Case No. 13/04-21/04-43/04, 38/04-39/04
                                                                 
      THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
                                
                            DECISION
     ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ITEM 15.3.1.1
     OF  CHAPTER II OF THE REASONING PART OF THE RULING  OF
     THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF  LITHUANIA
     OF  9  MAY  2006 AND ITEM 12.2 OF CHAPTER IV  OF   THE
     REASONING PART OF THE RULING OF 22 OCTOBER 2007

                          30 June 2010
                             Vilnius

     The  Constitutional  Court  of the Republic  of   Lithuania,
composed  of  the Justices of the Constitutional  Court   Armanas
Abramavičius,   Toma  Birmontienė,  Pranas  Kuconis,     Kęstutis
Lapinskas, Zenonas Namavičius, Ramutė Ruškytė, Egidijus Šileikis,
Algirdas Taminskas, and Romualdas Kęstutis Urbaitis,
     with the secretary of the hearing—Daiva Pitrėnaitė,
     pursuant  to  Article 61 of the Law on  the   Constitutional
Court  of the Republic of Lithuania, in its public hearing on  29
June  2010, considered petitions of the Šiauliai Regional   Court
and the Supreme Court of Lithuania requesting to construe certain
provisions  of Item 15.3.1.1 of Chapter II of the reasoning  part
of  the  ruling of the Constitutional Court of the  Republic   of
Lithuania  of  9  May 2006 and Item 12.2 of Chapter  IV  of   the
reasoning  part of the ruling of the Constitutional Court of  the
Republic of Lithuania of 22 October 2007.
     By  means of the Constitutional Court decision "On   Joining
the  Petitions" of 14 June 2010, petition No. 1B-16/2010 of   the
Šiauliai  Regional Court, a petitioner, and petition  No.  1B-28/
2010 of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, a petitioner, were joined
into one case.

     The Constitutional Court
                        has established:

     1. In constitutional justice case No. 13/04-21/04-43/04, the
Constitutional  Court  adopted the Ruling "On the compliance   of
Paragraph 2 (wording of 24 January 2002), Paragraph 3 (wording of
21  January 2003), Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 (wording of 24   January
2002) of Article 56, Paragraph 3 (wording of 28 January 2003)  of
Article  57, Paragraph 4 (wording of 24 January 2002) of  Article
63,  Paragraphs 2 and 3 (wording of 24 January 2002) of   Article
70,  Paragraphs 2 and 3 (wording of 24 January 2002) of   Article
71,  Paragraphs 2 and 3 (wording of 24 January 2002) of   Article
72,  Paragraph  2  (wording of 24 January 2002) of  Article   73,
Paragraph 1 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 74, Paragraph
1  (wording  of  24  January 2002) of Article  75,  Paragraph   2
(wording of 21 January 2003) of Article 76, Paragraph 3  (wording
of  24  January 2002) of Article 77, Paragraph 2 (wording of   21
January  2003) of Article 78, Paragraph 2 (wording of 24  January
2002)  of Article 79, Paragraphs 3 and 7 (wording of 24   January
2002)  of Article 81, Paragraphs 3 and 7 (wording of 24   January
2002)  of Article 90, Paragraphs 2 and 5 (wording of 24   January
2002) of Article 119, Items 3 and 4 (wording of 24 January  2002)
of  Article  120,  Paragraph 2 (wording of 24 January  2002)   of
Article  128 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Courts, of  Item
13  (wording  of  4  July 1996) of Paragraph 3  of  Article   11,
Paragraphs  1  and 3 (wording of 18 April 1995) and Paragraph   4
(wording  of 4 July 1996) of Article 17, Paragraph 3 (wording  of
18  April 1995) of Article 18 of the Republic of Lithuania Law  '
The Statute of the Supreme Court of Lithuania', and of Article  1
of Decree of the President of the Republic of Lithuania No.  2048
'On  the Dismissal of a Judge of the Regional Court from  Office'
of  10  February 2003 with the Constitution of the  Republic   of
Lithuania" (Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2006, No. 51-1894;
hereinafter  referred to as the Constitutional Court ruling of  9
May 2006).
     2.  On 22 October 2007, in constitutional justice case   No.
38/04-39/04  the Constitutional Court adopted the Ruling "On  the
compliance  of  Article 4 (wordings of 2 July 2002,  4   November
2004,  19 May 2005 and 8 June 2006) of the Republic of  Lithuania
Law on the State Pensions of Judges with the Constitution of  the
Republic of Lithuania" (Official Gazette Valstybės žinios,  2007,
No. 110-4511; hereinafter referred to as the Constitutional Court
ruling of 22 October 2007).
     3. The Šiauliai Regional Court, a petitioner, requests inter
alia  to construe whether the provision "the judge, despite   the
fact  that his powers have expired or he reached the  pensionable
age  established by law, may still hold his office for a  certain
period  of  time until the consideration of certain  cases,   the
consideration of which was not finished at the time (on the  day)
when the term of powers of that judge expired or when he  reached
the  pensionable  age  established by law,  is  finished   (final
decisions  therein  will be adopted), and at the time  when   the
consideration of the said cases is not yet finished he is a full-
fledged  judge"  of Item 15.3.1.1 of the reasoning part  of   the
Constitutional  Court ruling of 9 May 2006, which, according   to
the  petitioner, is repeated in Item 12.2 of the   Constitutional
Court  ruling of 22 October 2007 as well as Item 8 of Section  II
of  the  Constitutional Court ruling of 15 May 2009, means   that
powers  of  such  a  judge are limited by the  cases  which   are
indicated  in the decree of the President of the Republic on  the
extension of powers of such a judge.
     The Šiauliai Regional Court, a petitioner, requests also  to
construe whether:
     -  the  provision  "a full-fledged  judge",  formulated   in
Constitutional  Court rulings, means that the judge enjoys  full-
fledged powers only in the concrete cases indicated in the decree
of  the President of the Republic on the extension of powers   of
the judge;
     -  the  provision that the judge, during the period of   the
extension  of  his powers, has to receive the same  workload   as
other  judges of that court means that, during the period of  the
extension  of his powers, as long as the cases indicated in   the
decree of the President of the Republic are not finished, such  a
judge may consider (be a judge-rapporteur, a judge, and a  member
of the college) also other cases, which are not indicated in  the
decree  of  the  President of the Republic on the  extension   of
powers of the judge.
     4.  The Supreme Court of Lithuania, a petitioner,   requests
inter  alia to construe whether the provision "The   Constitution
does not in essence prevent such legal regulation established  by
law where the judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has
expired or he reached the pensionable age established by law, may
still  hold  his office for a certain period of time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted)" of the second paragraph of Item 15.3.1.1 of Chapter  II
of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May
2006 means that the powers of such a judge (a judge-rapporteur, a
judge, and a member of the college) to administer justice,  which
are  entrenched  in the Constitution, are limited by  the   cases
indicated  in the decree of the President of the Republic on  the
extension of powers of such a judge.
     The Supreme Court of Lithuania, a petitioner, requests inter
alia  to construe whether the provisions "<...> at the time  when
the consideration of the said cases is not yet finished the  said
judge  is  a  full-fledged judge:  while  administering   justice
(deciding  cases), he has the same powers as other judges of  the
corresponding  court, his status as a judge is indivisible,   the
same  restrictions  of activity and limitation  of   remuneration
which  stem from the Constitution are applied to him, he has  the
same responsibility and immunities as other judges. Thus, he  has
the  same  workload (inter alia because of the fact that in   the
said  court,  the  position  of a judge who must  carry  out   an
important  constitutional function—to administer justice—is   not
yet  vacant) as other judges of the corresponding court" of   the
second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of the reasoning part
of  the Constitutional Court ruling of 22 October 2007 mean  that
such  a judge (a judge-rapporteur, a judge, and a member of   the
college),  as  a  full-fledged  judge,  also  has  the    powers,
entrenched  in  the Constitution, to administer justice  and   in
other  cases,  which  are  not indicated in the  decree  of   the
President  of  the  Republic on the extension of powers  of   the
judge,  but  which are additionally received for   consideration,
until  final decisions therein are adopted or the   consideration
thereof is postponed.
     The Supreme Court of Lithuania, a petitioner, also  requests
to construe whether the judge who has reached the age of 65 years
and  whose  powers  have  been extended by  the  decree  of   the
President  of the Republic until the consideration of the   cases
indicated  in  the  decree  is finished, in the  case  when   the
consideration  of the cases indicated in the decree is  finished,
but  the  said  judge,  as a  full-fledged  judge,  is  a  judge-
rapporteur,  a judge, or a member of the college in other   cases
received  for  consideration, has the powers, entrenched in   the
Constitution,  to  administer justice in the said  other   cases,
which  are  not indicated in the decree of the President of   the
Republic and the consideration of which is not finished.

