 July 2004 (i.e. the provisions developing the constitutional doctrinal provisions formulated in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 and other acts of the Constitutional Court adopted in previous constitutional justice cases) from which the provision of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which is requested to be construed, cannot be separated, in the context of the petition requesting the construction of this provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, in addition to the already cited provisions of Item 6 (and Items 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 that constitute it) of Section II of the reasoning part of the said ruling of the Constitutional Court, the following provisions should be mentioned:

– “One must establish by means of legal acts such structure of the Seimas and its work procedure, must define such relations of the Seimas with other state institutions, and must consolidate such legal status of the member of the Seimas, so that the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, might be able to discharge its constitutional functions <…>” (the third paragraph of Item 2 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “Under the Constitution, the Seimas must establish such legal regulation, so that legal preconditions might be created to receive the necessary information needed in order to execute its constitutional powers” (the first paragraph of Item 5 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “<…> in a democratic state under the rule of law one cannot deny the powers of the parliament—the representation of the Nation—to take measures, inter alia, to form structural subunits of the parliament, which are meant for this purpose, and to commission them with conducting a corresponding investigation, so that information would be received about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various areas of life of the state and society and arising problems; otherwise, proper discharge of functions of the parliament—the representation of the Nation—and adoption of necessary decisions would not be ensured. The said powers arise from the very essence of the parliamentary democracy and is one of the features of parliamentarism. In the practice of parliaments of democratic states under the rule of law an opportunity of the parliament to take measures in order to receive information about processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various spheres of life of the state and society and the arising problems is also implemented by means of such institutes as provisional commissions (which are commissioned with conducting a certain investigation) formed by parliaments, parliamentary hearings and deliberations etc.” (the fourth paragraph of Item 5 of Section II of the reasoning part); “the institute of provisional commissions formed by the Seimas, inter alia, provisional investigation commissions, is also characteristic of the parliamentarism tradition of the State of Lithuania” (the fifth paragraph of Item 5 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “In each particular case, before deciding on the formation of a Seimas provisional investigation commission, the Seimas must deliberate and assess whether or not this Seimas provisional investigation commission can be formed according to the Constitution and laws. The Seimas must deliberate and assess, inter alia, the following: whether the issue due to which the formation of the Seimas provisional investigation commission is proposed is really of state importance; whether one suggests that this Seimas provisional investigation commission be commissioned with an investigation into the matters which, under the Constitution, institutions of public power may not investigate at all; whether one suggests that this Seimas provisional investigation commission be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of investigation of which the powers of other institutions which execute public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” (the first paragraph of Item 9 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “Before deciding on the formation of the Seimas provisional investigation commission, the Seimas may assess (inter alia, also from the aspect of expediency) also whether there are any circumstances, which would justify the non-forming of such commission, as, for example: whether a corresponding question has been investigated already or whether it is under investigation by a Seimas provisional investigation commission or another institution, whether the corresponding work may be performed by an already established and acting structural subunit of the Seimas, etc.” (the second paragraph of Item 9 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “<…> in cases when the question for investigation into which the formation of a Seimas provisional investigation commission is proposed is really of state importance and there are not any circumstances due to which the commission may not be formed under the Constitution and laws, and if there are not any circumstances which would justify the non-forming of such a commission, the free mandate of members of the Seimas must be used in such a way, so that the Seimas could effectively act in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, that it would properly perform its constitutional obligation” (the third paragraph of Item 13 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “<…> the principle of responsible governance is entrenched in the Constitution. The Seimas should not use its constitutional powers to form provisional investigation commissions in a way, whereby it would itself collect all the information necessary for legislation and performance of its other functions and whereby in its activities the formation of provisional investigation or similar commissions and the investigation conducted by them would dominate; as mentioned above in this ruling of the Constitutional Court, the Constitution does not imply any such activity of the Seimas. Otherwise, preconditions might be created where certain circumstances would hinder the work of the parliament, would hinder the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, to act rationally and effectively in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania” (Item 14 of Section II of the reasoning part).

5. The Constitutional Court’s Ruling “On the Compliance of Items 1, 2 and 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (Wording of 3 April 2003) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as on the Petition of a Group of Members of the Seimas, the Petitioner, Requesting an Investigation into Whether the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania (No. IX-1868) ‘On the Conclusion of the Provisional Commission of the Seimas for an Investigation into Possible Threats to Lithuanian National Security’ of 2 December 2003 is not in Conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 3 and 8 (Wording of 3 April 2003) of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions” of 13 May 2004 whose official constitutional doctrinal provisions are cited in this decision of the Constitutional Court was adopted in constitutional justice case No. 43/03-46/03, in which a group of members of the Seimas, one of the petitioners, impugned the compliance of: Item 1 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (which in the cited Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 is later referred to as the Law) to the extent that it provided that the commission has the right to receive documents, data or information from all state and governance institutions, state and municipal enterprises (including those controlled by them), establishments and organisations, even if they comprise the commercial, bank or official secret, also to receive primary and other documents, in which such data or information is recorded; Item 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 to the extent that it provided that the commission has the right to receive verbal and written explanations or notes from heads and other employees of all state and governance institutions, state and municipal enterprises (including those controlled by them), establishments and organisations, concerning the issues considered by the commission, as well as notes about the material and documents available at state institutions, enterprises, establishments or organisations; Item 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 to the extent that it provided that that the commission has the right to summon to its sittings state and municipal politicians, officials, servants as well as other persons working at state and municipal institutions, to hear their explanations, to demand that they present information or data concerning the issue considered by the commission and to receive them either in writing or orally; Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 to the extent that it provided that the commission has the right, upon the coordination with the Office of the Prosecutor General or an institution of pre-trial investigation, to familiarise itself, according to the procedure established by law, with a criminal case or other material and documents that are at their disposal, with Articles 5, 55, 61, 67, 109, and 118 of the Constitution, while another group of members of the Seimas, the other petitioner, impugned the compliance of the Seimas Resolution (No. IX-1868) “On the Conclusion of the Provisional Commission of the Seimas for an Investigation into Possible Threats to Lithuanian National Security”, which was adopted on 2 December 2003, to the extent that it provided that “via the President or his advisors, classified information used to reach the persons who did not have the right to be familiarised with it, or those in whose regard operational investigation was being conducted”, “the President and some of his advisors exerted impermissible influence on the privatisation of enterprises and individual subjects of private business”, “the President being tolerant, his advisors exceeded their competence, interfered with the activities of other state institutions, abused their status, thus causing confusion in state governance”, with Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5, Paragraph 1 of Article 31, Paragraph 1 of Article 67, Paragraph 1 of Article 109, Paragraph 1 of Article 114 of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law, as well as Articles 3 and 8 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions.

It needs to be noted that, by the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, the legal regulation established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (Items 1, 2, 3, and 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the said law (to the corresponding extent)) which was impugned in the said constitutional justice case, was ruled to be not in conflict with the Constitution.

