Lietuviškai
                                      Case No. 10/04-12/04-18/04A
                                
      THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

                             RULING
     ON  THE  COMPLIANCE  OF PARAGRAPH 8  (WORDING  OF   24
     JANUARY  2002)  OF  ARTICLE  90 OF  THE  REPUBLIC   OF
     LITHUANIA  LAW ON COURTS WITH THE CONSTITUTION OF  THE
     REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

                        27 November 2006
                             Vilnius

        The  Constitutional Court of the Republic of   Lithuania,
composed  of  the Justices of the Constitutional  Court   Armanas
Abramavičius,   Toma  Birmontienė,  Egidijus  Kūris,     Kęstutis
Lapinskas,   Zenonas   Namavičius,  Ramutė  Ruškytė,     Vytautas
Sinkevičius, Stasys Stačiokas, and Romualdas Kęstutis Urbaitis, 
        with the secretary of the hearing—Daiva Pitrėnaitė,
        in  the presence of the representative of the Seimas   of
the Republic of Lithuania, the party concerned, who was Gediminas
Sagatys,  senior advisor of the Legal Division of the Office   of
the Seimas;
        pursuant  to Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution  of
the  Republic  of  Lithuania  and Article 1 of the  Law  on   the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, in its  public
hearing  on  22 November 2006 heard case No.   10/04-12/04-18/04A
subsequent to the petitions No. 1B-09, No. 1B-11 and No. 1B-19 of
the Vilnius Regional Court, the petitioner, requesting inter alia
to investigate whether Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the  Republic
of Lithuania Law on Courts is not in conflict with Paragraph 2 of
Article  31 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania  and
with  the  principle  of a state under the rule  of  law   which,
according to the petitioner, is entrenched in the Preamble to the
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 

        The Constitutional Court 
                        has established:

                                I
        1.  The  Vilnius  Regional Court,  the  petitioner,   was
considering certain civil cases.
        1.1.  By its ruling (petition No. 1B-08), the said  court
applied to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting to
investigate  whether Decree of the President of the Republic  No.
164 "On the Dismissal of Judges of Local Courts and Presidents of
Courts"  of 22 July 2003, to the extent that it establishes  that
Darius  Japertas is dismissed from the office of a judge of   the
Panevėžys Local Court as well as from the office of the president
of the same court is not in conflict, as to its content and under
the  procedure of the adoption established in the   Constitution,
with  the principles of a just civil society and state under  the
rule of law which, according to the petitioner, are entrenched in
the Preamble to the Constitution, with Paragraph 1 of Article  29
of  the  Constitution, wherein the principle of equality of   all
persons  before the law is entrenched, with Article 115,  wherein
it  is  established  that judges of courts of  the  Republic   of
Lithuania  shall  be  dismissed  from office  according  to   the
procedure established by law, as well as with Articles 83, 84 and
86  and  Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article 90 of the Law on   Courts,
wherein  the  issues  of disciplinary liability  of  judges   are
regulated  and which establish the procedure for their  dismissal
and whether Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not
in  conflict with Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the   Constitution
and  with the principle of a state under the rule of law   which,
according to the petitioner, is entrenched in the Preamble to the
Constitution.
        1.2.  By its ruling (petition No. 1B-11), the said  court
applied to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting to
investigate  whether Decree of the President of the Republic  No.
164 "On the Dismissal of Judges of Local Courts and Presidents of
Courts"  of 22 July 2003, to the extent that it establishes  that
Arvydas  Gudas  is dismissed from the office of a judge  of   the
Lazdijai  Local District Court as well as from the office of  the
president of the same court is not in conflict, as to its content
and  under  the  procedure of the adoption  established  in   the
Constitution,  with  the principles of a just civil society   and
state  under the rule of law which, according to the  petitioner,
are  entrenched  in  the  Preamble  to  the  Constitution,   with
Paragraph  1  of  Article 29 of the  Constitution,  wherein   the
principle  of  equality  of  all  persons  before  the  law    is
entrenched,  with Article 115 of the Constitution, wherein it  is
established  that Judges of courts of the Republic of   Lithuania
shall  be  dismissed  from  office according  to  the   procedure
established  by law, as well as with Articles 83, 84 and 86   and
Paragraphs  6 and 7 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts,   wherein
the issues of disciplinary liability of judges are regulated  and
which  establish  the procedure for their dismissal and   whether
Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not in conflict
with  Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution and with  the
principle  of a state under the rule of law which, according   to
the   petitioner,   is  entrenched  in  the  Preamble  to     the
Constitution.
        1.3.  By its ruling (petition No. 1B-19), the said  court
applied to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting to
investigate  whether Decree of the President of the Republic  No.
164 "On the Dismissal of Judges of Local Courts and Presidents of
Courts"  of 22 July 2003, to the extent that it establishes  that
Palmira  Linkevičienė is dismissed from the office of a judge  of
the Biržai Local District Court as well as from the office of the
president of the same court is not in conflict, as to its content
and  under  the  procedure of the adoption  established  in   the
Constitution,  with  the principles of a just civil society   and
state  under the rule of law which, according to the  petitioner,
are  entrenched  in  the  Preamble  to  the  Constitution,   with
Paragraph  1 of Article 29 and Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of   the
Constitution, Paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Convention for  the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with Article
115  of  the  Constitution,  with Articles 83,  84  and  86   and
Paragraphs  6  and  7 of Article 90 of the Law  on  Courts,   and
whether Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not  in
conflict  with Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution  and
with  the  principle  of a state under the rule  of  law   which,
according to the petitioner, is entrenched in the Preamble to the
Constitution. 
        After it was held by the Constitutional Court decision of
7  April  2004 that under the Constitution,  the   Constitutional
Court  does not investigate the compliance of a law with a  legal
act  having  the  power of the law, it was decided by  the   same
decision  inter  alia to refuse to consider the petition of   the
Vilnius Regional Court, the petitioner, requesting to investigate
whether Paragraph 8 of Article 920 of the Law on Courts is not in
conflict with Paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Convention for  the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to return
the petition, to this extent, to the petitioner. 
        2.  By  the Constitutional Court decision of 3   November
2005,  the specified petitions were joined into one case and   it
was given reference number 10/04-12/04-18/04. 
        3.  By the Constitutional Court decision of 14   November
2006,  a part of the case subsequent to petitions No. 1B-09,  No.
1B-11  and  No.  1B-19  of  the  Vilnius  Regional  Court,    the
petitioner, to the extent that it requests to investigate whether
Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not in conflict
with  Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution and with  the
principle  of a state under the rule of law, which, according  to
the   petitioner,   is  entrenched  in  the  Preamble  to     the
Constitution,  was  separated into an individual case and   given
reference number 10/04-12/04-18/04A.

                                II
        The   petition  of  the  Vilnius  Regional  Court,    the
petitioner,  requesting  to investigate whether Paragraph  8   of
Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not in conflict with Paragraph
2  of Article 31 of the Constitution and with the principle of  a
state under the rule of law, which, according to the  petitioner,
is  entrenched in the Preamble to the Constitution, is based   on
the following arguments.
        Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts entrenches
the  provision  that  when a judge contests his  dismissal   from
office,  he shall be entitled to appeal to the Vilnius   Regional
Court. Thus, the cognizable cases for the Vilnius Regional  Court
are  the cases where one of the parties is the President of   the
Republic.  Because of the fact that, in respect of the judges  of
the  region,  the  President  of the  Republic  has  the   powers
established in the Law on Courts to appoint and dismiss judges of
a  regional court, to transfer judges to another court, thus,  in
the  opinion of the petitioner, there are grounds to think   that
Paragraph  8  of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is in   conflict
with Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution, under  which,
a  person charged with the commission of a crime shall have   the
right to a public and fair hearing of his case by an  independent
and  impartial  court, as well as with the principle of a   state
under  the  rule of law, which, according to the petitioner,   is
entrenched in the Preamble to the Constitution. 

                               III
        In  the  course of the preparation of the case  for   the
Constitutional  Court  hearing,  written  explanations  from   G.
Sagatys,  senior advisor of the Law Department of the Office   of
the Seimas, a representative of the Seimas, the party  concerned,
were received, wherein it is stated that the implication made  by
the  petitioner  that  Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the  Law   on
Courts  is  in  conflict with Paragraph 2 of Article 31  of   the
Constitution  and  with the constitutional principle of a   state
under the rule of law is groundless. 
        According  to  the  representative of  the  Seimas,   the
President of the Republic participates, in one way or another, in
the  appointment and dismissal of judges of all levels, thus,  if
one  assented to the statements of the petitioner, it would  mean
that  there  is  no  court  in  Lithuania  which  could   utterly
independently  and  impartially  investigate the case,  a   party
whereof is the President of the Republic. 
        The  list  of the grounds for dismissal of  judges   from
office which is entrenched in the Law on Courts is final; one  of
the  grounds  for dismissal of a judge from office—when  by   his
behaviour  the judge discredits the name of the judge—is  related
to the fact that it must be assessed whether by his behaviour the
judge discredited the name of the judge. 
        In  the opinion of the representative of the Seimas,  the
Law  on  Courts establishes a clear procedure for   investigation
whether  by his behaviour the judge discredited the name of   the
judge.   The  Court  of  Honour  of  Judges  participates    when
investigating  this  issue  and  the  Supreme  Court  may    also
participate.  Their  decision  that  a judge  by  his   behaviour
discredited  the  name of the judge is considered to  be  a  pre-
judicial fact. When the Vilnius Regional Court considers cases of
dismissal  of  judges from office, not the investigation of   the
material grounds (of the procedure for dismissal of a judge  from
office, etc.) for the dismissal of the judge from office, but the
investigation of the formal ones is of essential significance. 
        According  to  the  representative of  the  Seimas,   the
independent and impartial consideration of cases on the dismissal
of judges from office at the Vilnius Regional Court is ensured by
the   system   guaranteeing  independence  of  a   judge     (the
inviolability  of  the  term of office of the judge and  of   the
person  of the judge and the social (material) character of   the
judge).  The implementation of the principle of independence  and
impartiality of court which is entrenched in the Constitution  is
ensured by consolidating the procedural guarantees of parties  of
a case. It is first of all related to the right to appeal against
the  decision adopted by the Vilnius Regional Court at the  court
of  higher instance, as well as under the cassation  procedure—at
the  Supreme Court of Lithuania. Moreover, the career of a  judge
usually  lasts  longer than the office of the President  of   the
Republic  who appointed the judge to his office, thus, there  are
fewer possibilities to influence the judge directly. 
        In  the  opinion  of the representative of  the   Seimas,
Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not in conflict
with the Constitution.

                                IV
        At  the hearing of the Constitutional Court, G.  Sagatys,
the representative of the Seimas, the party concerned,  virtually
repeated the arguments set forth in the written explanations. 
        The Constitutional Court
                           holds that:
        1.  The Vilnius Regional Court, the petitioner,  requests
to  investigate whether Paragraph 8 of Article 90 of the Law   on
Courts  is not in conflict with Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of  the
Constitution  and  with the constitutional principle of a   state
under the rule of law.
        2.  The  petitioner  does  not specify  the  wording   of
Paragraph  8 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts whose  compliance
with  the Constitution he requests to investigate. It is  obvious
from  the arguments of the petitions of the petitioner that   the
petitioner  doubted  whether Paragraph 8 (wording of 24   January
2002) of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not in conflict  with
the Constitution.
        Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of
the  Law  on Courts establishes that "when a judge contests   his
dismissal he shall be entitled to appeal, within one month  after
the day of his dismissal, to the Vilnius Regional Court". 
        Even  though the petitioner requests to investigate   the
compliance  of whole Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002)  of
Article  90  of the Law on Courts with the Constitution,  it   is
obvious  from  the  arguments of the petitioner that  he   doubts
whether  the  provision "when a judge contests his dismissal   he
shall be entitled to appeal <…> to the Vilnius Regional Court" of
Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of the Law
on Courts is not in conflict with the Constitution.
        3.  In the context of the constitutional justice case  at
issue,  it  is  to  be  noted that  the  petitioner  doubts   the
compliance of Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article
90  of  the Law on Courts with Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of   the
Constitution  because  of  the fact that  the  legal   regulation
established  in  Paragraph  8 (wording of 24  January  2002)   of
Article  90  of  the  Law  on Courts is not  in  line  with   the
requirements of independence and impartiality of court entrenched
in Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution.
        4.  While  deciding, subsequent to the petition  of   the
Vilnius  Regional  Court, the petitioner whether  the   provision
"when  a judge contests his dismissal from office, he shall  have
the  right  <…>  to  appeal to the Vilnius  Regional  Court"   of
Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of the Law
on  Courts is not in conflict with Paragraph 2 of Article 31   of
the  Constitution,  as, in the opinion of the  petitioner,   this
provision  is not in line with the requirements of   independence
and impartiality of court entrenched in Paragraph 2 of Article 31
of   the  Constitution,  one  must  reveal  those  aspects     of
constitutional  concept  of  the independence of court  and   its
impartiality,  which are necessary in the constitutional  justice
case at issue. 
        Taking  account of the fact that the petitioner's   doubt
about the compliance of the provision "when a judge contests  his
dismissal  from office, he shall have the right <…> to appeal  to
the Vilnius Regional Court" of Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January
2002)  of  Article 90 of the Law on Courts with Paragraph  2   of
Article  31 of the Constitution is related to the procedure   for
the  dismissal  of judges from office established in the Law   on
Courts (wording of 24 January 2002 with subsequent amendments and
supplements), in the context of this constitutional justice  case
it  is also necessary to elucidate the grounds for the  dismissal
of judges from office which are established in Article 115 of the
Constitution, and the procedure for the dismissal of judges  from
office  which is established in Article 112 of the  Constitution,
as well as the procedure for the dismissal of a judge from office
because of the fact that by his behaviour he discredited the name
of the judge, which is established in the Law on Courts  (wording
of 24 January 2002 with subsequent amendments and supplements). 
