Lietuviškai
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA
D E C I S I O N
On the construction of the 21 December 1999 ruling
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Lithuania
Vilnius, 12 January 2000
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania,
composed of the Judges of the Constitutional Court Egidijus
Jarašiūnas, Egidijus Kūris, Zigmas Levickis, Augustinas
Normantas, Vladas Pavilonis, Jonas Prapiestis, Vytautas
Sinkevičius, Stasys Stačiokas, and Teodora Staugaitienė,
with the secretary of the hearing-Daiva Pitrėnaitė,
in the presence of:
the representative of the petitioner-a group of members of
the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania-Česlovas Juršėnas, a
Seimas member,
the representative of the party concerned-the Seimas of
the Republic of Lithuania-Jurgis Orlauskas, a senior consultant
to the Law Department of the Chancery of the Seimas,
pursuant to Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional
Court, on 10 January 2000 in the hearing of the Constitutional
Court investigated a request of the Chairman of the Supreme
Court of Lithuania and that of the Minister of Justice of the
Republic of Lithuania to construe certain provisions of the
Constitutional Court ruling of 21 December 1999.
The Constitutional Court
has established:
I
On 21 December 1999, the Constitutional Court adopted the
Ruling "On the compliance of Articles 14, 251, 26, 30, 33, 34,
36, 40, 51, 56, 58, 59, 66, 69, 691, and 73 of the Republic of
Lithuania Law on Courts with the Constitution of the Republic
of Lithuania" (hereinafter referred to as the Ruling).
The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania V. Greičius
and the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania G.
Balčiūnas, basing themselves on Part 1 of Article 61 of the Law
on the Constitutional Court, request to construe certain
provisions of the Ruling.
II
In his request of 5 January 2000, the Chairman of the
Supreme Court of Lithuania requests to construe:
1. Do the statements of Item 10 of Chapter IV of the
stating part and those Item 6 of the ruling part of the Ruling
whereby it is recognised that Part 2 of Article 58 of the
Republic of Lithuania Law on Courts (hereinafter referred to as
the Law) to the extent that the proposal of the Minister of
Justice regarding appointment of judges to the Court of Honour
of Judges is provided for contradicts Part 2 of Article 109 of
the Constitution mean that the present Court of Honour of
Judges which was formed prior to the ruling of the
Constitutional Court may continue its functions in its full
composition?
2. Are the provisions of Item 11 of Chapter IV of the
stating part and those of Item 7 of the ruling part whereby it
is recognised that Part 4 of Article 59 of the Law in the scope
whereby disciplinary action against the chairperson of a
district or regional court and the Court of Appeal, their
deputies, division chairpersons and other judges may be
instituted by the Minister of Justice on the proposal of the
Director of the Department of Courts or on his own initiative
and that the judge against whom disciplinary action has been
instituted may be removed from office on the proposal of the
Minister of Justice until the outcome of the case becomes clear
contradicts Part 2 of Article 109 and Part 5 of Article 112 of
the Constitution also applicable to the disciplinary cases
instituted by the Minister of Justice prior to the
Constitutional Court ruling in question and where decisions are
still pending?
3. Do the provisions regarding the material-technical
supply of courts of Item 12 of Chapter IV of the stating part
of the Ruling wherein it is asserted that the State budget must
provide as to how much finances are to be allocated to every
individual court, those of Item 12 of Chapter IV of the stating
part and those of Item 8 of the ruling part wherein it is
recognised that Part 2 of Article 69 of the Law in the scope
whereby the competence of the Minister of Justice to arrange
for the financial supply of district, regional courts and the
Court of Appeal is established contradicts Part 2 of Article
109 of the Constitution mean that the finances allocated to
every particular court, with the exception of the Supreme Court
of Lithuania, are to be accumulated in the Ministry of Justice
and later redistributed to every particular court according to
the assignations established to it in the State budget, or are
the finances provided for every particular court by an
individual clause in the budget to be allocated to the court
directly, i.e. not through the Ministry of Justice?