     The Constitutional Court
                           holds that:

                                I
     1.  The  powers of the Constitutional Court  to   officially
construe  its  own  rulings  are entrenched in the  Law  on   the
Constitutional  Court (Article 61). Paragraph 1 of Article 61  of
the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that a ruling of the
Constitutional   Court  may  be  officially  construed  by    the
Constitutional  Court at the request of the parties to the  case,
of  other institutions or persons to whom it was sent, or on  its
own initiative. Under Item 158 of the Rules of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Lithuania, upon announcement of a  final
act  of  the  Constitutional Court at a public  hearing  of   the
Constitutional Court, the General Division of the  Constitutional
Court,  not later than within 2 days of the date of adoption   of
the  said  documents,  sends copies thereof to  inter  alia   the
President  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Lithuania.  Thus,   under
Paragraph 1 of Article 61 of the Law on Constitutional Court, the
Supreme  Court  of  Lithuania  has the right  to  apply  to   the
Constitutional  Court  with a petition requesting to construe   a
Constitutional Court ruling.
     2.   The  petition  of  the  Šiauliai  Regional  Court,    a
petitioner,  requesting to construe the corresponding  provisions
of   the   Constitutional  Court  rulings,  was  accepted     for
consideration  by the Constitutional Court decision of 22   April
2010.
     3.  A decision concerning construction of a   Constitutional
Court  ruling shall be adopted at a Constitutional Court  sitting
as  a separate document (Paragraph 2 of Article 61 of the Law  on
the Constitutional Court).
     4.  In its acts the Constitutional Court has held more  than
once  that  the  purpose  of the institute  of  construction   of
Constitutional Court rulings and other final acts is to  disclose
the  contents  and  meaning  of corresponding  provisions  of   a
Constitutional  Court ruling or other final act more broadly  and
in  more  detail, if it is necessary, in order to ensure   proper
execution of that Constitutional Court ruling or other final  act
so that this Constitutional Court ruling or other final act would
be followed.
     5.  The Constitutional Court has held more than once that  a
ruling  of  the Constitutional Court is integral; the   operative
(resolving) part of a ruling of the Constitutional Court is based
upon  the arguments of the reasoning part; while construing   its
ruling, the Constitutional Court is bound both by the content  of
the  part of resolution and that of reasoning of its ruling;  the
decision  adopted  concerning construction of  a   Constitutional
Court ruling is inseparable from the Constitutional Court ruling.
     6.  Under  Paragraph  3  of Article 61 of the  Law  on   the
Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court must construe  its
ruling without changing its content.
     The  Constitutional Court has held more than once that  this
provision  of  Paragraph  3  of Article 61 of  the  Law  on   the
Constitutional  Court,  among  other things, means  that,   while
construing  its ruling, the Constitutional Court cannot  construe
its content so that the meaning of its provisions, inter alia the
notional entirety of the elements constituting the content of the
ruling, the arguments and reasons upon which that  Constitutional
Court  ruling is based, is changed, also that the  Constitutional
Court  may  not  construe  what was  not  investigated  in   that
constitutional  justice case, subsequent to which the   construed
ruling  was  adopted, either. The Constitutional Court has   held
more than once that the consideration of a petition requesting to
construe  a  Constitutional Court ruling or its other final   act
does not imply a new constitutional justice case.
     The  Constitutional Court has also held more than once  that
no   official   constitutional   doctrinal   provision   of     a
Constitutional  Court  ruling  or  its other final  act  may   be
construed  in  isolation, by ignoring its meaning  and   systemic
links with the other official constitutional doctrinal provisions
set forth in that Constitutional Court ruling or its other  final
act,  in other Constitutional Court acts, as well as with   other
provisions (explicit and implicit) of the Constitution.
     7.  It  has also been held more than once that the   formula
"shall  be  final and not subject to appeal" of Paragraph  2   of
Article  107  of  the  Constitution,  which  provides  that   the
decisions  of the Constitutional Court on issues ascribed to  its
competence by the Constitution shall be final and not subject  to
appeal,  also  means  that  the  Constitutional  Court   rulings,
conclusions and decisions by which a constitutional justice  case
is  finished,  i.e. final acts of the Constitutional Court,   are
obligatory  to all state institutions, courts, all   enterprises,
establishments  and  organisations,  as well  as  officials   and
citizens,  including the Constitutional Court itself: final  acts
of the Constitutional Court are obligatory to the  Constitutional
Court  itself,  they  restrict the Constitutional Court  in   the
aspect that it may not change them or review them if there are no
constitutional grounds for that.