        5.  Paragraph  2  of  Article  31  of  the   Constitution
establishes that "a person charged with the commission of a crime
shall have the right to a public and fair hearing of his case  by
an  independent and impartial court". Paragraph 2 of Article  109
of the Constitution entrenches that while administering  justice,
the  judge and courts shall be independent. These provisions   of
the  Constitution  entrench  the principle of  independence   and
impartiality of the judge and courts. The provisions of Paragraph
2  of  Article  31  and  Paragraph  2  of  Article  109  of   the
Constitution  which  entrench the principle of independence   and
impartiality  of the judge and courts are related to Paragraph  1
of Article 30 of the Constitution, wherein it is established that
"the person whose constitutional rights or freedoms are  violated
shall have the right to apply to court". 
        The  Constitutional Court has held in its acts more  than
once that from the constitutional principle of a state under  the
rule  of law stems the imperative that a person, who thinks  that
his rights or freedoms are violated, has an absolute right to  an
independent  and  impartial  court; that this  right  cannot   be
artificially  restricted,  nor that the implementation  of   this
right  may be unreasonably burdened; that this right may not   be
denied;  that  the  defence of the violated rights in  court   is
guaranteed  to  the person regardless of his legal status;   that
under the Constitution, the legislator has the duty to  establish
such  legal regulation, whereby all disputes regarding  violation
of  rights or freedoms of person could be decided in court;  that
the  violated  rights  of the person, inter  alia  the   acquired
rights,  as  well  as  legitimate interests  must  be   protected
regardless  of  whether  they are directly consolidated  in   the
Constitution; that the rights of the person must be protected not
formally,  but  in  reality and in an effective  manner   against
unlawful  actions of private persons as well as against those  of
state  institutions  or  officials; that  the  legal   regulation
consolidating  the procedure of implementation of the right of  a
person to judicial defence of his rights and freedoms must be  in
compliance inter alia with the requirement of legal clarity which
emerges  from the constitutional principle of a state under   the
rule  of law; that the legislator must clearly establish in  laws
in  what  way and to what court the person may apply so that   he
could really implement his right to apply to court regarding  the
violation  of  his  rights and freedoms; and that the  law   must
establish  such legal regulation so that it could be possible  to
appeal  against  the  final act adopted by a  court  of   general
jurisdiction or a specialised court established under Paragraph 2
of  Article  111  of the Constitution at least in one  court   of
higher instance. 
        In  the  context of the constitutional justice  case   at
issue,  it  is to be noted that the legislator  has   discretion,
following the constitutional principle of a state under the  rule
of  law, to establish at which court and under what procedure   a
person may apply regarding the defence of his violated rights and
freedoms.   It  is  also  to  be  emphasized  that,  under    the
Constitution,  the  legislator may not establish any such   legal
regulation, under which a person, regardless of his legal status,
could  not apply to court regarding his violated rights or   this
his right would be restricted.
        Thus,  under  the  Constitution, a judge, as  any   other
person who thinks that he was dismissed from office  groundlessly
and  unlawfully,  has the right to apply to court regarding   the
defence of his violated right. This his right is absolute and  it
is not permitted to restrict, nor to deny it. 
        6. Courts are one of the institutions which execute state
power  (Paragraph  1  of  Article 5 of  the  Constitution).   The
Constitution  establishes  that  in the Republic  of   Lithuania,
justice  shall  be administered only by courts (Paragraph  1   of
Article  109 of the Constitution). To administer justice is   the
purpose  and  constitutional  competence of the  judiciary.   The
judicial    power    implemented   by       courts—jurisdictional
institutions—together with the legislative and executive branches
of power, is an all-sufficient branch of state power, one of  the
branches of state power entrenched in the Constitution.
        The  Constitutional Court has held in its acts more  than
once  that the function of administration of justice   determines
the  independence of the judge and courts, that the  independence
of  the judge and courts is one of the essential principles of  a
democratic   state  under  the  rule  of  law:  courts,     while
administering  justice,  must ensure the implementation  of   the
rights established in the Constitution, the laws and other  legal
acts, they must guarantee the supremacy of law and protect  human
rights and freedoms. 
        The Constitutional Court has also emphasized in its  acts
more than once that the independence of judges and courts is  not
an  end in itself, but it is a necessary condition of  protection
of human rights and freedoms, not a privilege but one of the main
duties of a judge and courts arising from the right guaranteed in
the Constitution (inter alia Paragraph 2 of Article 109, as  well
as in Paragraph 1 of Article 30) of every person who thinks  that
his  rights  or  freedoms  are violated to  an  independent   and
impartial  arbiter of the dispute, which, under the  Constitution
and laws, would in essence solve the dispute at law. 
        The independence of the judge and court, as well as their
impartiality  are ensured by consolidating, in the   Constitution
and  laws,  the  independence of the system of courts  from   the
legislative  and executive powers (institutional   independence),
the  procedural  independence  of  judges,  the    organisational
independence and self-government of courts, the status of judges,
the  inviolability  of  the person of a judge,  immunities,   the
inviolability  of  the  term  of office  of  judges  and   social
(material)  guarantees  of judges, as well as  establishing   the
prohibition  for the institutions of state power and  governance,
Members of the Seimas and other officials, political parties  and
public organisations and citizens to interfere into the  activity
of the judge or court.
        One  of  important aspects of independence of the   judge
entrenched   in  the  Constitution  is  the  fact  that     while
administering  justice all judges have an equal legal status   in
the  aspect  that  no different self-sufficiency  guarantees   of
independence  of the judge while administering justice  (deciding
cases) may be established. No judge, while administering justice,
is  or may be subordinate to any other judge or president of  any
court  (inter alia the court, where he works, as well as a  court
of  higher level or instance). While deciding cases and  adopting
decisions, the judge follows only the Constitution, the laws  and
law.  The judge who investigates a case must be neutral, he   may
not be partial.
        The  constitutional right of persons to a hearing by   an
impartial  court also means that a judge, whose impartiality  may
raise  doubts,  may  not  investigate  the  case  of  a   person.
Impartiality  and  independence  of the court are  an   essential
guarantee  of  ensuring  human  rights and freedoms,  and  is   a
necessary  condition of fair investigation of the case, hence   a
condition of trust in court as well (Constitutional Court  ruling
of 12 February 2001). 
        7.  Courts,  being one of the institutions   implementing
state power—judicial power—and administering justice, must act so
that  society would have trust in them. The society's  confidence
in courts is an important element of a democratic state under the
rule of law and of an open, just and harmonious civil society and
an important condition of the effective activity of the  judicial
power.  The  society's  confidence in courts  is  determined   by
various  factors,  inter  alia qualification  of  judges,   their
professionalism,  ability to decide cases following not only  the
law, but also law, assurance of the proper legal process, respect
for  the  persons participating in the process,  rational   legal
argumentation (reasoning) of the final acts of the court, clarity
of  the final acts of the court to the persons participating   in
the  case,  etc. Judges must also meet very strict  ethical   and
moral  requirements:  their reputation must be  impeccable;   the
judge's  behaviour—both related to the direct performance of  his
office  and to his activity, which is not linked to  his  office—
should   not  raise  any  doubts  about  his  impartiality    and
independence;  the judge must discharge his duties and behave  so
that  by  his behaviour he would not discredit the name  of   the
judge.