4. Is the conclusion of Item 5 of the ruling part of the
Ruling whereby it is recognised that Part 3 of Article 51 of
the Law in the scope whereby a judge of a district or regional
court, that of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of
Lithuania, in case he agrees, may, by a decree of the President
of the Republic, be delegated for the term of up to one year to
the structures of the Ministry of Justice or those of the
Department of Courts and that for the term of the delegation
the powers of the delegated judge shall be suspended
contradicts Part 1 of Article 5, Part 2 of Article 109 and Part
1 of Article 113 of the Constitution also applicable to the
persons who were delegated prior to the ruling of the
Constitutional Court at issue? Does the said conclusion of the
Constitutional Court terminate the delegation, is the
termination of the term of office of the delegation which began
prior to the ruling of the Constitutional Court at issue
possible, and could this be assessed as a breach of oath of a
judge?
5. Does the statement "any attempts to reduce the salary
or other social guarantees of a judge or cut the budget of the
judiciary are interpreted as infringement on the judicial
independence" (Constitutional Court ruling of 6 December 1995
is quoted) of Part 6 of Item 7 of Chapter I of the stating part
of the Ruling mean that any attempts to reduce these salaries
or other social guarantees contradict the principle of the
independence of judges and courts established in Article 109 of
the Constitution, i.e. regardless of the fact on what motives
and by what form one intends to do so? Does the statement "any
attempts to reduce <
> are interpreted as infringement" mean
imperative prohibition of reduction, and does this prohibition
include restrictions of judges' salaries and their social
guarantees based on any motives and provided for by any
normative acts? If so, then what legal effects would the
normative acts have, if passed by the Government or the Seimas,
which would contradict the sentences of the stating part of the
ruling of the Constitutional Court and by which the
independence of judges and courts would be violated, for
example, judges' salaries would be reduced etc.?
6. Does the concept "judges' remuneration" employed in the
statement "judges' remuneration must not be reduced during his
or her judicial service" in Part 5 of Item 7 of Chapter I of
the stating part of the Ruling mean only the official salary
(only a constituent part of remuneration for work), or does it
presume all the payments established by the State (regardless
of how they are referred to in the normative acts) which the
person receives in connection with his office of a judge, i.e.
does the concept "judges' remuneration" include the official
salary defined on the grounds of certain criteria (stable norm
and coefficient), as well as its increase and extra pay for
employment period? Does such a provision mean that the existing
social guarantees and remuneration of judges may not be reduced
irrespective of the fact by the acts of which power-the
legislature or the executive-these social guarantees, including
remuneration, have been established?
III
In his request of 6 December 2000, the Minister of Justice
requests to construe whether the Minister of Justice could, in
attempt to ensure even development of the whole judicial
system, accomplish his duty to arrange for the
material-technical supply to district and regional courts and
the Court of Appeal through the financing of an individual
programme of arrangement for the material-technical supply of
courts which is approved by the Republic of Lithuania Budget
Law, at the same time being the administrator of the financial
assignations for the implementation of this programme. Under
this programme, the means would be allocated to the
construction of court buildings or their acquisition, and means
for special expenses for creation of computer systems of
courts, purchase of office equipment etc. would be provided
for.
The Minister of Justice also requests to construe whether
the Minister of Justice could, in attempt to prepare a draft
State budget, demand the data concerning the needs of courts
from respective chairpersons of courts which are necessary in
order to prepare a draft State budget and which are linked with
financing of courts.
IV
In the court hearing both the representatives of the
parties to the case Č. Juršėnas, the representative of a group
of Seimas members, and J. Orlauskas, the representative of the
Seimas, noted that the requests of the Chairman of the Supreme
Court of Lithuania and the Minister of Justice are important as
the construction of the Ruling will help to ensure an effective
functioning of the judicial system and the independence of
judges and courts.
The Constitutional Court
holds that:
1. Under Part 1 of Article 107 of the Constitution, laws
(or parts thereof) of the Republic of Lithuania or any other
acts (or parts thereof) of the Seimas, acts of the President of
the Republic of Lithuania, and acts (or parts thereof) of the
Government may not be applied from the day of official
promulgation of the decision of the Constitutional Court that
the act in question (or part thereof) is inconsistent with the
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.