                                II
     1.  The  Šiauliai Regional Court and the Supreme  Court   of
Lithuania,  the  petitioners, request to construe  the   official
constitutional  doctrinal  provisions  which  are  related   with
extension  of powers of the judge and which are set forth in  the
Constitutional Court rulings of 9 May 2006 and 22 October 2007.
     2.  It  needs  to  be  noted that  the  provisions  of   the
Constitutional Court rulings, the construction of which is  being
requested by the Šiauliai Regional Court and the Supreme Court of
Lithuania,  the petitioners, as well as the questions raised   by
the petitioners are related, therefore, they are to be  construed
in conjunction.
     2.1.  The Šiauliai Regional Court, the petitioner,  requests
inter alia to construe whether the provision "the judge,  despite
the  fact  that  his  powers  have expired  or  he  reached   the
pensionable age established by law, may still hold his office for
a  certain  period  of time until the consideration  of   certain
cases,  the consideration of which was not finished at the   time
(on  the  day) when the term of powers of that judge expired   or
when  he  reached  the pensionable age established  by  law,   is
finished  (final decisions therein will be adopted), and at   the
time when the consideration of the said cases is not yet finished
he  is  a full-fledged judge" of Item 15.3.1.1 of the   reasoning
part  of  the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006,   which,
according  to  the petitioner, is repeated in Item 12.2  of   the
Constitutional Court ruling of 22 October 2007 as well as Item  8
of Section II of the Constitutional Court ruling of 15 May  2009,
means that powers of such a judge are limited by the cases  which
are  indicated in the decree of the President of the Republic  on
the extension of powers of such a judge.
     2.2.  The  Šiauliai Regional Court, a petitioner,   requests
inter alia to construe whether:
     -  the  provision  "a full-fledged  judge",  formulated   in
Constitutional  Court rulings, means that the judge enjoys  full-
fledged powers only in the concrete cases indicated in the decree
of  the President of the Republic on the extension of powers   of
the judge;
     -  the  provision that the judge, during the period of   the
extension  of  his powers, has to receive the same  workload   as
other  judges of that court means that, during the period of  the
extension  of his powers, as long as the cases indicated in   the
decree of the President of the Republic are not finished, such  a
judge may consider (be a judge-rapporteur, a judge, and a  member
of the college) also other cases, which are not indicated in  the
decree  of  the  President of the Republic on the  extension   of
powers of the judge.
     2.3. The Supreme Court of Lithuania, a petitioner,  requests
inter  alia to construe whether the provision "The   Constitution
does not in essence prevent such legal regulation established  by
law where the judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has
expired or he reached the pensionable age established by law, may
still  hold  his office for a certain period of time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted)" of the second paragraph of Item 15.3.1.1 of Chapter  II
of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May
2006 means that the powers of such a judge (a judge-rapporteur, a
judge, and a member of the college) to administer justice,  which
are  entrenched  in the Constitution, are limited by  the   cases
indicated  in the decree of the President of the Republic on  the
extension of powers of such a judge.
     2.4. The Supreme Court of Lithuania, a petitioner,  requests
inter alia to construe whether the provisions "<...> at the  time
when the consideration of the said cases is not yet finished  the
said  judge is a full-fledged judge: while administering  justice
(deciding  cases), he has the same powers as other judges of  the
corresponding  court, his status as a judge is indivisible,   the
same  restrictions  of activity and limitation  of   remuneration
which  stem from the Constitution are applied to him, he has  the
same responsibility and immunities as other judges. Thus, he  has
the  same  workload (inter alia because of the fact that in   the
said  court,  the  position  of a judge who must  carry  out   an
important  constitutional function—to administer justice—is   not
yet  vacant) as other judges of the corresponding court" of   the
second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of the reasoning part
of  the Constitutional Court ruling of 22 October 2007 mean  that
such  a judge (a judge-rapporteur, a judge, and a member of   the
college),  as  a  full-fledged  judge,  also  has  the    powers,
entrenched  in  the Constitution, to administer justice  and   in
other  cases,  which  are  not indicated in the  decree  of   the
President  of  the  Republic on the extension of powers  of   the
judge,  but  which are additionally received  for   consideration
until  final decisions therein are adopted or the   consideration
thereof is postponed.
     2.5. The Supreme Court of Lithuania, a petitioner,  requests
inter alia to construe whether the judge who has reached the  age
of 65 years and whose powers have been extended by the decree  of
the  President  of the Republic until the consideration  of   the
cases  indicated in the decree is finished, in the case when  the
consideration  of the cases indicated in the decree is  finished,
but  the  said  judge,  as a  full-fledged  judge,  is  a  judge-
rapporteur,  a judge, or a member of the college in other   cases
received  for  consideration, has the powers, entrenched in   the
Constitution,  to  administer justice in the said  other   cases,
which  are  not indicated in the decree of the President of   the
Republic and the consideration of which is not finished.
     2.6. The provisions of the Constitutional Court ruling of  9
May  2006,  construction of which is requested by  the   Šiauliai
Regional   Court  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  Lithuania,    the
petitioners, constitute part of the text of the second  paragraph
of  Item  15.3.1.1  of Chapter II of the reasoning part  of   the
Constitutional  Court ruling of 9 May 2006, wherein it is   inter
alia  held: "<...> The Constitution does not in essence   prevent
such legal regulation established by law, where a judge,  despite
the  fact that his term of powers has expired or he reached   the
pensionable age established by law, may still hold his office for
a  certain  period  of time until the consideration  of   certain
cases,  the consideration of which was not finished at the   time
(on  the  day) when the term of powers of that judge expired   or
when  he  reached  the pensionable age established  by  law,   is
finished (final decisions therein will be adopted)."
     2.7. The provisions of the Constitutional Court ruling of 22
October 2007, construction of which is requested by the  Šiauliai
Regional   Court  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  Lithuania,    the
petitioners, constitute part of the text of the second  paragraph
of  Item  12.2  of  Chapter  IV of the  reasoning  part  of   the
Constitutional  Court  ruling of 22 October 2007, wherein it   is
inter alia held:
     "<...>  the  Constitution does not in essence prevent   such
legal regulation established by law where the judge, despite  the
fact  that  his  term of powers has expired or  he  reached   the
pensionable age established by law, may still hold his office for
a  certain  period  of time until the consideration  of   certain
cases,  the consideration of which was not finished at the   time
(on  the  day) when the term of powers of that judge expired   or
when  he  reached  the pensionable age established  by  law,   is