In the context of the petition at issue, which requests the construction of the provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, the provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 are also important, which construe (comment on) the legal regulation established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments made by the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Amendment of Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted by the Seimas on 3 April 2003 and the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on the Amendment of Article 7 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted on 6 November 2003). The provisions are as follows:

– “the provision ‘the Seimas, having recognised a necessity to investigate an issue of state importance, may form a Seimas provisional investigation commission’ of Paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Law means that the Seimas, under the Law, enjoys powers to form a Seimas provisional investigation commission in order to investigate not any, but a special issue, i.e. that of state importance. Thus, in every particular case the Seimas, before it decides on the formation of a Seimas provisional investigation commission, must consider and assess whether the issue is really that of state importance” (the second paragraph of Item 2 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “In Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (3 April 2003) of the Law the rights of the Seimas provisional investigation commission are established. The Seimas provisional investigation commission has the right: to familiarise itself with the information related with the investigated issue, to receive documents, data or information from all state and governance institutions, the Bank of Lithuania, state and municipal enterprises (including those controlled by them), establishments and organisations, even if they comprise the commercial, bank or official secret, also to receive primary and other documents, in which such data or information is recorded; if the data comprise the state secret, they must be presented to the commission under the procedure established by the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on State Secrets and Their Protection and the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Operational Activities (Item 1); to receive verbal and written explanations or notes from heads and other employees of all state and governance institutions, the Bank of Lithuania, state and municipal enterprises (including those controlled by them), establishments and organisations, concerning the issues considered by the commission, as well as notes about the material and documents available at state institutions, enterprises, establishments or organisations (Item 2); to summon to its sittings state and municipal politicians, officials, servants as well as other persons working at state and municipal institutions, to hear their explanations, to demand that they present information or data concerning the issue considered by the commission and to receive them either in writing or orally (Item 3); to summon to its sittings other persons and request them to present reports, explanations, information or data concerning the issue investigated by the commission either in writing or orally (Item 4); upon the coordination with the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation, to familiarise itself, according to the procedure established by law, with a criminal case or other material and documents that are at their disposal (Item 5) <…>” (Item 3 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law consolidate the rights of the Seimas provisional investigation commission that are linked with the receiving of the information from the persons indicated in these items, which is necessary for carrying out of the tasks formulated to the commission by the Seimas. The powers of the Seimas provisional investigation commission, linked with the receiving of the said information, are distinguished as to from what persons this information must be received, the character of the information, also as to the way according to which the Seimas provisional investigation commission must receive this information from certain persons” (the first paragraph of Item 4 of Section II of the reasoning part); “In Items 1 and 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law the right of the Seimas provisional investigation commission is entrenched to receive documents, data, information, as well as the primary and other documents, in which these data were recorded, verbal and written explanations or references, as well as references about the available material, documents from heads and other employees from all state institutions of power and governance, the Bank of Lithuania, state and municipal enterprises (including those controlled by them), establishments and organisations, their heads and other employees related to the issues investigated by the Seimas provisional investigation commission. This information is necessary so that the Seimas provisional investigation commission would perform the tasks formulated to it by the Seimas” (the first paragraph of Item 4.1 of Section II of the reasoning part); “The legal regulation established in Items 1 and 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law means, inter alia, that the persons indicated in these items must present all information to the Seimas provisional investigation commission, which is necessary to perform the tasks of the commission. <…> the Law does not provide that a person indicated in Items 1 and 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law can refuse to present the aforementioned information, or to present not all information (save the exceptions, established in Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law). On the contrary, under Item 1 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, one must present documents, data or information to the Seimas provisional investigation commission, even if this is a state, commercial, bank, or official secret; this item also provides that if the data comprise the state secret, they must be presented to the commission under the procedure established by the Law on State Secrets and Their Protection and the Law on Operational Activities, while under Paragraph 2 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, in cases when one refuses to present the documents and material indicated in Item 1 of Paragraph 1 of the same article, which are demanded by the commission, the commission has the right to invite police officers so that they help to seize these documents and material, save the cases when such documents and material are in a criminal case or operative record file or card, in a civil or administrative case, or when they are material of on-going inspection under the procedure established in the Code of Criminal Procedure. <…> under Paragraph 6 of Article 7 (wording of 6 November 2003) of the Law, in case the issue under investigation is linked with the state secret, then the sittings of the Seimas provisional investigation commission are closed to all persons except the summoned ones, also that under Paragraph 5 of Article 8 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, when the mass media are informed about a conclusion or decision adopted by the Seimas provisional investigation commission, the data or information which comprise a state, commercial, bank, official, private life secret or another secret protected by law shall not be presented” (the second paragraph of Item 4.1 of Section II of the reasoning part); “Item 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law consolidates the right of the Seimas provisional investigation commission to summon to its sittings state and municipal politicians, officials, servants as well as other persons working at state and municipal institutions, to hear their explanations, to demand that they present information or data concerning the issue considered by the commission and to receive them either in writing or orally. This information is also necessary so that the Seimas provisional investigation commission would perform the tasks assigned to it by the Seimas” (the first paragraph of Item 4.2 of Section II of the reasoning part); “The legal regulation established in Item 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law means, inter alia, that the persons indicated in this item, who are summoned to a sitting of the Seimas provisional investigation commission, have a duty to appear at the sitting and present explanations to the commission concerning the investigated issue of state importance, to answer the questions given by members of the commission, also that explanations to the commission and answers to questions of members of the commission must be presented in the manner established by the commission, i.e. either orally or in writing. <…> the Law does not provide that a certain person indicated in Item 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law who is summoned to a sitting of the Seimas provisional investigation commission has the right not to appear or refuse to appear at this sitting without valid reasons; the law does not provide, either, that a certain person indicated in Item 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law has the right to refuse to present explanations to the Seimas provisional investigation commission concerning the investigated question of state importance (save the exceptions established in Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law). Thus, under the Law all the persons indicated in Item 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law who are summoned must appear at the sitting of the Seimas provisional investigation commission, must present explanations to the commission concerning the investigated issue of state importance, must answer the questions given by members of the commission in the manner established by the commission, i.e. either in writing or orally (save the exceptions established in Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law)” (the second paragraph of Item 4.2 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> should the persons indicated in Items 1, 2, and 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law fail to carry out of the aforesaid requirements of the Seimas provisional investigation commission and refuse to present the information indicated in these items to the commission, which is necessary so that the Seimas provisional investigation commission would perform the tasks assigned to it by the Seimas, or should present not all information (save the exceptions established in Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law), then, having taken account of all important circumstances in each particular case, it might be regarded as a hindrance for the Seimas provisional investigation commission to perform the tasks assigned to it by the Seimas. Alongside, this would be a hindrance for the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, to discharge its constitutional functions, and to realise the constitutional powers of the Seimas” (Item 4.3 of Section II of the reasoning part); “Under Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, the Seimas provisional investigation commission also has the right to summon to its sittings other persons and request them to present, either in writing or orally, reports, explanations, information or data concerning the issue investigated by the commission” (the first paragraph of Item 4.4 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> the Law does not contain any provisions on the grounds of which the Seimas provisional investigation commission might demand that the persons indicated in Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law appear at a sitting of the Seimas provisional investigation commission that summoned them, and present reports, explanations, information or data concerning the issue of state importance investigated by the commission” (the second paragraph of Item 4.4 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> the legal regulation established in Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law means, inter alia, that the persons indicated in this item may, at their own discretion, decide whether to appear at the sitting of the Seimas provisional investigation commission that has summoned them, and that they may, at their discretion, decide whether or not to present reports, explanations, information or data concerning the issue of state importance investigated by the commission, and whether or not to answer the questions given by members of the Seimas provisional investigation commission” (the third paragraph of Item 4.4 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> the legal regulation established in Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law does not ensure that the Seimas provisional investigation commission will, in all cases, receive all information necessary for the investigation conducted by it; thus, the aforementioned legal regulation creates preconditions for aggravating the work of the Seimas provisional investigation commission and does not ensure that the Seimas provisional investigation commission will, in all cases, perform the tasks assigned to it by the Seimas. Therefore, the said legal regulation does not ensure that the Seimas will, in all cases, receive exhaustive and objective information concerning the investigated issue of state importance, that the Seimas in all cases will be able to effectively act in the interests of the Nation and the State of Lithuania, and to properly execute its constitutional obligation. This legal regulation established in Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law should be amended” (the fourth paragraph of Item 4.4 of Section II of the reasoning part); “Under Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, the Seimas provisional investigation commission has the right, ‘upon the coordination with the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation, to familiarise itself, according to the procedure established by law, with a criminal case or other material and documents that are at their disposal’” (the first paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law provides for certain peculiarities of reception of the information necessary for the investigation by the Seimas provisional investigation commission, which is at the disposal of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation: it is permitted to familiarise oneself with a criminal case or other material and documents that are at the disposal