        8.  The independence of the judge and court, as well   as
their  impartiality, as mentioned, are ensured inter alia by  the
constitutional  guarantee of inviolability of the term of  office
of judges.
        While ensuring the inviolability of the term of office of
a  judge,  the  cases  are provided for in Article  115  of   the
Constitution, when the judge may be dismissed from office; it  is
also  entrenched  in this Constitutional Court ruling  that   the
judge   may  be  dismissed  from  office  under  the    procedure
established by the law. 
        Under  Article  74  of  the  Constitution,  the    judges
specified in this article may be dismissed from office under  the
procedure for impeachment proceedings, established by the Statute
of the Seimas.
        It   needs  to  be  emphasized  that  the    Constitution
entrenches the final list of the grounds for dismissal of  judges
from  office  and that this list may not be expanded by laws   or
other legal acts.
        8.1. When the requirement to establish the procedure  for
dismissal of judges from office by law entrenched in Article  115
of the Constitution is construed in the context of Paragraph 4 of
Article  111 of the Constitution, under which the formation   and
competence  of courts shall be established by the Law on  Courts,
it  means  that the procedure for the dismissal of  judges   from
office must be established not in any law, but namely in the  Law
on Courts.
        The  formula  "judges of courts shall be dismissed   from
office  according  to the procedure established by law" used   in
Article  115  of the Constitution means that the  procedure   for
dismissal of judges from office established in the Law on  Courts
must be followed by all the subjects who, under the  Constitution
and the Law on Courts, have the powers to decide the questions of
the  dismissal  of  judges  from office or have  the  powers   to
participate  while  deciding the questions of the  dismissal   of
judges from office in the ways established in the Law on Courts. 
        While establishing the procedure for dismissal of  judges
from  office  in  the Law on Courts, the legislator,  under   the
Constitution, has certain discretion, however, while establishing
this  procedure,  the  legislator inter alia may  not  deny   nor
restrict  the  constitutional  powers of the  President  of   the
Republic,  the  Seimas and of the special institution of   judges
specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution which
are  entrenched in the Constitution. The powers of the  President
of  the  Republic  entrenched in Item 11 of Article  84  of   the
Constitution,  as well as the powers of the Seimas entrenched  in
Item  10  of Article 67 of the Constitution in formation of   the
judiciary are a significant element of the constitutional  status
of these state power institutions; changing or limitation of  the
specified  powers of the President of the Republic or the  Seimas
in  this sphere, as well as establishment of such procedure   for
implementation of these powers that the President of the Republic
and  the  Seimas would be conditioned or bound by  decisions   of
institutions  or  officials, which are not provided for  in   the
Constitution,   would  mean  a  change  of  the    constitutional
competence of the President of the Republic or the Seimas. As the
Constitutional Court held in its ruling of 9 May 2006, any change
or restriction of the powers of the special institution of judges
provided  for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112   of
the  Constitution to advise the President of the Republic on  the
appointment, promotion, transfer of judges of all courts or their
dismissal  from office would mean a change of the purpose of  the
special  institution of judges provided for by law specified   in
Paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution which arises  from
the Constitution itself. 
        8.2.  Different  grounds (particularities  thereof)   for
dismissal of judges from office established in Article 115 of the
Constitution  imply  inter  alia the fact that  the   legislator,
taking  account  of  the  particularities  of  the  grounds   for
dismissal of a judge from office, has the powers to differentiate
the  legal regulation of dismissal of a judge from office in  the
Law  on  Courts,  i.e.  to establish  different  procedures   for
dismissal  of  a judge from office. It is also to be   emphasized
that  while establishing the procedures for dismissal of a  judge
from  office by the Law on Courts (taking account of inter   alia
the  ground (particularities thereof) of the dismissal), in   all
cases  one must heed the principle of independence of the   judge
and court, the presumption of innocence, the requirements of  the
proper legal proceedings and other imperatives entrenched in  the
Constitution.
        8.3.  The Constitutional Court has held in its acts  more
than  once that independence of courts implies inter  alia  self-
regulation  and self-governance of courts, that while  regulating
by laws the relations linked to the formation of  self-government
institutions of the judiciary, as an independent branch of  state
power,  the  legislator  enjoys broad discretion  and  that   the
legislator  has  the right to consolidate in the Law  on   Courts
various  self-government  institutions  of  the  judiciary,    to
establish their formation procedure, powers, etc.
        In  its  ruling of 9 May 2006, the Constitutional   Court
held  that  the  special institution of judges  pointed  out   in
Paragraph  5  of  Article  112 of  the  Constitution  must   give
recommendation  to the President of the Republic concerning   all
the   questions  of  appointment  of  judges,  those  of    their
professional  career,  as well as those of their dismissal   from
office,  save  the exceptions which stem from  the   Constitution
itself;  that while establishing the procedure for the  dismissal
of judges from office, the legislator must entrench in the Law on
Courts  such legal regulation, under which a special  institution
of  judges  specified  in  Paragraph 5 of  Article  112  of   the
Constitution would be composed.
        It  needs  to  be noted that the Constitution  does   not
prohibit  the  legislator from establishing by  law  other  self-
government institutions of the judiciary which participate in the
proceedings of the dismissal of a judge from office too, however,
these   institutions  cannot  take  over  the  powers    directly
attributed  to  the  President of the Republic  or  the   special
institution of judges provided for by law, which is specified  in
Paragraph  5  of Article 112 of the Constitution, nor can   these
institutions change, nor restrict them.
        8.4.  Under  Article 115 of the Constitution, judges   of
courts shall be dismissed from office according to the  procedure
established  by  law  inter alia when by  their  behaviour   they
discredit  the name of the judge (Item 5). It needs to be   noted
that  the behaviour provided for in Item 5 of Article 115 of  the
Constitution  by  which the name of the judge  was   discredited,
implies  not only the establishment (statement) of  corresponding
facts of objective nature, but also their assessment.
        The Constitution does not expressis verbis establish what
types of behaviour of the judge is attributed to those, by  which
the  name of the judge is discredited. It needs to be noted  that
the  formula  "behaviour discrediting the name of the judge"   is
capacious,  it includes not only the behaviour of the judge,   by
which,  while implementing his powers as a judge, he  discredited
the  name of the judge, but also the behaviour which  discredited
the  name of the judge with no relation to the implementation  of
the powers of the judge. Under the Constitution, the  legislator,
as well as the self-government institutions of the judiciary have
discretion  to  establish what behaviour of the judge is  to   be
attributed  to  those,  by  which  the  name  of  the  judge   is
discredited,  however,  neither  laws,  nor  decisions  of  self-
government  institutions  of  the judiciary  may  establish   any
thorough (final) list of actions by which a judge discredits  the
name  of  the judge. The question whether the behaviour  of   the
judge  is the one by which the name of the judge is   discredited
every  time is decided after assessment of all the  circumstances
related with the said behaviour and significant to the case.