finished  (final  decisions  therein  will  be  adopted);    such
exceptional legal regulation would be constitutionally  grounded,
since,   otherwise,   i.e.  without  establishing  such     legal
regulation, the decision of corresponding cases—administration of
justice—would slow down and, thus, preconditions could be created
to  injure  the rights and legitimate interests of  persons   and
certain  constitutional  values would be violated; such a   judge
must  be  dismissed as soon as the corresponding legal fact,   to
which  the extension of powers of the judge is related,  happens—
the   consideration   of   corresponding  cases   is     finished
(Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006). At the time when the
consideration  of  the said cases is not yet finished  the   said
judge  is  a  full-fledged judge:  while  administering   justice
(deciding  cases), he has the same powers as other judges of  the
corresponding  court, his status as a judge is indivisible,   the
same restrictions of activity and limitation of remuneration that
stem  from the Constitution are applied to him, he has the   same
responsibility  and immunities as other judges. Thus, he has  the
same  workload (inter alia because of the fact that in the   said
court,  the position of a judge who must carry out an   important
constitutional function—to administer justice—is not yet  vacant)
as  other judges of the corresponding court, and he must be  paid
the same remuneration as other judges of the corresponding court,
he  also  has  the same social (material) guarantees  which   the
judges of the corresponding court have."
     3. Thus, these petitions of the Šiauliai Regional Court  and
the  Supreme Court of Lithuania, the petitioners, requesting   to
construe the corresponding provisions of the Constitutional Court
rulings, are to be treated as the requests to construe whether:
     -  the  provision  "The Constitution does  not  in   essence
prevent such legal regulation established by law where the judge,
despite  the  fact  that his term of powers has  expired  or   he
reached  the pensionable age established by law, may still   hold
his  office for a certain period of time until the  consideration
of certain cases, the consideration of which was not finished  at
the  time  (on  the day) when the term of powers of  that   judge
expired  or  when he reached the pensionable age established   by
law,  is finished (final decisions therein will be adopted)"   of
the  second  paragraph  of Item 15.3.1.1 of Chapter  II  of   the
reasoning  part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May  2006
as  well  as the provisions "<...> the Constitution does not   in
essence  prevent such legal regulation established by law   where
the  judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has  expired
or  he reached the pensionable age established by law, may  still
hold  his  office  for  a  certain  period  of  time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted);   such   exceptional   legal  regulation   would     be
constitutionally   grounded,  since,  otherwise,  i.e.    without
establishing such legal regulation, the decision of corresponding
cases—administration  of  justice—would  slow  down  and,   thus,
preconditions  could  be  created  to  injure  the  rights    and
legitimate interests of persons and certain constitutional values
would be violated; such a judge must be dismissed as soon as  the
corresponding legal fact, to which the extension of powers of the
judge  is  related, happens—the consideration  of   corresponding
cases is finished (Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006). At
the  time  when the consideration of the said cases is  not   yet
finished   the  said  judge  is  a  full-fledged  judge:    while
administering justice (deciding cases), he has the same powers as
other judges of the corresponding court, his status as a judge is
indivisible, the same restrictions of activity and limitation  of
remuneration that stem from the Constitution are applied to  him,
he  has the same responsibility and immunities as other   judges.
Thus,  he has the same workload (inter alia because of the   fact
that  in the said court, the position of a judge who must   carry
out an important constitutional function—to administer justice—is
not  yet vacant) as other judges of the corresponding court,  and
he  must  be paid the same remuneration as other judges  of   the
corresponding  court,  he  also has the same  social   (material)
guarantees  which the judges of the corresponding court have"  of
the second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of the  reasoning
part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 22 October 2007  inter
alia  mean that the judge, during the period of the extension  of
his powers, may administer justice as a full-fledged judge (inter
alia be a judge, a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college)
also  in  other cases, which are assigned to  his   consideration
after his powers have been extended;
     - the provisions "<...> the Constitution does not in essence
prevent such legal regulation established by law where the judge,
despite  the  fact  that his term of powers has  expired  or   he
reached  the pensionable age established by law, may still   hold
his  office for a certain period of time until the  consideration
of certain cases, the consideration of which was not finished  at
the  time  (on  the day) when the term of powers of  that   judge
expired  or  when he reached the pensionable age established   by
law, is finished (final decisions therein will be adopted);  such
exceptional legal regulation would be constitutionally  grounded,
since,   otherwise,   i.e.  without  establishing  such     legal
regulation, the decision of corresponding cases—administration of
justice—would slow down and, thus, preconditions could be created
to  injure  the rights and legitimate interests of  persons   and
certain  constitutional  values would be violated; such a   judge
must  be  dismissed as soon as the corresponding legal fact,   to
which  the extension of powers of the judge is related,  happens—
the   consideration   of   corresponding  cases   is     finished
(Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006). At the time when the
consideration  of  the said cases is not yet finished  the   said
judge  is  a  full-fledged judge:  while  administering   justice
(deciding  cases), he has the same powers as other judges of  the
corresponding  court, his status as a judge is indivisible,   the
same restrictions of activity and limitation of remuneration that
stem  from the Constitution are applied to him, he has the   same
responsibility  and immunities as other judges. Thus, he has   to
receive the same workload (inter alia because of the fact that in
the  said  court the position of a judge who must carry  out   an
important  constitutional function—to administer justice—is   not
yet  vacant) as other judges of the corresponding court, and   he
must  be  paid  the  same remuneration as other  judges  of   the
corresponding  court,  he  also has the same  social   (material)
guarantees  which the judges of the corresponding court have"  of
the second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of the  reasoning
part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 22 October 2007  inter
alia  mean  that the judge whose powers have been  extended   may
administer  justice  as  a full-fledged judge (inter alia  be   a
judge, a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college) in  other
cases (which are assigned for his consideration after his  powers
have  been extended), inter alia also after the consideration  of
certain cases, the consideration of which was not finished at the
time  (on the day) when powers of that judge were extended,   has
already been finished.