of these state institutions only upon the coordination with these state institution” (the second paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part); “The notion ‘upon coordination’ of Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law means that the Seimas provisional investigation commission may receive the information necessary for its investigation, which is in criminal cases or other material and documents that are at the disposal of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation, only after it receives consent of a respective state institution; in case the said state institutions do not consent that the Seimas provisional investigation commission receive this information, then the commission will not be able to receive this information” (the third paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part); “The formula ‘according to the procedure established by law’ of Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law means that the Seimas provisional investigation commission cannot establish the procedure for familiarising with a criminal case or other material and documents that are at the disposal of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation by itself—this is done in accordance with the procedure established by law. It is clear that the organisational and technical questions of such familiarisation must be coordinated with the state institutions at whose disposal there is the criminal case or other material and documents” (the fourth paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “<…> under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any such legal regulation whereby this constitutional value might be denied or otherwise the independence of the prosecutor, in the course of organising pre-trial investigation and being in charge of it, while pursuing charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases, would be denied or restricted otherwise” (the sixth paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> one constitutional value—the independence of the prosecutor in the organisation of pre-trial investigation and being in charge of it, pursuit of charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases—may not be opposed to any other constitutional values; the legislature must ensure a balance between this constitutional value and other constitutional values so that not a single of constitutional values would be raised above other constitutional values or, on the contrary, would be sacrificed to the benefit of another constitutional value” (the eighth paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “<…> under Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, in case the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation do not consent that the Seimas provisional investigation commission receive this information, then the Seimas provisional investigation commission will not be able to receive the information which is necessary for its investigation, which is in criminal cases or other material and documents that are at the disposal of the aforementioned state institutions. It needs to be noted that this item (and, in general, the Law) does not provide for any criteria on the basis of which the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation might refuse to give their consent in order that the Seimas provisional investigation commission would receive the information necessary for it, or on the basis of which certain limitations could be applied to the use of this information in the work of the commission” (the tenth paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> by the legal regulation established in Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, one has created preconditions for placing one constitutional value—the independence of the prosecutor in the organisation of pre-trial investigation and being in charge of it—in opposition to other constitutional values, for raising it above the latter, in particular, above the functions of the Seimas as the representation of the Nation, and above the logical necessity, which follows from the purpose of the Seimas, from its constitutional functions and constitutional powers, which is to undertake by itself, in case of need, to investigation activity in connection with an issue of state importance so that to receive exhaustive and objective information about certain processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various sectors of life of the state and society and the arising problems” (the eleventh paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> although the legal regulation established in Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law has created pre-conditions for aggravating the discharge of certain functions of the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, the said constitutional values are not denied by this legal regulation, therefore, there is no ground to hold that the legal regulation established in Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law is in conflict with the Constitution in the said aspect. <…> this legal regulation should be amended and particularised in order that the ‘coordination’ indicated in Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law would not create pre-conditions for the institutions pointed out in this item virtually not to permit the Seimas provisional investigation commission to conduct thorough and objective investigation in connection with the issue of state importance that has been assigned to it, in other words, that one would not create pre-conditions for placing pre-trial investigation in opposition to the investigation of the issue of state importance conducted by the Seimas provisional investigation commission” (the twelfth paragraph of Item 4.5 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “The legal regulation established in Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law is inseparable from the legal regulation established in other articles (parts, items thereof) of the Law” (the first paragraph of Item 4.6 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law provides that the Seimas provisional investigation commission, while investigating the issue assigned to it and implementing its rights, does not interfere with the activities of the court, the judge, the prosecutor, the official of pre-trial investigation when they conduct the pre-trial investigation and consider the case in court” (the first paragraph of Item 4.6.1 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> under the Law, the Seimas provisional investigation commission does not have any right to demand that a judge, a prosecutor, an official of pre-trial investigation should present to the Seimas provisional investigation commission explanations concerning on-going or completed pre-trial investigation, or a case that has been accepted for consideration, or is being considered in court, or whose consideration in court is over, thus, the judge, the prosecutor, the official of pre-trial investigation cannot be summoned to a sitting of the Seimas provisional investigation commission to present their explanations concerning on-going or completed pre-trial investigation, or a case that has been accepted for consideration, or is being considered in court , or whose consideration in court is over. Thus, the legal regulation established in Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law provides for an exception, which is applicable to the duty consolidated in Items 1 and 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, of all state institutions of power and governance, the Bank of Lithuania, state and municipal enterprises (including those controlled by them), establishments and organisations, of their heads and other employees to present to the Seimas provisional investigation commission all information necessary to perform the tasks of the commission (documents, data, information, as well as primary and other documents in which these data or information is recorded, verbal and written explanations or references from the heads or other employees, also references about the available material and documents), as well as an exception which is applicable to the duty consolidated in Item 3 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, of state and municipal politicians, officials, employees, other persons who work at state or municipal institutions to appear at the sitting of the Seimas provisional investigation commission, to present explanations concerning the issue of state importance that is investigated by the commission, to answer the questions of members of the commission” (the second paragraph of Item 4.6.1 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> under Paragraph 2 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, in cases when one refuses to present to the Seimas provisional investigation commission the documents and material required by the commission, which are indicated in Item 1 of Paragraph 1 of the same article, the commission has the right to invite police officers so that they help to seize these documents and material, save the cases when such documents and material are in a criminal case or operative record file or card, in a civil or administrative case, or when they are material of on-going inspection under the procedure established in the Code of Criminal Procedure” (the third paragraph of Item 4.6.1 of Section II of the reasoning part); “The legal regulation established in Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) and Paragraph 2 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law should be regarded as one ensuring that in the activities of the Seimas provisional investigation commission one will follow the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 109 of the Constitution that in the Republic of Lithuania justice shall be administered solely by courts, the provision of Paragraph 2 of Article 109 of the Constitution that while administering justice, the judge and courts shall be independent, the provision of Paragraph 3 of Article 109 of the Constitution that while considering cases, judges shall obey only the law, the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 114 of the Constitution that interference by institutions of state power and administration, members of the Seimas and other officials, political parties, political and public organisations, or citizens with the activities of a judge or the court shall be prohibited and incur liability as provided for by law, the provision of Paragraph 1 of Article 118 of the Constitution that the prosecutor shall organise and be in charge of pre-trial investigation as well as pursue charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases, the provision of Paragraph 3 of Article 118 of the Constitution that while discharging his functions, the prosecutor shall be independent and obey only the law, as well as the other provisions of the Constitution that consolidate the independence of the judge and courts in the course of administration of justice and the independence of the prosecutor in the course of organisation of pre-trial investigation and being in charge of it” (the fourth paragraph of Item 4.6.1 of Section II of the reasoning part); “<…> there might occur a situation where the information necessary so that the Seimas provisional investigation commission would perform the tasks formulated to it by the Seimas is possessed by a judge, a prosecutor, or an official of pre-trial investigation, who learned about this information or otherwise received it while they were outside their duties as a judge, a prosecutor, or an official of pre-trial investigation. In such cases, under the Law, the Seimas provisional investigation commission has the right to demand that the judge, the prosecutor, or the official of pre-trial investigation should appear, after they have been summoned, at the sitting of the commission and that the indicated persons present their explanations to the Seimas provisional investigation commission in connection with the questions not related with on-going or completed pre-trial investigation, or a case that has been accepted for consideration, or is being considered in court, or whose consideration in court is over. However, even in these cases the Seimas provisional investigation commission does not have the right to demand that the judge, the prosecutor, or the official of pre-trial investigation should appear, after they have been summoned, at the sitting of the commission and that the indicated persons present their explanations to the Seimas provisional investigation commission, if this could be regarded as interference with the activities of the judge, the prosecutor, or the official of pre-trial investigation when they discharge the functions established to them in the Constitution and laws, and if this could be regarded as a violation of the independence of the judge or the prosecutor” (the fifth paragraph of Item 4.6.1 of Section II of the reasoning part); “it is impossible to construe the legal regulation established in Paragraph 2 of Article 3 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law as meaning that, purportedly, the Seimas provisional investigation commission in general does not have the right to demand any information from the court or the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania in connection with the issues of state importance investigated by the Seimas provisional investigation commission. However, under the Constitution, the Seimas provisional investigation commission cannot demand any such information from the court or the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania, the demand of which could be regarded as interference with the activities of these institutions, when they discharge their functions established in the Constitution and laws, and as a violation of the independence of the judge or the prosecutor” (the sixth paragraph of Item 4.6.1 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “<…> Under Paragraph 3 of Article 8 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, the conclusion must, within one day after the decision was adopted, be presented to the Seimas. <…> Under Paragraph 5 of Article 8 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law, the Seimas provisional investigation commission, after it has presented its conclusion or adopted decision to the Seimas, informs public mass media about this; the data or information which comprises the state, commercial, bank, official, private life secret or another secret protected by law, may not be published” (the second paragraph of Item 5 of Section II of the reasoning part);