Article 72 Consequences of the Recognition of a Legal Act
as Being Contradictory to the Constitution of the Law on the
Constitutional Court provides that laws of the Republic of
Lithuania (or a part thereof) or other Seimas acts (or a part
thereof), acts of the President of the Republic, or acts of the
Government (or a part thereof) shall not be applicable from the
day that a Constitutional Court ruling that the appropriate act
(or a part thereof) contradicts the Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania is officially promulgated. The same
consequences shall arise when the Constitutional Court adopts a
ruling that an act of the President of the Republic or act of
the Government (or a part thereof) is in contradiction with
laws. Rulings adopted by the Constitutional Court shall have
the power of law and shall be binding to all governmental
institutions, companies, firms, and organisations as well as to
officials and citizens. All governmental institutions as well
as their officials must revoke executive acts or provisions
thereof which they have adopted and which are based on an act
which has been recognized as unconstitutional. Decisions based
on legal acts which have been recognized as being contradictory
to the Constitution or laws must not be executed if they have
not been executed prior to the appropriate Constitutional Court
ruling became effective. The power of the Constitutional Court
to recognize a legal act or part thereof as unconstitutional
may not be overruled by a repeated adoption of a like legal act
or part thereof.
The Constitutional Court notes that that a ruling of the
Constitutional Court constitutes a whole. Its ruling part is
based on the arguments of the stating part. Construing its
ruling, therefore, the Constitutional Court is bound by both
the content of the ruling part and that of the stating part. A
decision adopted in connection with the construction of a
ruling of the Constitutional Court is inseparable from the
ruling of the Constitutional Court.
2.1. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
requests to construe whether the statements of Item 10 of
Chapter IV of the stating part and those of Item 6 of the
ruling part of the Ruling whereby it is recognised that Part 2
of Article 58 of the Law to the extent that the proposal of the
Minister of Justice regarding appointment of judges to the
Court of Honour of Judges is provided for contradicts Part 2 of
Article 109 of the Constitution mean that the present Court of
Honour of Judges which was formed prior to the Constitutional
Court ruling in question may continue its functions in its full
composition.
2.2. The Constitutional Court notes that the norm of a law
contradicting the Constitution shall not be applicable from the
day that a Constitutional Court respective ruling is officially
promulgated. It is pointed out in the request of the Chairman
of the Supreme Court of Lithuania that the Court of Honour of
Judges which is composed of the judges appointed on the
proposal of the Minister of Justice was formed prior to the
official publication of the Constitutional Court ruling.
All the judges of the Court of Honour of Judges were
appointed in pursuance of the Law which was then in force.
Submitting proposals regarding appointment of judges to the
Court of Honour of Judges, the Minister of Justice was
implementing his powers which were provided for in the Law. The
proposal of the Minister of Justice regarding appointment of
individual persons to the Court of Honour of Judges is an act
of application of the legal norm.
Upon application of the norm of Part 2 of Article 58 of
the Law, there appeared new legal relations linked with
accomplishment of the functions of judges of the Court of
Honour of Judges and which continue now. Therefore upon the
official promulgation of the ruling of the Constitutional
Court, the powers of the judges of the Court of Honour of
Judges who have been appointed on the proposal of the Minister
of Justice do not terminate of their own accord.
3.1. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
requests to construe whether the provisions of Item 11 of
Chapter IV of the stating part and those of Item 7 of the
ruling part of the Ruling whereby it is recognised that Part 4
of Article 59 of the Law in the scope whereby disciplinary
action against the chairperson of a district or regional court
and the Court of Appeal, their deputies, division chairpersons
and other judges may be instituted by the Minister of Justice
on the proposal of the Director of the Department of Courts or
on his own initiative and that the judge against whom
disciplinary action has been instituted may be removed from
office on the proposal of the Minister of Justice until the
outcome of the case becomes clear contradicts Part 2 of Article
109 and Part 5 of Article 112 of the Constitution are also
applicable to the disciplinary cases instituted by the Minister
of Justice prior to the ruling of the Constitutional Court and
where decisions are still pending.