                               III
     1.  While  construing  the  indicated  provisions  of    the
Constitutional  Court ruling of 9 May 2006, it needs to be  noted
that,  in  the  constitutional  justice case  wherein  the   said
Constitutional  Court  ruling  was  adopted,  investigation   was
carried out inter alia regarding the compliance of Paragraph 3 of
Article 57 (wording of 28 January 2003) of the Law on Courts with
the  Constitution.  The  following was prescribed  in  the   said
paragraph:  when a judge of the Supreme Court of Lithuania,   the
Court of Appeal of Lithuania and the Supreme Administrative Court
of  Lithuania,  a regional court and a  regional   administrative
court reaches the age of 65 years, his powers may be extended  by
the  institution which appointed him until he reaches the age  of
70 years; in such cases the judge wishing to have an extension of
his  powers  shall apply to the President of the  Republic;   the
issue in respect of the extension of the judge's powers shall  be
decided in accordance with the procedure for the appointment of a
judge of an appropriate court as laid down in the Law on  Courts.
In  the aforementioned constitutional justice case subsequent  to
the  petitions of a group of Members of the Seimas and the  Court
of  Appeal of Lithuania, the petitioners, while deciding  whether
Paragraph 3 of Article 57 (wording of 28 January 2003) of the Law
on  Courts  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  Constitution,   the
Constitutional  Court  pointed  out that, first of  all,  it   is
necessary to establish whether the institute of the extension  of
powers of the judge entrenched in this paragraph is in line  with
the  principle of the independence of the judge, which is   inter
alia entrenched in the Constitution, whether this institute  does
not   create  preconditions  to  influence  in  any  way,    even
indirectly,  administration of justice and, thus, to violate  the
principle of the independence of the judge.
     2.  In  the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006,   the
provision "If the judge's term of powers expires while a case  is
still pending, his powers are extended till the consideration  of
the  case  is  finished or its consideration  is  postponed"   of
Paragraph 5 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 57 of the Law
on   Courts  was  assessed  by  the  Constitutional  Court     as
constitutionally grounded. Paragraph 3 of Article 57 (wording  of
28  January  2003)  of the Law on Courts, which  entrenched   the
possibility  to extend powers of a judge of the Supreme Court  of
Lithuania,  the  Court  of Appeal of Lithuania and  the   Supreme
Administrative  Court  of  Lithuania,  a regional  court  and   a
regional administrative court who has reached the age of 65 years
until  he  reaches  the age of 70 years, in  the   aforementioned
Constitutional Court ruling was recognised to be in conflict with
the Constitution.
     3.  It  has been mentioned that no official   constitutional
doctrinal provision of a Constitutional Court ruling or its other
final act may be construed in isolation, by ignoring its  meaning
and  systemic  links  with  the  other  official   constitutional
doctrinal  provisions  set  forth in that  Constitutional   Court
ruling  or  its other final act, in other  Constitutional   Court
acts, as well as with other provisions (explicit and implicit) of
the Constitution.
     4.  The  official constitutional doctrine related with   the
term  of powers of the judge (inter alia extension thereof)   was
developed  not only in the Constitutional Court ruling of 9   May
2006, but also in other Constitutional Court acts, inter alia the
Constitutional  Court ruling of 22 October 2007, construction  of
the  corresponding provisions of which is also requested by   the
petitioners.   Therefore,  the  construed  provisions  of     the
Constitutional  Court rulings of 9 May 2006 and 22 October   2007
are  to be construed in conjunction with one another, by   taking
account  of  the  whole context of the  official   constitutional
doctrine,  inter alia other constitutional doctrinal   provisions
that are set forth in the indicated rulings.
     5. The Constitutional Court has held more than once that one
of the guarantees of the independence of the judge entrenched  in
the  Constitution  is  the guarantee of the term of  his   powers
(Constitutional  Court  rulings of 6 December 1995, 21   December
1999,  12 July 2001, and 9 May 2006). Only an independent  court,
thus, only such whose judges are guaranteed the inviolability  of
the  term of their office may be considered as one  administering
justice  as  required by the Constitution (Constitutional   Court
ruling of 9 May 2006). The guarantee of the inviolability of  the
term of powers of the judge is also important because of the fact
that a judge, whatever political forces are in power, must remain
independent  and  not  conciliate  to  the  possible  change   of
political  forces  (Constitutional Court rulings of  6   December
1995,  21  December 1999, and 9 May 2006). The principle of   the
independence  of  the  judge, entrenched  in  the   Constitution,
implies only such legislative regulation of the term of powers of
the  judge that, when appointing a judge, he would know the  term
of  his  powers (until the time established by law or  until   he
reaches  the  pensionable age established by law); the  term   of
powers of the judge may not depend on the future decisions of the
state power institutions that have appointed him, which would  be
grounded  on free discretion (Constitutional Court rulings of   9
May  2006, 22 October 2007, 20 December 2007, and decision of  15
May 2009).
     Such  legal  regulation when the possibility to extend   the
term  of powers of judges upon their expiration (irrespective  of
the  term for which powers of the judge are extended and of   the
level  of  the  court  powers of whose judge  are  extended)   is
provided  may  create preconditions for other persons to try   to
influence the judge directly or indirectly in order that he, when
seeking extension of his powers, would make certain decisions  in
the cases under his consideration; such legal regulation is to be
assessed  as  enabling someone to induce the judge  to   consider
cases and adopt decisions in them not only by obeying the law, as
required  by the Constitution (Paragraph 3 of Article 109),   but
also  by heeding the fact how the decisions adopted in the  cases
under his consideration will influence the possibility to  extend
his  powers in the future. In other words, such legal  regulation
creates  preconditions for a judge to adopt the decisions in  the
cases  under his consideration which would correspond not to  the
concept  of the justice of the judge himself, but to the  concept
of the justice of other persons (Constitutional Court rulings  of
9 May 2006, 22 October 2007, and decision of 15 May 2009).
     6.  In  its rulings of 9 May 2006 and 22 October 2007,   the
Constitutional Court also held that the Constitution does not  in
essence  prevent such legal regulation established by law   where
the  judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has  expired
or  he reached the pensionable age established by law, may  still
hold  his  office  for  a  certain  period  of  time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted);   such   exceptional   legal  regulation   would     be
constitutionally   grounded,  since,  otherwise,  i.e.    without
establishing such legal regulation, the decision of corresponding
cases—administration  of  justice—would  slow  down  and,   thus,
preconditions  could  be  created  to  injure  the  rights    and
legitimate   interests  of  persons  and  to  violate     certain
constitutional values.
     In  its ruling of 9 May 2006, the Constitutional Court  also
held:  in  every case on such extension of powers of the   judge,
which  is allowed only in the exceptional cases, a  corresponding
legal act—a decree of the President of the Republic or (if powers
of  a  justice  of  the Supreme Court  are  extended)  a   Seimas
resolution must be passed; in every such case, the advice of  the
special  institution of judges provided for by law and  specified
in  Paragraph  5  of  Article 112 of  the  Constitution  on   the
extension of powers is necessary; such advice of the said special
institution  of judges to extend powers of the judge also   means
its  advice  to  dismiss the judge from office as  soon  as   the
corresponding   legal   fact   happens—the   consideration     of
corresponding  cases  is finished; powers of the judge  must   be
discontinued   under   the  established  procedure   when     the
corresponding legal fact, to which the extension of powers of the
judge  is  related, happens—the consideration  of   corresponding
cases  is finished; when this legal fact, to which the  extension
of  powers of the judge is related, happens, it is not  necessary
for  the  President  of  the Republic to apply  to  the   special