        9. Under the Constitution, judges shall be dismissed from
office: justices of the Supreme Court as well as its President—by
the  Seimas upon the submission of the President of the  Republic
(Paragraph  2 of Article 112 of the Constitution); judges of  the
Court of Appeal as well as its President—by the President of  the
Republic  upon the assent of the Seimas (Paragraph 3 of   Article
113  of  the Constitution); judges and presidents of  local   and
regional courts—by the President of the Republic (Paragraph 4  of
Article  112  of  the Constitution); judges  and  presidents   of
specialised  courts  (at this moment, one system of   specialised
courts,  namely administrative ones, has been established and  is
functioning)—by  the  President of the Republic (Paragraph 4   of
Article 112 of the Constitution). 
        10. Under Paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution,
a special institution of judges provided for by law shall  advise
the  President  of the Republic on the dismissal of judges   from
office. 
        In  the  context of the constitutional justice  case   at
issue,  it is to be noted that, as the Constitutional Court  held
in  its ruling of 9 May 2006, in the cases when the President  of
the  Republic  applies  to  the special  institution  of   judges
provided  for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112   of
the  Constitution so that it would advise him inter alia on   the
dismissal  of a judge from office because his term of powers  has
expired  or he reached the pensionable age established by law  or
the  court judgement convicting that judge has come into  effect,
the  said special institution of judges must not only make   sure
that there has been a certain behaviour (deed) of the judge,  but
also   assess  whether  by  this  behaviour  (deed)  he    really
discredited the name of the judge. If by his behaviour the  judge
really discredited the name of the judge, the special institution
of judges provided for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article
112 of the Constitution must advise the President of the Republic
to dismiss the judge from office. It is to be emphasized that  in
such cases the special institution of judges provided for by  law
specified  in Paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution  may
not decide not to advise the President of the Republic to dismiss
the judge from office, while the President of the Republic,  when
he receives such advice, has the powers to dismiss the judge from
office (if the judge to be dismissed is a justice of the  Supreme
Court—he  has the powers to propose that the Seimas dismiss   him
and  if the judge to be dismissed from office is a judge of   the
Court  of Appeal—he has the powers to request for the assent   of
the Seimas in order to dismiss him from office). However, if  the
special  institution of judges provided for by law specified   in
Paragraph  5 of Article 112 of the Constitution holds that   even
though there was certain behaviour (deed) of a judge, he did  not
discredit  the  name of the judge by that behaviour (deed),   the
special institution of judges may not advise the President of the
Republic  to  dismiss  the  said judge from  office,  while   the
President  of the Republic, without having received such  advice,
cannot  dismiss him from office, cannot propose that the   Seimas
dismiss  him  (if the judge to be dismissed is a justice of   the
Supreme Court) and cannot request for the assent of the Seimas in
order  to dismiss him from office (if the judge to be   dismissed
from office is a judge of the Court of Appeal). 
        11.  It was mentioned that in the constitutional  justice
case  at issue it is also important to elucidate what   procedure
for  the dismissal of the judge from office because of the   fact
that  he discredited the name of the judge is entrenched in   the
Law on Courts. 
        At  the  time  when  the  Vilnius  Regional  Court,   the
petitioner,  adopted the rulings by which it was applied to   the
Constitutional Court with the petition requesting to  investigate
whether Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of
the Law on Courts is not in conflict with Paragraph 2 of  Article
31 of the Constitution and with the constitutional principle of a
state  under  the  rule of law, the  relations  of   disciplinary
liability of judges were regulated by Articles 83-88 (wording  of
24 January 2002) of the Law on Courts and dismissal of judges was
regulated  by Article 90 (wording of 24 January 2002) of the  Law
on Courts.
        11.1. Articles 83-88 (wording of 24 January 2002) of  the
Law  on Courts established disciplinary liability of judges   and
the procedure of its application.
        Article  83  (wording of 24 January 2002) of the Law   on
Courts  inter  alia provides that "a disciplinary case shall   be
brought  against  a  judge  by the  Judicial  Court  of   Honour"
(Paragraph  1); that "disciplinary case may be brought against  a
judge  at  the  Judicial Court of Honour <…> for  the   behaviour
discrediting  the name of the judge <…>" (Paragraph 2); that  the
behaviour  discrediting  the  name  of the judge  shall  be   the
behaviour  incompatible with the judge's honour and in   conflict
with the requirements of the Judge's Code of Conduct discrediting
the name of the judge and undermining the authority of the court;
and  that any misconduct in office—negligent performance of   any
specific  duty of a judge or failure to act without a good  cause
shall also be regarded as behaviour discrediting the name of  the
judge (Paragraph 3). 
        Article  84  (wording of 24 January 2002) of the Law   on
Courts  established  that a disciplinary case may be   instituted
against a judge immediately after at least one of the  violations
specified in Paragraph 2 (wording of 24 January 2002) of  Article
83 comes to light (thus, inter alia when the fact comes to  light
that  by  his  behaviour the judge discredited the name  of   the
judge); that the Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission  shall
have the right to institute a disciplinary case against the judge
(Paragraph  1);  that  the  Council of Courts, as  well  as   the
president of the court where the judge works, or the president of
any court of higher level shall have the right to propose that  a
disciplinary case be instituted against the judge (Paragraph  4);
and that the instituted disciplinary case shall be transferred to
the Judicial Court of Honour (Paragraph 6).
        Under Paragraph 1 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article
86  of the Law on Courts, upon consideration of the  disciplinary
case, the Judicial Court of Honour may, by its decision:  dismiss
the  disciplinary  case  because there are no  grounds  for   the
disciplinary liability; dismiss the disciplinary case because  of
missing the deadline to institute this case; limit itself to  the
consideration of the case; impose a disciplinary sanction.
        Paragraph 2 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 86 of
the Law on Courts provides:
        "The  Judicial  Court  of Honour may, by  its   decision,
advise the President of the Republic or the Seimas, following the
procedure provided by this Law:
        1)  to appoint the judge to a judicial office of a  court
of a lower level;
        2) to dismiss the judge from office;
        3)  to institute the impeachment proceedings against  the
judge."
        Under Paragraph 4 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article
86  of  the Law on Courts, a decision of the Judicial  Court   of
Honour  may, within ten days after its adoption, be appealed   to
the  Supreme Court; such appeals shall be heard by a college   of
three  justices of the Supreme Court; an appeal may be filed   by
the  judge  and the subject which recommended to  institute   the
disciplinary case. 