– “It is clear that the Seimas is not an institution of pre-trial investigation, or the prosecutor’s office, or a court. <…> the formulation of the opinion and point of view of the Seimas regarding the conclusion of the Seimas provisional investigation commission formed by it in a resolution of the Seimas may not be construed, under the Constitution, as legal qualification of the actions that the Seimas provisional commission has investigated, of the decisions adopted by it on the issues that it was assigned to investigate, and of other circumstances that were elucidated by it. The Seimas, after it has decided either to approve or not to approve of the conclusion of the Seimas provisional investigation commission, or to approve of it in part (with reservations), does not adopt a decision on the compliance of the said actions, decisions, and circumstances with legal acts which is mandatory to other state institution (including institutions of pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor’s office, courts), but it merely formulates its point of view as to the conclusion of the Seimas provisional investigation commission that was formed by it. The Seimas resolution in which the opinion and point of view of the Seimas are formulated as to the conclusion of the Seimas provisional investigation commission that was formed by it is not binding on institutions of pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor’s office, and the court” (the third paragraph of Item 9 of Section II of the reasoning part).

6. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 (whose provision the Constitutional Court is requested to construe) also construes (comments upon) the legal regulation established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments made by the Law on the Amendment of Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted by the Seimas on 3 April 2003 and the Law on the Amendment of Article 7 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted on 6 November 2003). However, it needs to be noted that the legal regulation established in the said law is construed (commented on) by the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 by virtually repeating (and not developing) the corresponding provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004; the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 also construes the legal regulation established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions and the Statute of the Seimas, which is designed for the initiation and formation of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (i.e. for the aspects which are not requested to be construed by the President of the Republic, who has submitted the petition requesting to construe the provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006).

7. In the context of the considered petition requesting the construction of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, while summing up the official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2004 and 4 April 2006, as well as the provisions which construe (comment on) the legal regulation established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments made by the Law on the Amendment of Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted by the Seimas on 3 April 2003 and the Law on the Amendment of Article 7 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted on 6 November 2003) (which, as mentioned before, is not in conflict with the Constitution), thus, while construing the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 in the context of other provisions of the same ruling of the Constitutional Court and other provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, it should be held that the provisions of the Constitution imply broad powers of Seimas provisional investigation commissions, however, alongside, they consolidate the limits on investigation activity of Seimas provisional investigation commissions, which cannot be expanded by means of laws or other legal acts.

7.1. The Constitution authoritatively demands that such legal regulation—first of all, legislative regulation—so that, on the one hand, one could ensure the activity of Seimas provisional investigation commissions whom the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, commissions to conduct investigation so that information is collected about certain processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various spheres of the life of the state and society and arising problems, thus, also, so that one could ensure the discharging of the control function by the Seimas (parliamentary control), thus, so that there are no spheres in the life of the state in which the Seimas, the representation of the Nation, could not (in case there is a special matter (of state importance)), by heeding the Constitution, exercise parliamentary control, and, on the other hand, so that no harm would be inflicted upon any values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution if the Seimas provisional investigation commissions were formed for an investigation into such matters, which, under the Constitution, cannot be investigated by institutions of public power at all (for instance, circumstances of the private or family life of a human being, if such investigation could unreasonably, from the constitutional point of view, interfere with the private life of a human being, which is defended and protected by the Constitution, the inviolability of private life was violated etc.), nor any such matters in the course of the investigation into which one would interfere with the powers of other state and municipal institutions (their officials) (inter alia, of courts and prosecutors), which are provided for in the Constitution. The legal regulation established in laws and other legal acts must be such so that there is a rational balance between these two imperatives, which arise from the Constitution, and that none of them is ignored or sacrificed for another.

As mentioned before, it was held in the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2004 and 4 April 2006 that, under the Constitution, “the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with”; “a Seimas provisional investigation commission cannot take over the constitutional powers of courts or otherwise interfere with the implementation of the constitutional competence of courts, nor violate the independence of the judge and courts in the course of administration of justice, let alone administer justice by itself; the Seimas provisional investigation commission may not take over the constitutional powers of prosecutors or otherwise interfere with the implementation of the constitutional competence of prosecutors, nor violate the independence of the prosecutor when he organises pre-trial investigation and pursues charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases”. It also needs to be noted that, under Paragraph 2 of Article 118 of the Constitution, in cases established by law, the prosecutor shall defend the rights and legitimate interests of the person, society and the state, while under Paragraph 3 thereof, when performing his functions, the prosecutor shall be independent and shall obey only the law.