institution  of  judges  provided for by law  and  specified   in
Paragraph  5  of Article 112 of the Constitution  regarding   the
dismissal  of the judge from office when his powers have  expired
or  when  he has reached the pensionable age established by   law
once  again  (as  the  corresponding  advice  has  already   been
received).
     Such  legal regulation, when the possibility is provided  to
extend  powers of judges upon expiration of their term, save  the
exceptions  allowed by the Constitution itself, is   incompatible
with  the principle of the independence of the judge and   courts
entrenched  in the Constitution, with Paragraph 2 of Article  109
of  the Constitution, under which, while administering   justice,
judges  and  courts  are independent, with Paragraph 3  of   this
article,  in  which  it is established that,  while   considering
cases,   judges  obey  only  the  law,  as  well  as  with    the
constitutional  principle  of  a  state under the  rule  of   law
(Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006).
     7.  The  official  constitutional  doctrine  related    with
extension   of  powers  of  the  judge  was  developed  in    the
Constitutional  Court  ruling of 22 October 2007, wherein it   is
held:  at  the time when the consideration of the cases, to   the
consideration  of which the extension of powers of the judge   is
related,  is  not yet finished the said judge is a   full-fledged
judge:  while administering justice (deciding cases), he has  the
same  powers  as  other judges of the corresponding  court,   his
status  as  a  judge is indivisible, the  same  restrictions   of
activity  and  limitation  of remuneration that  stem  from   the
Constitution  are applied to him, he has the same  responsibility
and  immunities as other judges; thus, he must receive the   same
workload (inter alia because of the fact that in the said  court,
the  position  of  a  judge  who must  carry  out  an   important
constitutional function—to administer justice—is not yet  vacant)
as  other judges of the corresponding court, and he must be  paid
the same remuneration as other judges of the corresponding court,
he  also  has  the same social (material) guarantees  which   the
judges of the corresponding court have.
     8. While construing whether the indicated provisions of  the
Constitutional  Court rulings of 9 May 2006 and 22 October   2007
mean  that the judge, during the period of the extension of   his
powers,  may  administer justice as a full-fledged judge   (inter
alia be a judge, a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college)
also  in  other cases, which are assigned for his   consideration
after his powers have been extended, as it has been mentioned  in
this  decision, it needs to be noted: such legal regulation  when
the  possibility  is  provided to extend powers of  judges   upon
expiration  of  their term, save the exceptions allowed  by   the
Constitution  itself, is incompatible with the principle of   the
independence   of  the  judge  and  courts  entrenched  in    the
Constitution;  however,  the  Constitution does not  in   essence
prevent such legal regulation established by law where the judge,
despite  the  fact  that his term of powers has  expired  or   he
reached  the pensionable age established by law, may still   hold
his  office for a certain period of time until the  consideration
of certain cases, the consideration of which was not finished  at
the  time  (on  the day) when the term of powers of  that   judge
expired  or  when he reached the pensionable age established   by
law, is finished (final decisions therein will be adopted);  such
exceptional legal regulation would be constitutionally  grounded,
since,   otherwise,   i.e.  without  establishing  such     legal
regulation, the decision of corresponding cases—administration of
justice—would slow down and, thus, preconditions could be created
to  injure the rights and legitimate interests of persons and  to
violate  certain  constitutional values; in every case  on   such
extension  of powers of the judge, which is allowed only in   the
exceptional  cases,  a corresponding legal act—a decree  of   the
President  of  the  Republic or (if powers of a justice  of   the
Supreme Court are extended) a Seimas resolution must be passed.
     Thus, under the official constitutional doctrine, inter alia
formulated in the Constitutional Court rulings of 9 May 2006  and
22 October 2007, the Constitution allows, by means of the law, to
establish  only  exceptional  legal regulation of  extension   of
powers  of the judge. In this context it needs to be noted  that,
as  mentioned, when appointing a judge, he must know the term  of
his powers (until the time established by law or until he reaches
the  pensionable age established by law). Therefore, work of  the
judge   (inter  alia  assignment  of  cases  for  the     judge's
consideration)  must  be  organised so that on the  day  of   the
expiration of powers of the judge he would have a possibility  to
have finished the consideration of the cases assigned to him.
     Thus,  extension of powers of the judge is allowed only   in
exceptional  cases, i.e. when, upon expiry of the term of  powers
of the judge or upon reaching the pensionable age established  by
law   and  without  extending  his  powers,  the  decision     of
corresponding  cases—administration  of justice—would slow   down
and,  thus, preconditions could be created to injure the   rights
and  legitimate  interests  of persons and  to  violate   certain
constitutional  values. For example, the decision of cases  would
slow down, if powers of the judge were not extended inter alia in
those  cases when on the day of the expiration of his powers  the
judge  is finishing the consideration of the complicated   cases,
wherein most procedural actions have been completed and the  time
is  required for completion of certain final actions, inter  alia
adoption  of  the  final decision (drawing up  and   promulgating
thereof).
     It  has been mentioned that in every case on such  extension
of powers of the judge, which is allowed only in the  exceptional
cases, a corresponding legal act—a decree of the President of the
Republic  or  (if powers of a justice of the Supreme  Court   are
extended) a Seimas resolution must be passed.
     9. While construing whether the indicated provisions of  the
Constitutional  Court rulings of 9 May 2006 and 22 October   2007
mean  that the judge, during the period of the extension of   his
powers,  may  administer justice as a full-fledged judge   (inter
alia be a judge, a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college)
also  in  other cases, which are assigned for his   consideration
after his powers have been extended, as it has been mentioned  in
this decision, it needs to be noted: the judge, despite the  fact
that his term of powers has expired or he reached the pensionable
age  established by law, may still hold his office for a  certain
period  of  time  until the consideration of  certain  cases   is
finished (final decisions therein will be adopted); while holding
this office he is a full-fledged judge; he must receive the  same
workload (inter alia because of the fact that in the said  court,
the  position  of  a  judge  who must  carry  out  an   important
constitutional function—to administer justice—is not yet  vacant)
as  other judges of the corresponding court; and he must be  paid
the same remuneration as other judges of the corresponding court;
he  also  has  the same social (material) guarantees  which   the
judges  of  the  corresponding court have; at that time  such   a
judge, whose powers have been extended on the aforesaid basis, as
such an exception is allowed by the Constitution itself, may  not
be  granted the social (material) guarantees of the judge   which
are  established  (and applied) to judges upon expiry  of   their
powers.
     Thus, the judge whose powers have been extended must, for  a
certain  period of time (until the term of the extension of   his
powers has not expired), still receive the same workload as other
judges of the corresponding court, i.e. such a judge may consider
(until  the term of the extension of his powers has not  expired)
also  such cases the consideration of which is started after  his
powers,  upon  the  expiry  of the term of his  office  or   upon
reaching  the  pensionable  age established by  law,  have   been
extended.
     10.  Taking  account of the arguments set forth, one is   to
draw  a conclusion that the provision "The Constitution does  not
in essence prevent such legal regulation established by law where
the  judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has  expired
or  he reached the pensionable age established by law, may  still
hold  his  office  for  a  certain  period  of  time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted)" of the second paragraph of Item 15.3.1.1 of Chapter  II
of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May