        11.2. Thus, the Law on Courts (wording of 24 January 2002
with  subsequent amendments and supplements) provides that  after
having  considered the disciplinary case, the Judicial Court   of
Honour—a  self-government institution of the judiciary—may  adopt
one  of  the  decisions specified in Article 86 (wording  of   24
January  2002) of the Law on Courts, inter alia it may impose   a
disciplinary  sanction  or  adopt  a decision  on  advising   the
President of the Republic or the Seimas, following the  procedure
provided by the Law on Courts, to dismiss the judge from  office;
the  decision of the Judicial Court of Honour may be appealed  at
the Supreme Court. 
        It needs to be noted that the formula "the Judicial Court
of Honour" used in the Law on Courts (wording of 24 January  2002
with subsequent amendments and supplements) may not be  construed
only verbatim, as permitting to state that the Judicial Court  of
Honour  is  a court, i.e. an institution administering   justice,
which is provided for in the Constitution. The mere fact that the
said formula includes the notion "court" does not mean that  this
institution  is  a court. The fact that the said institution   is
composed only of judges is not the grounds to state that it is  a
court,  either.  Under the Constitution, the court is only   such
state  institution that is named in the Constitution namely as  a
court,  i.e. an institution which administers justice. Under  the
Constitution,  the Judicial Court of Honour is not nor may it  be
regarded as a court: the Judicial Court of Honour provided for in
the  Law on Courts is one of self-government institutions of  the
judiciary  which has the powers to consider deeds made by  judges
and  to impose disciplinary sanctions on them. It is also to   be
emphasized that the Judicial Court of Honour provided for in  the
Law  on  Courts  is not a constitutional  institution—under   the
Constitution, the legislator has the powers to decide whether  or
not to provide for such an institution in the Law on Courts.
        It was mentioned that Paragraph 4 (wording of 24  January
2002)  of  Article  86 of the Law on Courts  provides  that   the
decision  of the Judicial Court of Honour may be appealed at  the
Supreme  Court and that such appeals are considered by  a  three-
justice college at the Supreme Court. The specified provisions of
Paragraph 4 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 86 of the Law
on   Courts   are  not  a  matter  of  investigation  in     this
constitutional justice case.
        11.3.  Under  Item  5 (wording of 24  January  2002)   of
Paragraph  1 of Article 90 of the Law on Courts, the judge  shall
be dismissed from office when by his behaviour he discredits  the
name of the judge. 
        Paragraph 2 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of
the  Law on Courts established that the justices of the   Supreme
Court  shall be dismissed by the Seimas on the recommendation  of
the  President  of  the Republic and upon the  proposal  of   the
President  of  the Supreme Court. (By the  Constitutional   Court
ruling of 9 May 2006, Paragraph 3 (wording of 24 January 2002) of
Article 90 of the Law on Courts, in which it was established that
without  the proposal of the President of the Supreme Court   for
the President of the Republic to dismiss a justice of the Supreme
Court from office, the President of the Republic cannot recommend
the  Seimas  to  dismiss a justice from the Supreme  Court   from
office,   was   recognized  as  being  in  conflict  with     the
Constitution.)
        Paragraph 4 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of
the Law on Courts provides that the judges of the Court of Appeal
shall  be dismissed from office by the President of the  Republic
upon the assent of the Seimas.
        Paragraph 6 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of
the  Law  on  Courts provides that the judges  of  regional   and
district  courts  shall  be dismissed by the  President  of   the
Republic.
        Paragraph 7 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of
the  Law  on Courts provided that the President of the   Republic
shall  be advised on the dismissal of judges of a local court,  a
regional  administrative  court, a regional court, the Court   of
Appeal  of Lithuania and the Supreme Administrative Court by  the
Council  of Courts. (By the Constitutional Court ruling of 9  May
2006,  Paragraph 7 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90  of
the  Law on Courts, wherein it was established that the   special
institution of judges provided for by law specified in  Paragraph
5  of Article 112 of the Constitution has no right to advise  the
President of the Republic regarding the dismissal of justices  of
the  Supreme  Court  from  office, was recognized  as  being   in
conflict with the Constitution.)
        Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of
the  Law  on  Courts  provides that when a  judge  contests   his
dismissal  from office, he shall have the right to apply to   the
Vilnius Regional Court. 
        12. In the context of the constitutional justice case  at
issue,  it  is important to elucidate whether, under the Law   on
Courts (wording of 24 January 2002 with subsequent amendments and
supplements), the institution of a disciplinary case against  the
judge,  who discredited the name of the judge by his   behaviour,
and  the decision of the Judicial Court of Honour to advise   the
President  of  the  Republic to dismiss the  judge  from   office
because of the fact that by his behaviour he discredited the name
of  the judge are a necessary (obligatory) part of the  procedure
for  the  dismissal of a judge from office, and in case  of   not
fulfilment  of  this part, i.e. if the disciplinary case is   not
instituted against the judge who by his behaviour discredited the
name  of  the judge and if the Judicial Court of Honour has   not
advised  the President of the Republic to dismiss the judge  from
office because of that fact, the President of the Republic has no
powers to dismiss the judge from office because of that fact, and
whether non-institution of the disciplinary case, thus, also  the
absence  of  the  decision of the Judicial Court  of  Honour   to
propose that the President of the Republic dismiss the judge from
office because of the said, are not an obstacle for the President
of  the  Republic to apply to the special institution of   judges
provided  for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112   of
the Constitution for advice regarding the dismissal of the  judge
from  office because of the fact that by his behaviour the  judge
discredited the name of the judge, and after having received  the
advice  regarding the dismissal of the judge from office  because
of the fact that by his behaviour the judge discredited the  name
of the judge, to decide whether to dismiss the judge from office.
        12.1. While assessing the legal regulation established in
the  Law  on Courts (wording of 24 January 2002 with   subsequent
amendments and supplements) in a systemic manner, one is to  hold
that  the  Law  on  Courts  (wording of  24  January  2002   with
subsequent  amendments and supplements) entrenches such   overall
regulation regarding the relations of the dismissal of the  judge
from  office because of the fact that by his behaviour the  judge
discredited the name of the judge, under which the Judicial Court
of  Honour has the right inter alia to submit proposals for   the
President  of  the  Republic to dismiss the  judge  from   office
because  of the fact that by his behaviour the judge  discredited
the  name of the judge, and the President of the Republic,  after
having received the advice from the special institution of judges
provided  for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112   of
the Constitution regarding the dismissal of the judge from office
because  of the fact that by his behaviour the judge  discredited
the  name  of  the judge, has the powers to  decide  whether   to
dismiss the judge from office on the said grounds. 
        It is to be noted that neither Article 90 (wording of  24
January  2002) of the Law on Courts, nor other articles of   this
law establish that the President of the Republic may dismiss  the
judge  from office because of the fact that by his behaviour  the
judge  discredited the name of the judge only upon the   proposal
from  the  Judicial  Court  of Honour to the  President  of   the
Republic; neither Article 90 (wording of 24 January 2002) of  the
Law on Courts, nor other articles of this law establish that  the
President of the Republic may apply to the special institution of
judges  provided for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of   Article
112 of the Constitution regarding the dismissal of the judge from
office  because  of  the fact that by his  behaviour  the   judge
discredited the name of the judge only in the case, when there is
a proposal from the Judicial Court of Honour for the President of
the Republic to dismiss the judge from office because of the fact
that  by  his  behaviour the judge discredited the name  of   the
judge. 