In this context, it needs to be mentioned that the official constitutional doctrinal provisions (cited in this decision of the Constitutional Court) of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 regarding the relations of Seimas provisional investigation commissions with the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania (with prosecutors), as well as the provisions (cited in this decision of the Constitutional Court) which construe (comment on) the legal regulation of the relations between Seimas provisional investigation commissions and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania (prosecutors), which is established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments made by the Law on the Amendment of Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted by the Seimas on 3 April 2003 and the Law on the Amendment of Article 7 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted on 6 November 2003), are also applicable mutatis mutandis to the legal regulation of the relations between Seimas provisional investigation commissions and other state institutions (their officials), which, according to laws, conduct pre-trial investigation and/or are subjects of operational activities.

7.2. The Constitution requires that the legal regulation be established by means of a law, so that certain information whose non-disclosure (complete non-disclosure or that to certain extent) is protected and defended by the Constitution, inter alia information, which constitutes the secret protected and defended by the Constitution, should be submitted to the Seimas provisional investigation commission (which, it goes without saying, is formed not in order to investigate the matters that a Seimas provisional investigation commission may not investigate, nor the matters in the course of investigation of which one would interfere with the powers of other state and municipal institutions (their officials) which are provided for in the Constitution), if corresponding information could be submitted at all, only by following the procedure established in laws in the strictest manner and by most strictly guaranteeing that this information will not be disclosed to any person who, under the Constitution and laws, does not enjoy the right to receive such information, since such disclosure of the said information would inflict damage upon the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution.

It is clear that submitting any information to the Seimas, which is a political institution (which, by the way, is composed of persons belonging to various political forces) is always connected with the risk that this information might spread wider than it should according to the Constitution and laws.

The legislative consolidation of the legal regulation which effectively guarantees the non-disclosure of the secrets defended and protected by the Constitution and the corresponding organisational and technical means are necessary conditions of submission of the information to Seimas provisional investigation commissions (provided such information may be submitted to a Seimas provisional investigation commission at all).

7.2.1. In this context, it needs to be noted that there are provisions in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments made by the Law on the Amendment of Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted by the Seimas on 3 April 2003 and the Law on the Amendment of Article 7 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted on 6 November 2003) which are designed for guaranteeing that such information (the disclosure of which may inflict damage upon the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution) be not submitted to Seimas provisional investigation commissions (provided such information may be submitted to them at all), and if such information is submitted to them, that such information be not disclosed to the persons who, under the Constitution and laws, enjoy no right to receive such information. From among such provisions, inter alia, the provisions should be mentioned, which require that certain information be submitted to Seimas provisional investigation commissions only upon coordination with the corresponding institutions (the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an establishment of pre-trial investigation). As mentioned before, Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions, in which it is prescribed that the commission has the right, upon the coordination with the Office of the Prosecutor General or an institution of pre-trial investigation, to familiarise itself, according to the procedure established by law, with a criminal case or other material and documents that are at their disposal, was ruled by the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 to be not in conflict with the Constitution.

7.2.2. Alongside, it needs to be noted that, as it was held in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, the legal regulation established in Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (under which a Seimas provisional investigation commission has the right, upon the coordination with the Office of the Prosecutor General or an institution of pre-trial investigation, to familiarise itself, according to the procedure established by law, with a criminal case or other material and documents that are at their disposal) should be amended an particularised in Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law in order that the “coordination” indicated in the said item would not create any pre-conditions for the institutions pointed out in this item virtually not to permit the Seimas provisional investigation commission to conduct thorough and objective investigation in connection with the issue of state importance that has been assigned to it, in other words, that one would not create pre-conditions for placing pre-trial investigation in opposition to the investigation of the issue of state importance conducted by the Seimas provisional investigation commission.

7.2.3. It should also be noted that, as held in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (and, in general, the said law) “does not provide for any criteria on the basis of which the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation might refuse to give their consent in order that the Seimas provisional investigation commission would receive the information necessary for it, or on the basis of which certain limitations could be applied to the use of this information in the work of the commission”.

7.2.4. However, it needs to be specially emphasised that the said legal regulation may not be amended or specified in a way so that preconditions would be created to raise one constitutional value—the function of control by the Seimas, which is entrenched in the Constitution, and its constitutional powers to take up by itself the investigation activity on the issue of state importance, so that exhaustive and objective information about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various sectors of life of the state and society and the arising problems could be collected—above other constitutional values ant to oppose it to other constitutional values, inter alia, the independence of the prosecutor when he organises and directs pre-trial investigation (as mentioned before, the corresponding constitutional doctrinal provisions are also applicable mutatis mutandis to the legal regulation of the relations between Seimas provisional investigation commissions and other state institutions (their officials), which, according to laws, conduct pre-trial investigation and/or are subjects of operational activities). The said legal regulation may not be amended or corrected so that in the course of establishing the criteria by following which the corresponding state institutions might disagree that a Seimas provisional investigation commission receive the information required by it, or the criteria under which some other limitations would be applied as regards the use of this information in the work of the Seimas provisional investigation commission, then such their constitutionally reasonable powers not to provide someone with certain information or to apply some other limitations would virtually be denied. If these powers of the corresponding institutions to disagree to submit certain information or to apply some other limitations were limited or denied altogether, there might appear a threat for various values entrenched in, as well as defended and protected by the Constitution.

It goes without saying, when such disagreement is expressed, it must be substantiated by the corresponding reasoning.

7.2.5. After the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 had come into force, the legislature has not amended or corrected the legal regulation established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments) at all.

Such failure to act by the legislature creates preconditions for various indeterminacies and even conflict situations. It does not ease proper submission of information to Seimas provisional investigation commissions, providing such information is really necessary to a certain Seimas provisional investigation commission in order that the Seimas could discharge its constitutional functions.

7.2.6. From the de lege ferenda standpoint it also needs to be noted that no matter what legislative regulation there is, the legal regulation must, heeding the Constitution, be such so that the powers of subjects be established in the law not to disclose the information, the disclosure of which might inflict harm on the values entrenched in and defended and protected by the Constitution.

On the other hand, the law must also establish the legal regulation which would enable one to guarantee that the powers of the subjects established in the law not to disclose the information the disclosure of which might inflict harm on the values entrenched in and defended and protected by the Constitution, should not be used to justify decisions also not to disclose the information, where the non-disclosure (complete or to certain extent) of which is not defended and protected by the Constitution and which, under procedure established by the law, must be disclosed to certain subjects, inter alia, to Seimas provisional investigation commissions, which are formed for investigation into special questions (of state importance).

8. The Constitution consolidates a parliamentary democracy. However, a parliamentary democracy is not “the convent rule”. A parliamentary democracy is not a system, where the parliament directly organises the work of other state or municipal institutions or may, at any time, interfere with the activity of any state or municipal institutions (their officials) which implement public power. Nor is a parliamentary democracy a system, where the parliament, under the slightest pretext, may even exert control over any decisions of such institutions (their officials), may initiate the application of sanctions against the corresponding persons, let alone adopt decisions by itself for the state or municipal institutions (their officials) which enjoy the corresponding competence, i.e. adopt such decisions which can be adopted only by the state institutions (their officials) which enjoy the corresponding competence, for example, courts, prosecutors, the National Audit Office, institutions of pre-trial investigation, and subjects of the operational activity provided for in laws.