3.2. Under the Law the Minister of Justice had been
entitled to institute disciplinary action against the
chairperson of a district, regional court and the Court of
Appeal, their deputies, division chairpersons and other judges
before the Constitutional Court ruling was officially
promulgated. After the recognition that the said norms of the
Law contradict Part 2 of Article 109 and Part 5 of Article 112
of the Constitution, the Minister of Justice may no longer
implement the powers established in Part 4 of Article 59 of the
Law. Institution of disciplinary action is an act of
application of a legal norm. The Minister of Justice instituted
disciplinary actions against the judges under the Law which was
then in force. Upon application of the said legal norm, there
appeared other legal relations, i.e. the relations linked with
the investigation of these cases and the adoption of a
decision. Therefore, the official promulgation of the Ruling in
itself does not create any basis to dismiss the disciplinary
cases instituted against the judges only due to the fact that
they were instituted by the Minister of Justice.
4.1. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
requests to construe whether the provisions regarding the
material-technical supply of courts of Item 12 of Chapter IV of
the stating part of the Ruling wherein it is asserted that the
State budget must provide as to how much finances are to be
allocated to every individual court, those of Item 12 of
Chapter IV of the stating part and those of Item 8 of the
ruling part wherein it is recognised that Part 2 of Article 69
of the Law in the scope whereby the competence of the Minister
of Justice to arrange for the financial supply of district,
regional courts and the Court of Appeal is established
contradicts Part 2 of Article 109 of the Constitution mean that
the finances allocated to every particular court, with the
exception of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, are to be
accumulated in the Ministry of Justice and later redistributed
to every particular court according to the assignations
established to it in the State budget, or whether the finances
provided for every particular court by an individual clause in
the budget are to be allocated to the court directly, i.e. not
through the Ministry of Justice.
The Minister of Justice requests to construe whether the
Minister of Justice could, in attempt to ensure even
development of the overall judicial system, accomplish his duty
to arrange for the material-technical supply to district and
regional courts and the Court of Appeal through the financing
of an individual programme of arrangement for the
material-technical supply of courts which is approved by the
Republic of Lithuania Budget Law, at the same time being the
administrator of the financial assignations for the
implementation of this programme. Under this programme, the
means would be allocated to the construction of court buildings
or their acquisition, and means for special expenses for
creation of computer systems of courts, purchase of office
equipment etc. would be provided for. The Minister of Justice
also requests to construe whether the Minister of Justice
could, in attempt to prepare a draft State budget, demand the
data from chairpersons of courts which are necessary in order
to prepare a draft State budget and which are linked with
financing of courts.
4.2. In its Ruling the Constitutional Court held that "the
principle of independence of courts also includes the
independent financing of courts from the executive. This
principle may be secured by providing in laws that the State
budget must provide as to how much finances are to be allocated
to every individual court so that proper conditions might be
created for administration of justice".
The said provisions of the Ruling mean that in the State
budget assignations must be provided for every individual
court. These finances must be allocated to every individual
court directly and not through the Ministry of Justice. The
provision of the Ruling whereby the State budget must provide
as to how much finances are to be allocated to every individual
court also mean that the Minister (Ministry) of Justice is not
an administrator of the assignations allocated to courts,
therefore he may not determine as to how the finances of the
State budget allocated to courts should be used.
4.3. The provision of the Ruling whereby the State budget
must provide as to how much finances are to be allocated to
every individual court does not mean that one may not establish
in the State budget as to how much finances are allocated to
concrete supply programmes for the whole judicial system.
The subjects, including the Minister of Justice, who will
be indicated in a respective law may be administrators of the
assignations provided for in the State budget for concrete
supply programmes for the whole judicial system, however, these
subjects may never administer the finances individually
provided for every individual court in the State budget.
It was held in the Ruling that in the area of the
arrangement for financial supply of courts the powers of the
Minister of Justice regarding preparation of a draft State
budget and those concerning its discussion in the Seimas may be
ascribed to his competence. This provision of the Ruling
pre-supposes the fact that the Minister of Justice, in attempt
to ensure that in a draft State budget sufficient finances were
provided so that appropriate performance of courts might be
guaranteed, has the right to get the data concerning the needs
of courts from respective chairpersons of courts.
In its Ruling the Constitutional Court did not investigate
the issue regarding financing of the Court of Honour of Judges,
therefore it will not construe it in the present decision.