        It is also to be noted that the constitutional powers  of
the President of the Republic to apply to the special institution
of judges provided for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article
112  of the Constitution for advice regarding the dismissal of  a
judge  from office because of the fact that by his behaviour  the
judge  discredited the name of the judge, cannot be bound by  the
presence  or absence is a corresponding proposal of the  Judicial
Court  of  Honour  to the President of the Republic.  Under   the
Constitution,  no decision of the Judicial Court of Honour in   a
disciplinary  case,  wherein it was investigated whether by   his
behaviour  the judge discredited the name of the judge,  whatever
the  content  of  such  decision  (inter  alia  to  dismiss   the
disciplinary  case  if  there are no  grounds  for   disciplinary
liability;  to  restrict  oneself to the  consideration  of   the
disciplinary  case;  to  impose a disciplinary sanction  on   the
judge), restricts nor let alone denies the constitutional  powers
of  the  President  of  the Republic to  apply  to  the   special
institution of judges provided for by law specified in  Paragraph
5  of  Article 112 of the Constitution for advice regarding   the
dismissal  of the judge from office because of the fact that   by
his behaviour the judge discredited the name of the judge.
        Thus, the mere fact that the Law on Courts (wording of 24
January   2002  with  subsequent  amendments  and    supplements)
establishes such legal regulation under which the Judicial  Court
of Honour—a self-government institution of the judiciary—has  the
right to consider the disciplinary cases of judges and inter alia
to  propose  that the President of the Republic dismiss a   judge
from  office because of the fact that by his behaviour the  judge
discredited the name of the judge, does not mean that the Law  on
Courts (wording of 24 January 2002 with subsequent amendments and
supplements)  establishes such legal regulation, under which  the
implementation  of the constitutional powers of the President  of
the  Republic  to  dismiss judges from office, as  well  as   the
implementation  of  the  constitutional powers  of  the   special
institution of judges provided for by law specified in  Paragraph
5  of Article 112 of the Constitution to advise the President  of
the  Republic regarding the dismissal of the judge from   office,
depend  on  the fact whether there is the said proposal  of   the
Judicial Court of Honour to dismiss the judge from office. 
        If  the said legal regulation established in the Law   on
Courts (wording of 24 January 2002 with subsequent amendments and
supplements)  were  construed as, purportedly, establishing   the
prohibition  for  the President of the Republic to apply to   the
special  institution of judges provided for by law specified   in
Paragraph  5  of  Article  112 of the  Constitution  for   advice
regarding  the  dismissal  of the judge from  office  until   the
Judicial   Court  of  Honour  (after  it  has  considered     the
disciplinary  case  instituted against the judge)  proposes   the
President  of  the  Republic to dismiss the  judge  from   office
because  of the fact that by his behaviour the judge  discredited
the  name of the judge, and as establishing the prohibition   for
the  President of the Republic to dismiss the judge from   office
because  of the fact that by his behaviour the judge  discredited
the  name of the judge if the Judicial Court of Honour (after  it
has  considered  the  disciplinary case instituted  against   the
judge) does not propose the President of the Republic to  dismiss
the  judge from office because of the fact that by his  behaviour
the  judge discredited the name of the judge, it would mean  that
Article  86  (wording  of 24 January 2002) (we  construe  it   in
relation  with Article 90) of the Law on Courts establishes  such
legal regulation that restricts or even denies the powers of  the
President  of  the  Republic,  which  are  established  in    the
Constitution,  to dismiss judges of local and regional courts  as
well  as judges of the Court of Appeal who, by their   behaviour,
discredited  the  name of the judge, and that restricts or   even
denies  the powers of the special institution of judges  provided
for  by  law  specified  in Paragraph 5 of Article  112  of   the
Constitution  to advice the President of the Republic   regarding
the  dismissal  of the judge from office. If the Law  on   Courts
(wording  of  24  January 2002 with  subsequent  amendments   and
supplements) established the said legal regulation—restricting or
even  denying the powers of the President of the Republic,  which
are  established  in the Constitution, to dismiss judges of   the
local  and  regional  courts as well as judges of the  Court   of
Appeal  who,  by  their behaviour, discredited the name  of   the
judge, and restricting or even denying the powers of the  special
institution of judges provided for by law specified in  Paragraph
5  of Article 112 of the Constitution to advice the President  of
the Republic regarding the dismissal of the judge from  office—it
could be assessed as being in conflict with the Constitution.
        Having  held  that  the legal regulation  entrenched   in
Article  86  (wording of 24 January 2002) of the Law on   Courts,
under which the Judicial Court of Honour has the right (after  it
has  considered  the  disciplinary case instituted  against   the
judge)  inter alia to propose that the President of the  Republic
dismiss  the  judge from office because of the fact that by   his
behaviour the judge discredited the name of the judge, may not be
interpreted  as  establishing that until the Judicial  Court   of
Honour  has proposed that the President of the Republic   dismiss
the  judge from office because of the fact that by his  behaviour
the judge discredited the name of the judge, the President of the
Republic  may not dismiss the judge from office, one is to   hold
that  the powers of the Judicial Court of Honour established   in
the  Law  on Courts (wording of 24 January 2002 with   subsequent
amendments  and  supplements),  after  it  has  considered    the
disciplinary  case  instituted against the judge, inter alia   to
propose that the President of the Republic dismiss the judge from
office  because  of  the fact that by his  behaviour  the   judge
discredited  the name of the judge, are to be assessed not as   a
necessary  part of the procedure of dismissal of the judge   from
office  because  of  the fact that by his  behaviour  the   judge
discredited  the name of the judge, but only as a proposal  which
draws the attention of the President of the Republic to the  fact
that,  in the opinion of the Judicial Court of Honour, the  judge
against  whom a disciplinary case was instituted because of   the
fact  that by his behaviour he discredited the name of the  judge
should  be dismissed from office. Such proposal of the   Judicial
Court of Honour, either under the Constitution, or under the  Law
on  Courts, does not mean that upon receiving such proposal   the
President  of  the Republic has a duty to apply to  the   special
institution of judges provided for by law specified in  Paragraph
5  of  Article 112 of the Constitution for advice regarding   the
dismissal of the judge who, as it was held by the Judicial  Court
of Honour, by his behaviour discredited the name of the judge. 
        12.2.  It  has been held in this constitutional   justice
case  that the legislator has the powers to establish what  self-
government institutions of the judiciary and under what procedure
participate (may participate) in the process of the dismissal  of
the judge from office and that by doing so the legislator may not
establish  any  such  legal regulation,  under  which  the  self-
government institutions of the judiciary which participate in the
process  of the dismissal of judges from office would be  granted
such powers, by which the constitutional powers of the  President
of the Republic, the Seimas and the special institution of judges
provided  for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112   of
the Constitution would be interfered with. 