The model of a parliamentary democracy consolidated in the Constitution is rational and moderate. It is based not only upon the control exercised by the parliament and not only by inter-institutional checks and balances; in a parliamentary democracy, the inter-functional partnership, which is based, inter alia, upon trust, plays a role of no less importance. It has been held in the Constitutional Court’s acts that when general functions and tasks of the state are being accomplished, there exists inter-functional partnership among state institutions, as well as reciprocal control and balance (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 10 January 1998, 21 April 1998 and 9 May 2006). The Constitutional Court has held that “the interaction of state power may not be treated as their conflict or competition, thus, also the checks and balances that the judicial power (its institutions) and other state powers (its institutions) have towards each other, may not be treated as mechanisms of the opposition of powers” (the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 9 May 2006).

A different interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, which consolidate the control function performed by the Seimas (inter alia, the provisions which substantiate an opportunity to form Seimas provisional investigation commissions) would unavoidably deny the constitutional principles of responsible governance, the separation of powers, a state under the rule of law, and democracy, also, the striving for an open, harmonious and just civil society which is proclaimed in the Preamble to the Constitution, it would create preconditions for instability in state governance, in management of public affairs, as well as the preconditions for violation of the rights and freedoms as well as the legitimate interests and legitimate expectations or the person and other values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution.

III

1. Subsequent to the petition requesting to construe a provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which was submitted by the President of the Republic, the petitioner whether the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 means that the Seimas does not have any powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters related with the organisation of work of other state institutions, provided decision of these issues is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, as, for instance, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution, it should be noted that, as it was held in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, under the Constitution, it is not permitted to establish any exhaustive (final) list of questions, for the investigation of which the Seimas may form provisional investigation commissions; the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation can virtually form provisional investigation commissions designated for the investigation of most varied processes which take place in the state and society.

Alongside, it needs to be noted that Seimas provisional investigation commissions may be formed for the investigation of not any, but only special questions, i.e. those of state importance (the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2004 and 4 April 2006).

2. Thus, in general, when there is a special matter (of state importance), the Constitution does not prohibit the Seimas from forming also such Seimas provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into the activity of state or municipal institutions, i.e. into how the corresponding state or municipal institutions perform their functions defined in the Constitution and laws, and into how they implement the powers established in the Constitution and laws. In order that it could carry out such a task set by the Seimas, the Seimas provisional investigation commission has to have an opportunity to receive, under procedure established in laws, also such information which is related with the organisation of work in the corresponding state or municipal institutions, irrespective of whether the decision of the respective questions regarding, inter alia, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution, is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, or whether also other persons take part in adoption of such decisions. However, it needs to be underlined that Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot be formed for elucidation of only such questions as those mentioned above: the investigation into such may not be an end in itself. The reception of factual information about such matters may only serve as a means to elucidate special questions (of state importance).

Thus, Seimas provisional investigation commissions may not be commissioned with investigation and assessment, both in the lawfulness and/or expediency respects, or with exercising control over decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions as regards the professional career of persons who work in the corresponding institutions, since only the state and municipal institutions (their officials) that enjoy the necessary empowerments may conduct such investigation, assessment and control, and may adopt the corresponding decisions.

Seimas provisional investigation commissions may be commissioned with investigation and assessment of decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions, inter alia, as regards the structure of the corresponding institutions, however, inasmuch as it is necessary in order to elucidate whether these decisions are such, so that the corresponding state or municipal institutions can properly discharge their functions defined in the Constitution and laws, and that they can implement the powers established to them in the Constitution and laws.

In this context, it needs to be noted that, as it was held in this decision of the Constitutional Court, under the Constitution, the control function discharged by the Seimas does not imply that the Seimas directly organises the work of other state or municipal institutions or may, at any time, interfere with the activity of any state or municipal institutions (their officials) which implement public power. Nor does the control function discharged by the Seimas imply that an opportunity for the Seimas to adopt such decisions which can be adopted only by the state institutions (their officials) which enjoy the corresponding competence.

Even more so, no subunit of the Seimas, thus also Seimas provisional investigation commissions, may enjoy any such powers.

3. It also needs to be noted that, as it was held in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, “in order that it could properly discharge its constitutional functions, the Seimas may require to form also such structural subunits, which would enjoy powers in regard of various state and municipal institutions, their officials, and other persons”; “such powers may also be related with reception of exhaustive and objective information from state or municipal institutions, their officials and other persons about the processes taking place in the state and society, about the situation in various sectors of life of the state and society and the arising problems”; “reception of this information cannot be dependent upon the fact whether or not corresponding institutions and other persons are accountable to the Seimas: in order to receive exhaustive and objective information necessary to adopt corresponding decisions, the Seimas, as the representation of the Nation, has to have an opportunity to receive information not only from institutions, other persons that are accountable to it, but also from persons that are not accountable to it”; “in case one needs to establish authoritative empowerments of a structural subunit of the Seimas in regard of institutions, their officials and other persons that are not accountable to the Seimas (including the right to demand the information the submission whereof is regulated by law), then such powers of the structural subunit of the Seimas must be established by law”; “when such powers are being established, one must pay heed to the norms and principles of the Constitution”.

It was also held in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 that “the fact that Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws would be interfered with, does not mean that Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot have any powers in regard of state or municipal institutions, their officials and other persons at all”; “such powers may be established by means of a law, when heed is paid to the Constitution as well”.

The formulas “such powers of the structural subunit of the Seimas must be established by law” and “such powers may be established by means of a law, when heed is paid to the Constitution as well” used therein also mean that the laws must establish expressis verbis, clearly and unambiguously, as to what authoritative empowerments a Seimas provisional investigation commission has in regard of the institutions, their officials, other persons, who are not accountable to the Seimas. When such powers are being established, one must pay heed to the norms and principles of the Constitution, inter alia, the official doctrinal provisions formulated in Constitutional Court’s acts, in which the corresponding provisions of the Constitution are construed.

It needs to be noted that the work of Seimas provisional investigation commissions must be regulated so that the necessary information is received and the interrogation of the persons summoned to the sittings of Seimas provisional investigation commissions is arranged so that pre-conceived opinion is not formed by the questions and comments presented by the members of that commission, that human dignity is not degraded, that the right of the person to private life is not violated, that only such questions and comments are presented which are connected with the matter under investigation, and that the questions are not imaginary or provocative. Also, one must ensure that the information received by Seimas provisional investigation commissions, the non-disclosure of which is protected by the Constitution, will not be made public or disclosed to the persons who, under the Constitution and laws, have no right to receive such information, since such disclosure of the said information would inflict damage on the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution.