2006  as well as the provisions "<...> the Constitution does  not
in essence prevent such legal regulation established by law where
the  judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has  expired
or  he reached the pensionable age established by law, may  still
hold  his  office  for  a  certain  period  of  time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted);   such   exceptional   legal  regulation   would     be
constitutionally   grounded,  since,  otherwise,  i.e.    without
establishing such legal regulation, the decision of corresponding
cases—administration  of  justice—would  slow  down  and,   thus,
preconditions  could  be  created  to  injure  the  rights    and
legitimate interests of persons and certain constitutional values
would be violated; such a judge must be dismissed as soon as  the
corresponding legal fact, to which the extension of powers of the
judge  is  related, happens—the consideration  of   corresponding
cases is finished (Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006). At
the  time  when the consideration of the said cases is  not   yet
finished   the  said  judge  is  a  full-fledged  judge:    while
administering justice (deciding cases), he has the same powers as
other judges of the corresponding court, his status as a judge is
indivisible, the same restrictions of activity and limitation  of
remuneration that stem from the Constitution are applied to  him,
he  has the same responsibility and immunities as other   judges.
Thus,  he has the same workload (inter alia because of the   fact
that  in the said court, the position of a judge who must   carry
out an important constitutional function—to administer justice—is
not  yet vacant) as other judges of the corresponding court,  and
he  must  be paid the same remuneration as other judges  of   the
corresponding  court,  he  also has the same  social   (material)
guarantees  which the judges of the corresponding court have"  of
the second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of the  reasoning
part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 22 October 2007  inter
alia  mean  that the judge whose powers have been extended   must
receive  the same workload as other judges of the   corresponding
court  and, during the period of the extension of his powers,  he
may  administer justice as a full-fledged judge (inter alia be  a
judge,  a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college) also  in
other  cases, which are assigned for his consideration after  his
powers have been extended.
     11.   While  construing  whether  the  provisions  of    the
Constitutional Court ruling of 22 October 2007, indicated by  the
Supreme  Court  of Lithuania, a petitioner, mean that the   judge
whose powers have been extended may administer justice as a full-
fledged  judge (inter alia be a judge, a judge-rapporteur, and  a
member of the college) in other cases (which are assigned for his
consideration  after his powers have been extended), inter   alia
also after the consideration of certain cases, the  consideration
of which was not finished at the time (on the day) when powers of
that judge were extended, has already been finished, it needs  to
be noted that, as it was held in the Constitutional Court  ruling
of  9 May 2006, the judge, despite the fact that his powers  have
expired or he reached the pensionable age established by law, may
still  hold  his office for a certain period of time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted).  Thus, the expiration of the term of the extension   of
powers  of  the  judge  is linked to the end of  the  cases   the
consideration of which was not finished at the time (on the  day)
when the term of powers of that judge expired or when he  reached
the  pensionable  age  established  by law, inter  alia  to   the
adoption of final decisions in these cases or postponement of the
consideration of these cases.
     It  has  been  mentioned  that,  as  it  was  held  in   the
Constitutional  Court  ruling of 9 May 2006, the advice  of   the
special  institution of judges provided for by law and  specified
in  Paragraph  5  of  Article 112 of  the  Constitution  to   the
President of the Republic on the extension of powers of the judge
also means its advice to dismiss the judge from office as soon as
the  corresponding  legal  fact  happens—the  consideration    of
corresponding  cases  is finished; powers of the judge  must   be
discontinued  under  the  established procedure as soon  as   the
corresponding legal fact, to which the extension of powers of the
judge  is  related, happens—the consideration  of   corresponding
cases  is finished; when this legal fact, to which the  extension
of powers of a judge is related, happens, it is not necessary for
the President of the Republic to apply to the special institution
of  judges  provided for by law and specified in Paragraph 5   of
Article  112 of the Constitution regarding the dismissal of   the
judge  from  office when his powers have expired or when he   has
reached the pensionable age established by law once again (as the
corresponding advice has already been received).
     Thus, the judge, when the legal fact to which the  extension
of  his  powers  is related happens, i.e. when he  finishes   the
consideration  of  the cases the consideration of which was   not
finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers of that
judge expired or when he reached the pensionable age  established
by law and for the period of the consideration whereof his powers
have been extended, must be dismissed from office. Powers of  the
judge  must  be discontinued under the established procedure   as
soon  as the aforementioned legal fact happens—the  consideration
of  the  cases  to the consideration of which the  term  of   the
extension  of  powers  of  the judge  is  related  is   finished.
Consequently,  such a judge must be dismissed from office and  he
may  no  longer consider any other cases (inter alia  the   cases
which   were  assigned  for  his,  as  a  full-fledged     judge,
consideration  during the period of the extension of his   powers
and  the consideration of which has not been finished until   the
day when the consideration of the cases, to the consideration  of
which  the  term of the extension of his powers is  related,   is
finished).
     12.  Taking  account of the arguments set forth, one is   to
draw  a  conclusion that the provisions "<...> the   Constitution
does not in essence prevent such legal regulation established  by
law where the judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has
expired or he reached the pensionable age established by law, may
still  hold  his office for a certain period of time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted);   such   exceptional   legal  regulation   would     be
constitutionally   grounded,  since,  otherwise,  i.e.    without
establishing such legal regulation, the decision of corresponding
cases—administration  of  justice—would  slow  down  and,   thus,
preconditions  could  be  created  to  injure  the  rights    and
legitimate interests of persons and certain constitutional values
would be violated; such a judge must be dismissed as soon as  the
corresponding legal fact, to which the extension of powers of the
judge  is  related, happens—the consideration  of   corresponding
cases is finished (Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006). At
the  time  when the consideration of the said cases is  not   yet
finished   the  said  judge  is  a  full-fledged  judge:    while
administering justice (deciding cases), he has the same powers as
other judges of the corresponding court, his status as a judge is
indivisible, the same restrictions of activity and limitation  of
remuneration that stem from the Constitution are applied to  him,
he  has the same responsibility and immunities as other   judges.
Thus, he has to receive the same workload (inter alia because  of
the fact that in the said court, the position of a judge who must
carry  out  an important constitutional  function—to   administer
justice—is  not yet vacant) as other judges of the  corresponding
court, and he must be paid the same remuneration as other  judges
of  the  corresponding  court,  he  also  has  the  same   social
(material) guarantees which the judges of the corresponding court
have"  of the second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of  the
reasoning  part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 22  October
2007  inter  alia  mean that the judge whose  powers  have   been
extended  may administer justice as a full-fledged judge   (inter
alia be a judge, a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college)
also  in  other cases (which are assigned for his   consideration
after  his  powers  have  been  extended)  but  only  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not  finished at the time (on the day) when powers of that  judge
were extended, is finished.
     