        The Judicial Court of Honour which is provided for in the
Law  on  Courts  (wording  of 24 January  2002  with   subsequent
amendments  and  supplements), and which, as it  was   mentioned,
under  Article  86  (wording of 24 January 2002) of the  Law   on
Courts,  has the right (after it has considered the  disciplinary
case instituted against the judge) inter alia to propose that the
President  of the Republic dismiss the judge from office  because
of the fact that by his behaviour the judge discredited the  name
of  the  judge,  is one of self-government institutions  of   the
judiciary which could be granted (and was granted) the said right
in the law by the legislator. It was mentioned that the mere fact
that  the  Law  on  Courts  (wording of  24  January  2002   with
subsequent  amendments  and supplements) establishes such   legal
regulation,  under  which the Judicial Court  of  Honour—a  self-
government institution of the judiciary—has the right to consider
disciplinary  cases of judges and inter alia to propose that  the
President  of the Republic dismiss the judge from office  because
of the fact that by his behaviour the judge discredited the  name
of the judge, does not mean that the Law on Courts (wording of 24
January   2002  with  subsequent  amendments  and    supplements)
establishes such legal regulation, under which the implementation
of the constitutional powers of the President of the Republic  to
dismiss judges from office, as well as the implementation of  the
constitutional  powers  of  the special  institution  of   judges
provided  for by law specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112   of
the  Constitution  to  advise  the  President  of  the   Republic
regarding  the dismissal of the judge from office, depend on  the
fact whether there is the said proposal of the Judicial Court  of
Honour to dismiss the judge from office. 
        13.  Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of  Article
90  of  the Law on Courts provides: "When a judge  contests   his
dismissal from office, he shall be entitled to appeal, within one
month  from  the day of his dismissal, to the  Vilnius   Regional
Court."
        It was mentioned that it is obvious from the arguments of
the  petitioner that he doubted the compliance of the   provision
"when  a  judge contests his dismissal from office, he shall   be
entitled  to  appeal  <…>  to the  Vilnius  Regional  Court"   of
Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of the Law
on  Courts with Paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the Constitution  in
the  aspect that the legal regulation established in Paragraph  8
(wording  of 24 January 2002) of Article 90 of the Law on  Courts
is  not  in  line  with the  requirements  of  independence   and
impartiality of court entrenched in Paragraph 2 of Article 31  of
the Constitution. 
        14.  The provision "when a judge contests his   dismissal
from  office, he shall be entitled to appeal <…> to the   Vilnius
Regional  Court" of Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January 2002)   of
Article  90 of the Law on Courts means that every judge, who  was
dismissed  from office on the grounds established in Article  115
of  the  Constitution,  has the right to apply  to  the   Vilnius
Regional  Court,  i.e. the cases regarding the dismissal of   all
judges from office are cognizable only to this court.
        It  was mentioned that, under the Constitution, a  judge,
as any other person who thinks that he was dismissed from  office
groundlessly  and  unlawfully, has the right to apply  to   court
regarding  the defence of his violated right. This his right   is
absolute  and it is not permitted to restrict nor to deny it.  It
was  also mentioned that, under the Constitution, the  legislator
has discretion, following the constitutional principle of a state
under the rule of law, to establish at which court, inter alia  a
court of general competence, and under what procedure the  person
who  thinks  that he was dismissed from office groundlessly   and
unlawfully  may  apply  regarding the defence  of  his   violated
rights.
        It has also been held in this Constitutional Court ruling
that  the  Constitution provides for significant powers  to   the
President of the Republic, as the Head of State, in the formation
of courts. The President of the Republic participates, in one way
or another, when appointing or dismissing judges of courts of all
levels.  The  special institution of judges provided for by   law
specified in Paragraph 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution which
advises  the President of the Republic inter alia regarding   the
dismissal  of  judges from office is a counter-balance to   these
constitutional powers of the President of the Republic.
        It  needs  to be emphasized that the mere fact that   the
President  of the Republic decides or participates when  deciding
questions related to the career of judges—appoints and  dismisses
the  judges of local and regional courts and of the   specialised
courts  established  under  Paragraph 2 of Article  111  of   the
Constitution and upon assent of the Seimas appoints and dismisses
the  judges  of  the Court of Appeal as well as submits  to   the
Seimas  candidatures  to be appointed to or dismissed  from   the
Supreme   Court  justices—is  not  the  grounds  to  doubt    the
independence  of courts and judges when they, in court,  consider
cases of dismissal of judges from office, the judges whereof  are
appointed  by the President of the Republic. If one agreed   with
the reasoning of the Vilnius Regional Court, the petitioner, that
the  fact  that  the  President of  the  Republic  appoints   and
dismisses judges of the regional courts and decides the questions
of  their  professional  career  is the  grounds  to  doubt   the
independence and impartiality of the regional court, when a party
of  the  case considered by this court is the President  of   the
Republic, one should hold that no court exists in Lithuania which
is  independent  and could utterly impartially  investigate   the
case,  a party in which is the President of the Republic. It   is
obvious  that such a statement (if one agreed with the  reasoning
of the Vilnius Regional Court, the petitioner, substantiating his
doubt  regarding  the compliance of the provision "when a   judge
contests  his  dismissal  from office, he shall be  entitled   to
appeal <…> to the Vilnius Regional Court" of Paragraph 8 (wording
of  24  January  2002) of Article 90 of the Law on  Courts   with
Paragraph  2  of  Article 31 of the Constitution  and  with   the
constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law)  would
be absolutely constitutionally groundless.
        15. Taking account of the arguments set forth, one is  to
draw  a conclusion that the provision "when a judge contests  his
dismissal from office, he shall be entitled to appeal <…> to  the
Vilnius  Regional  Court" of Paragraph 8 (wording of 24   January
2002) of Article 90 of the Law on Courts is not in conflict  with
Paragraph  2  of  Article 31 of the Constitution  and  with   the
constitutional principle of a state under the rule of law.
        Conforming to Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution of
the  Republic of Lithuania and Articles 1, 53, 54, 55 and 56   of
the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania,
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has  passed
the following
        
                             ruling:
                                
        To  recognize that the provision "when a judge   contests
his dismissal from office, he shall be entitled to appeal <…>  to
the Vilnius Regional Court" of Paragraph 8 (wording of 24 January
2002,  Official  Gazette Valstybės žinios, 2002, No. 17-649)   of
Article  90 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Courts is not  in
conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.
        
        This ruling of the Constitutional Court is final and  not
subject to appeal.
        The ruling is promulgated in the name of the Republic  of
Lithuania.

Justices of the Constitutional Court:	Armanas Abramavičius
					Toma Birmontienė
					Egidijus Kūris
					Kęstutis Lapinskas
					Zenonas Namavičius
					Ramutė Ruškytė
					Vytautas Sinkevičius
					Romualdas Kęstutis Urbaitis