Alongside, the Constitutional Court notes that an independent
institution of judges established and acting on the basis of
laws must in all cases be financed from the State budget.
5.1. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
requests to construe whether the conclusion of Item 5 of the
ruling part of the Ruling whereby it is recognised that Part 3
of Article 51 of the Law in the scope whereby a judge of a
district or regional court, that of the Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Lithuania, in case he agrees, may, by a decree
of the President of the Republic, be delegated for the term of
up to one year to the structures of the Ministry of Justice or
those of the Department of Courts and that for the term of the
delegation the powers of the delegated judge shall be suspended
contradicts Part 1 of Article 5, Part 2 of Article 109 and Part
1 of Article 113 of the Constitution is also applicable to the
persons who were delegated prior to the ruling of the
Constitutional Court at issue.
The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania also
requests to construe whether the said conclusion of the
Constitutional Court terminates the delegation, whether the
termination of the term of office of the delegation which began
prior to the ruling of the Constitutional Court at issue is
possible, and whether this could be assessed as a breach of
oath of a judge.
5.2. It has been mentioned in the present decision that
under Part 1 of Article 107 of the Constitution and Article 72
of the Law on the Constitutional Court, laws (or parts thereof)
may not be applied from the day of official promulgation of the
decision of the Constitutional Court that the act in question
(or part thereof) is inconsistent with the Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania.
The judges pointed out in the request of the Chairman of
the Supreme Court of Lithuania were delegated to the
institutions of the executive pursuant to the norms of the Law
which were in effect until the official promulgation of the
Constitutional Court ruling. Part 3 of Article 51 of the Law
which was recognised as contradicting the Constitution by the
Ruling may no longer be applied after the official promulgation
of the Constitutional Court ruling. Thus the judges were
delegated to the structures of the Ministry of Justice or those
of the Department of Courts pursuant to the norms of the Law
which were then in effect. Under the Law, the judges were
delegated to the institutions of the executive for up to one
year. The delegation of a person for work in the structures of
the Ministry of Justice or those of the Department of Courts is
an act of the application of the legal norm.
However, in the case indicated by the Chairman of the
Supreme Court of Lithuania, one has to take account of the fact
that after the recognition by the Constitutional Court ruling
that the part of the article of the Law providing for the
delegation of a judge to the institutions of the executive as
contradicting the Constitution, any further work of the
delegated judge at the Ministry of Justice or the Department of
Courts is not in line with Part 1 of Article 113 of the
Constitution and the status of judges provided for in the
Constitution.
6.1. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
requests to construe whether the statement "any attempts to
reduce the salary or other social guarantees of a judge or cut
the budget of the judiciary are interpreted as infringement on
the judicial independence" (Constitutional Court ruling of 6
December 1995 is quoted) of Part 6 of Item 7 of Chapter I of
the stating part of the Ruling means that any attempts to
reduce these salaries or other social guarantees contradict the
principle of the independence of judges and courts established
in Article 109 of the Constitution, i.e. regardless of the fact
on what motives and by what form one intends to do so.
He also requests to construe whether the statement "any
attempts to reduce <
> are interpreted as infringement" means
imperative prohibition of reduction, and whether this
prohibition includes restrictions of judges' salaries and their
social guarantees based on any motives and provided for by any
normative acts. If so, then what legal effects the normative
acts would have, if passed by the Government or the Seimas,
which would contradict the sentences of the stating part of the
ruling of the Constitutional Court and by which the
independence of judges and courts would be violated, for
example, judges' salaries would be reduced etc.
6.2. Giving its interpretation of the constitutional
principle of the independence of judges and courts in the
Ruling, the Constitutional Court held that the protection of
remuneration of judges and their other social guarantees is one
of the guarantees of ensuring of this principle. Part 2 of
Article 109 of the Constitution provides that, while
administering justice, judges and courts shall be independent.
It was held in the Ruling that any attempts to reduce the
salary or other social guarantees of a judge or cut the budget
of the judiciary are interpreted as infringement on the
judicial independence.
The said provision of the Ruling means that in attempt to
ensure the independence of judges and courts from the
legislature and the executive any attempts to reduce the
remuneration or other social guarantees of a judge during his
or her judicial service are prohibited. This is an imperative.