4. Taking account of the arguments set forth as regards the petition requesting the construction of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which was submitted by the President of the Republic, the petitioner, whether the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 means that the Seimas does not have any powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters related with the organisation of work of other state institutions, provided decision of these issues is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, as, for instance, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution, the conclusion is to be drawn that the said provision of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, when it is construed in the context of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 and of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 also means that

under the Constitution, the Seimas enjoys the powers, when there is a special matter (of state importance), to form also such Seimas provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into activities of state or municipal institutions, i.e. into how the corresponding state or municipal institutions discharge their functions which are defined in the Constitution and laws and into how they implement the powers established in the Constitution and laws; in order that it could carry out such a task set by the Seimas, the Seimas provisional investigation commission has to have an opportunity to receive, under procedure established in laws, also such information which is related with the organisation of work in the corresponding state or municipal institutions, irrespective of whether the decision of the corresponding questions regarding, inter alia, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution, is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, or whether also other persons take part in adoption of such decisions, however, Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot be formed for elucidation of only such questions as those mentioned above: the reception of factual information about such matters may only serve as a means to elucidate special questions (of state importance);

Seimas provisional investigation commissions may not be commissioned with investigation and assessment, both in the lawfulness and/or expediency respects, or with exercising control over decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions as regards the professional career of persons who work in the corresponding institutions, since only the state and municipal institutions (their officials) that enjoy the necessary empowerments may conduct such investigation, assessment, control and adopt the corresponding decisions;

Seimas provisional investigation commissions may be commissioned with investigation and assessment of decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions, inter alia, as regards the structure of the corresponding institutions, however, inasmuch as it is necessary in order to elucidate whether these decisions are such, so that the corresponding state or municipal institutions can properly discharge their functions defined in the Constitution and laws, and that they can implement the powers established to them in the Constitution and laws;

one must ensure that the information received by Seimas provisional investigation commissions, the non-disclosure of which is protected by the Constitution, will not be made public or disclosed to the persons who, under the Constitution and laws, have no right to receive such information, since such disclosure of the said information would inflict damage on the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution;

it is not permitted that by means of the legal regulation of the activities of Seimas provisional investigation commissions create preconditions where the Seimas provisional investigation commission or the entire Seimas directly organises the work of other state or municipal institutions or interferes with the activity of any state or municipal institutions (their officials) which implement public power, or adopts such decisions which can be adopted only by the state institutions (their officials) which enjoy the corresponding competence.

IV

1. Subsequent to the petition requesting the construction of a certain provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which was submitted by the President of the Republic, the petitioner, whether the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 means that the Seimas cannot commission a Seimas provisional investigation commission with an investigation into the matters, which would in themselves mean that their investigation will require only the material of pre-trial, operational or other investigation conducted by the state institution, on the basis of which the final conclusions of the provisional investigation commission would be formulated, while the disclosure of such material could harm the pre-trial, operational or other investigation, it needs to be noted that, as it was held in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, “the Seimas is not an institution of pre-trial investigation, or the prosecutor’s office, or a court”.

2. It is also to be noted that, as it was held in Constitutional Court’s rulings of 13 May 2004 and 4 April 2006, under the Constitution “the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with”; “a Seimas provisional investigation commission cannot take over the constitutional powers of courts or otherwise interfere with the implementation of the constitutional competence of courts, nor violate the independence of the judge and courts in the course of administration of justice, let alone administer justice by itself”; “the Seimas provisional investigation commission may not take over the constitutional powers of prosecutors or otherwise interfere with the implementation of the constitutional competence of prosecutors, nor violate the independence of the prosecutor when he organises pre-trial investigation and pursues charges on behalf of the state in criminal cases”. It was also mentioned that, under Paragraph 2 of Article 118 of the Constitution, in cases established by law, the prosecutor shall defend the rights and legitimate interests of the person, society and the state.

It also needs to be noted that, as held in this decision of the Constitutional Court, the cited official constitutional doctrinal provisions regarding the relations of Seimas provisional investigation commissions with the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania (with prosecutors), as well as the provisions which construe (comment on) the legal regulation of the relations between Seimas provisional investigation commissions and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania (prosecutors), which is established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments made by the Law on the Amendment of Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted by the Seimas on 3 April 2003 and the Law on the Amendment of Article 7 of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions which was adopted on 6 November 2003), are also applicable mutatis mutandis to the legal regulation of the relations between Seimas provisional investigation commissions and other state institutions (their officials), which, according to laws, conduct pre-trial investigation and/or are subjects of operational activities.

3. It needs also to be noted that, as held in this decision of the Constitutional Court, the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, when it is construed in the context of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 and of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 also means that

under the Constitution, the Seimas enjoys the powers, when there is a special matter (of state importance), to form also such Seimas provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into activities of state or municipal institutions, i.e. into how the corresponding state or municipal institutions discharge their functions which are defined in the Constitution and laws and into how they implement the powers established in the Constitution and laws; in order that it could carry out such a task set by the Seimas, the Seimas provisional investigation commission has to have an opportunity to receive, under procedure established in laws, also such information which is related with the organisation of work in the corresponding state or municipal institutions, irrespective of whether the decision of the corresponding questions regarding, inter alia, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution, is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, or whether also other persons take part in adoption of such decisions, however, Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot be formed for elucidation of only such questions as those mentioned above: the reception of factual information about such matters may only serve as a means to elucidate special questions (of state importance);

Seimas provisional investigation commissions may not be commissioned with investigation and assessment, both in the lawfulness and/or expediency respects, or with exercising control over decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions as regards the professional career of persons who work in the corresponding institutions, since only the state and municipal institutions (their officials) that enjoy the necessary empowerments may conduct such investigation, assessment, control and adopt the corresponding decisions;

Seimas provisional investigation commissions may be commissioned with investigation and assessment of decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions, inter alia, as regards the structure of the corresponding institutions, however, inasmuch as it is necessary in order to elucidate whether these decisions are such, so that the corresponding state or municipal institutions can properly discharge their functions defined in the Constitution and laws, and that they can implement the powers established to them in the Constitution and laws;

one must ensure that the information received by Seimas provisional investigation commissions, the non-disclosure of which is protected by the Constitution, will not be made public or disclosed to the persons who, under the Constitution and laws, have no right to receive such information, since such disclosure of the said information would inflict damage on the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution;

it is not permitted that by means of the legal regulation of the activities of Seimas provisional investigation commissions create preconditions where the Seimas provisional investigation commission or the entire Seimas directly organises the work of other state or municipal institutions or interferes with the activity of any state or municipal institutions (their officials) which implement public power, or adopts such decisions which can be adopted only by the state institutions (their officials) which enjoy the corresponding competence.

4. A Seimas provisional investigation commission may receive the material of pre-trial, operational or other investigation (if the corresponding information could be submitted at all) provided this information is indeed necessary that the Seimas could discharge its constitutional functions, only by following the procedure established in laws in the strictest manner and by most strictly guaranteeing that this information will not be disclosed to any person who, under the Constitution and laws, does not enjoy the right to receive such information, since such disclosure of the said information would inflict damage upon the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution. It has been held in this decision of the Constitutional Court that the legislative consolidation of the legal regulation which effectively guarantees the non-disclosure of the secrets defended and protected by the Constitution and the corresponding organisational and technical means are necessary conditions of submission of the information to Seimas provisional investigation commissions (provided such information may be submitted to a Seimas provisional investigation commission at all).

In this context, it needs to be mentioned that, as it has been held in this decision of the Constitutional Court, there are provisions in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments) which are designed for guaranteeing that such information (the disclosure of which may inflict damage upon the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution) be not submitted to Seimas provisional investigation commissions (provided such information may be submitted to them at all), and if such information is submitted to them, that such information be not revealed to the persons who, under the Constitution and laws, enjoy no right to receive such information; there are, inter alia, the provisions which require that certain information be submitted to Seimas provisional investigation commissions only upon coordination with the corresponding institutions (the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an establishment of pre-trial investigation), however, after the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 had come into force, the legislature has not amended or corrected the legal regulation established in the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions (wording of 23 March 1999 with subsequent amendments) at all, namely, so that the “coordination” indicated in Item 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law would not create pre-conditions for the institutions pointed out in this item virtually not to permit the Seimas provisional investigation commission to conduct thorough and objective investigation in connection with the issue of state importance that has been assigned to it, in other words, that one would not create pre-conditions for placing pre-trial investigation in opposition to the investigation of the issue of state importance conducted by the Seimas provisional investigation commission, or so that criteria might be established on the basis of which the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or an institution of pre-trial investigation might refuse to give their consent in order that the Seimas provisional investigation commission would receive the information necessary for it, or on the basis of which certain limitations could be applied to the use of this information in the work of the commission.