     Conforming  to  Article  102  of the  Constitution  of   the
Republic  of  Lithuania and Articles 1 and 61 of the Law on   the
Constitutional   Court  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania,     the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has passed  the
following
     

                            decision:
                                

     1. To construe that the provision "The Constitution does not
in essence prevent such legal regulation established by law where
the  judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has  expired
or  he reached the pensionable age established by law, may  still
hold  his  office  for  a  certain  period  of  time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted)" of the second paragraph of Item 15.3.1.1 of Chapter  II
of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May
2006  (Official Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2006, No. 51-1894)   as
well  as  the  provisions "<...> the Constitution  does  not   in
essence  prevent such legal regulation established by law   where
the  judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has  expired
or  he reached the pensionable age established by law, may  still
hold  his  office  for  a  certain  period  of  time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted);   such   exceptional   legal  regulation   would     be
constitutionally   grounded,  since,  otherwise,  i.e.    without
establishing such legal regulation, the decision of corresponding
cases—administration  of  justice—would  slow  down  and,   thus,
preconditions  could  be  created  to  injure  the  rights    and
legitimate interests of persons and certain constitutional values
would be violated; such a judge must be dismissed as soon as  the
corresponding legal fact, to which the extension of powers of the
judge  is  related, happens—the consideration  of   corresponding
cases is finished (Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006). At
the  time  when the consideration of the said cases is  not   yet
finished   the  said  judge  is  a  full-fledged  judge:    while
administering justice (deciding cases), he has the same powers as
other judges of the corresponding court, his status as a judge is
indivisible, the same restrictions of activity and limitation  of
remuneration that stem from the Constitution are applied to  him,
he  has the same responsibility and immunities as other   judges.
Thus,  he has the same workload (inter alia because of the   fact
that  in the said court, the position of a judge who must   carry
out an important constitutional function—to administer justice—is
not  yet vacant) as other judges of the corresponding court,  and
he  must  be paid the same remuneration as other judges  of   the
corresponding  court,  he  also has the same  social   (material)
guarantees  which the judges of the corresponding court have"  of
the second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of the  reasoning
part  of  the  Constitutional Court ruling of  22  October   2007
(Official  Gazette  Valstybės žinios, 2007, No. 110-4511)   inter
alia  mean that the judge, during the period of the extension  of
his powers, may administer justice as a full-fledged judge (inter
alia be a judge, a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college)
also  in  other cases which are assigned for  his   consideration
after his powers have been extended.
     2.  To construe that the provisions "<...> the  Constitution
does not in essence prevent such legal regulation established  by
law where the judge, despite the fact that his term of powers has
expired or he reached the pensionable age established by law, may
still  hold  his office for a certain period of time  until   the
consideration  of certain cases, the consideration of which   was
not finished at the time (on the day) when the term of powers  of
that  judge  expired  or  when he reached  the  pensionable   age
established by law, is finished (final decisions therein will  be
adopted);   such   exceptional   legal  regulation   would     be
constitutionally   grounded,  since,  otherwise,  i.e.    without
establishing such legal regulation, the decision of corresponding
cases—administration  of  justice—would  slow  down  and,   thus,
preconditions  could  be  created  to  injure  the  rights    and
legitimate interests of persons and certain constitutional values
would be violated; such a judge must be dismissed as soon as  the
corresponding legal fact, to which the extension of powers of the
judge  is  related, happens—the consideration  of   corresponding
cases is finished (Constitutional Court ruling of 9 May 2006). At
the  time  when the consideration of the said cases is  not   yet
finished   the  said  judge  is  a  full-fledged  judge:    while
administering justice (deciding cases), he has the same powers as
other judges of the corresponding court, his status as a judge is
indivisible, the same restrictions of activity and limitation  of
remuneration that stem from the Constitution are applied to  him,
he  has the same responsibility and immunities as other   judges.
Thus, he has to receive the same workload (inter alia because  of
the fact that in the said court, the position of a judge who must
carry  out  an important constitutional  function—to   administer
justice—is  not yet vacant) as other judges of the  corresponding
court, and he must be paid the same remuneration as other  judges
of  the  corresponding  court,  he  also  has  the  same   social
(material) guarantees which the judges of the corresponding court
have"  of the second paragraph of Item 12.2 of Chapter IV of  the
reasoning  part of the Constitutional Court ruling of 22  October
2007  (Official  Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2007,  No.   110-4511)
inter  alia mean that the judge whose powers have been   extended
may  administer justice as a full-fledged judge (inter alia be  a
judge,  a judge-rapporteur, and a member of the college) also  in
other  cases (which are assigned for his consideration after  his
powers  have been extended) but only until the consideration   of
certain cases, the consideration of which was not finished at the
time  (on  the day) when powers of that judge were extended,   is
finished.
     

     This  decision of the Constitutional Court is final and  not
subject to appeal.
     The  decision is promulgated in the name of the Republic  of
Lithuania.
     
 Justices of the Constitutional Court: Armanas Abramavičius
                                       Toma Birmontienė
                                       Pranas Kuconis
                                       Kęstutis Lapinskas
                                       Zenonas Namavičius
                                       Ramutė Ruškytė
                                       Egidijus Šileikis
                                       Algirdas Taminskas
                                       Romualdas Kęstutis Urbaitis