It has also been held in this decision of the Constitutional Court that such failure to act by the legislature creates preconditions for various indeterminacies and even conflict situations; it does not ease proper submission of information to Seimas provisional investigation commissions, providing such information is really necessary for a certain Seimas provisional investigation commission in order that the Seimas could discharge its constitutional functions.

5. It needs to be emphasised that the information at the disposal of the Office of the Prosecutor General, the National Audit Office, the State Security Department or a pre-trial investigation establishment (which are mentioned in Article 4 (wording of 3 April 2003) of the Law on Seimas Provisional Investigation Commissions), which is the material of pre-trial, operational or other investigation and until such investigation is over and its conclusions are formalised by the corresponding procedural documents, cannot, as a rule, serve as the grounds for conclusions made by a Seimas provisional investigation commission; this statement is not an absolute one; however, whatever its exceptions, which arise from the Constitution that contains obligations to defend and protect the rights and legitimate interests of the person, society and the state, as well as other constitutional values, regardless of whether the legislator has carried out his duty and properly reflected these exceptions in laws, one must in all cases pay heed to the powers of the corresponding state institution, inter alia, the powers of an institution of pre-trial investigation or/and a subject of operational activities to refuse, by giving reasons, that a Seimas provisional investigation commission receive the said information which is necessary to it, or to demand that certain limitations be applied for the use of such information in the work of the Seimas provisional investigation commission.

In this context, it needs to be mentioned that, as it was held in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004, “it is clear that the organisational and technical questions of such familiarisation must be coordinated with the state institutions at whose disposal there is the criminal case or other material and documents”.

6. Taking account of the arguments set forth as regards the petition requesting the construction of a certain provision of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, which was submitted by the President of the Republic, the petitioner, whether the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 means that the Seimas cannot commission a Seimas provisional investigation commission with an investigation into the matters, which would in themselves mean that their investigation will require only the material of pre-trial, operational or other investigation conducted by the state institution, on the basis of which the final conclusions of the provisional investigation commission would be formulated, while the disclosure of such material could harm the pre-trial, operational or other investigation, the conclusion is to be drawn that the said provision of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006, when it is construed in the context of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 and of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 also means that the Seimas enjoys the powers, in case there is a special matter (of state importance) to commission a Seimas provisional investigation commission with investigation into the matters for the investigation of which also the material of the investigation (as well as pre-trial and operational investigation) conducted by the corresponding institutions will be necessary, however, it cannot be the information which, under the Constitution, may not be disclosed to the Seimas provisional investigation commission altogether, nor may the powers of the subjects established by law not to disclose the information whose disclosure could inflict damage on the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution, as well as on unfinished pre-trial and operational investigation, be denied.

Conforming to Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 1 and 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania adopts the following

decision:

To construe that the provision “the conclusion should be drawn from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and other provisions of the Constitution that the Seimas has no powers to form any such provisional investigation commissions which would be commissioned with an investigation into the matters in the course of the investigation of which the powers of other institutions which exercise public power, as well as the powers of other state and municipal institutions provided for in the Constitution and/or laws, would be interfered with” of Item 6.3. of Section II of the reasoning part of the of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania “On the compliance of Paragraph 3 (wording of 22 December 1998) of Article 73 of the Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania” of 4 April 2006 (Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2006, No. 38-1349), when it is construed in the context of the official constitutional doctrinal provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 4 April 2006 and of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 May 2004 also means that

under the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania enjoys the powers, when there is a special matter (of state importance), to form also such Seimas provisional investigation commissions, which would be commissioned with an investigation into activities of state or municipal institutions, i.e. into how corresponding state or municipal institutions discharge their functions which are defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and laws and into how they implement the powers established in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and laws; in order that it could carry out such a task set by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Seimas provisional investigation commission has to have an opportunity to receive, under procedure established in laws, also such information which is related with the organisation of work in the corresponding state or municipal institutions, irrespective of whether the decision of corresponding questions regarding, inter alia, the establishment of the structure of the institutions, the establishment and liquidation of structural subunits, employees’ admission to work, their release from office, their transfer to another position, their removal from duties and other issues related with the career, legal status etc. of employees of the institution, is, according to laws, within the competence of the heads of these institutions, or whether also other persons take part in adoption of such decisions, however, Seimas provisional investigation commissions cannot be formed for elucidation of only such questions as those mentioned above: the reception of factual information about such matters may only serve as a means to elucidate special questions (of state importance);

Seimas provisional investigation commissions may not be commissioned with investigation and assessment, both in the lawfulness and/or expediency respects, or with exercising control over decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions as regards the professional career of persons who work in corresponding institutions, since only the state and municipal institutions (their officials) that enjoy the necessary empowerments may conduct such investigation, assessment, control and adopt corresponding decisions;

Seimas provisional investigation commissions may be commissioned with investigation and assessment of decisions of heads of state and municipal institutions, inter alia, as regards the structure of corresponding institutions, however, inasmuch as it is necessary in order to elucidate whether these decisions are such, so that corresponding state or municipal institutions can properly discharge their functions defined in the Constitution and laws, and that they can implement the powers established to them in the Constitution and laws;

the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania enjoys the powers, in case there is a special matter (of state importance) to commission a Seimas provisional investigation commission with investigation into the matters for the investigation of which also the material of the investigation (as well as pre-trial and operational investigation) conducted by corresponding institutions will be necessary, however, it cannot be the information which, under the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, may not be disclosed to the Seimas provisional investigation commission altogether, nor may the powers of the subjects established by law not to disclose the information whose disclosure could inflict damage on the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as on unfinished pre-trial and operational investigation, be denied;

one must ensure that the information received by Seimas provisional investigation commissions, the non-disclosure of which is protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, will not be made public or disclosed to the persons who, under the Constitution and laws, have no right to receive such information, since such disclosure of the said information would inflict damage on the values entrenched in, and defended and protected by the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania;

it is not permitted that by means of the legal regulation of the activities of Seimas provisional investigation commissions create preconditions where the Seimas provisional investigation commission or the entire Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania directly organises the work of other state or municipal institutions or interferes with the activity of any state or municipal institutions (their officials) which implement public power, or adopts such decisions which can be adopted only by the state institutions (their officials) which have corresponding competence.

This decision of the Constitutional Court is final and not subject to appeal.

The decision is pronounced in the name of the Republic of Lithuania.

Justices of the Constitutional Court:          Armanas Abramavičius

                                                                               Toma Birmontienė

                                                                               Egidijus Kūris

                                                                               Kęstutis Lapinskas

                                                                               Zenonas Namavičius

                                                                               Ramutė Ruškytė

                                                                               Vytautas Sinkevičius

                                                                               Stasys Stačiokas

                                                                               Romualdas Kęstutis Urbaitis