In case it is violated, conditions are created to subject the
judiciary to a political situation. The imperative character of
this provision derives from the principle of the independence
of judges and courts which is established in Article 109 of the
Constitution, and from the imperative prohibition established
in Article 113 of the Constitution whereby judges are also not
permitted during the professional career to receive any
remuneration other than the salary established for judges as
well as payments for educational, scientific, or creative
activities. It also derives from the professional and not
political nature of the judiciary, which was indicated in the
Ruling.
It was held in the Ruling that the principle of
independence of judges and courts is established in all the
constitutions of democratic states and a number of
international acts. The constitutional protection also includes
the protection of the guarantees of social (material) nature of
the independence of judges and courts. This is also confirmed
by the constitutional jurisprudence of democratic states. For
instance, by its decision of 18 September 1997, the Supreme
Court of Canada recognised the measures of restriction of
judges' salaries which were applied to avoid the budget deficit
as contradicting the principle of the independence of courts,
and, therefore, anti-constitutional; by its decision of 15
September 1999, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
recognised the legal provisions whereby extra pays to judges'
salaries were abolished as anti-constitutional.
6.3. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
requests to construe as to what legal effects the normative
acts would have if passed by the Government or the Seimas which
would contradict the sentences of the stating part of the
ruling of the Constitutional Court and by which the
independence of judges and courts would be violated.
The Constitutional Court notes that under Part 1 of
Article 102 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court shall
decide whether the laws and other legal acts adopted by the
Seimas are in conformity with the Constitution and legal acts
adopted by the President and the Government, do not violate the
Constitution or laws. Part 1 of Article 7 of the Constitution
provides that any law or other statute which contradicts the
Constitution shall be invalid.
The Constitutional Court does not decide as to what legal
effects the legal acts which have not been adopted or which
have not been investigated by the Constitutional Court might
have.
Under Part 2 of Article 72 of the Law on the
Constitutional Court, rulings adopted by the Constitutional
Court shall have the power of law and shall be binding to all
governmental institutions, companies, firms, and organisations
as well as to officials and citizens. This means that all
subjects of law, including the legislator, are bound by the
earlier passed rulings of the Constitutional Court, therefore
the principle of the independence of judges and courts as well
as the guarantees of this principle may not be violated by any
legal act.
7.1. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Lithuania
requests to construe whether the concept "judges' remuneration"
employed in the statement "judges' remuneration must not be
reduced during his or her judicial service" in Part 5 of Item 7
of Chapter I of the stating part of the Ruling mean only the
official salary (only a constituent part of remuneration for
work), or whether it presumes all the payments established by
the State (regardless of how they are referred to in the
normative acts) which the person receives in connection with
his office of a judge, i.e. whether the concept "judges'
remuneration" includes the official salary defined on the
grounds of certain criteria (stable norm and coefficient), as
well as its increase and extra pay for employment period. He
also requests to construe whether such a provision means that
the existing social guarantees and remuneration of judges may
not be reduced irrespective of the fact by the acts of which
power-the legislature or the executive-these social guarantees,
including remuneration, have been established.
7.2. The concept "remuneration of judges" employed in the
Ruling includes all payments paid to a judge from the State
budget.
The Constitutional Court held in the Ruling that the
social guarantees for judges may not be reduced.
Conforming to Article 61 of the Republic of Lithuania Law
on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court has
adopted the following
decision:
1. The provisions of Item 10 of Chapter IV of the stating
part and those of Item 6 of the ruling part of the 21 December
1999 ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Lithuania whereby it is recognised that Part 2 of Article 58 of
the Republic of Lithuania Law on Courts to the extent that the
proposal of the Minister of Justice regarding appointment of
judges to the Court of Honour of Judges is provided for
contradicts Part 2 of Article 109 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Lithuania mean that upon the official promulgation
of the 21 December 1999 ruling of the Constitutional Court, the
powers of the judges of the Court of Honour of Judges who have
been appointed on the proposal of the Minister of Justice do
not terminate of their own accord.
2. The provisions of Item 11 of Chapter IV of the stating
part and those of Item 7 of the ruling part of the ruling of 21
December 1999 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Lithuania whereby it is recognised that Part 4 of Article 59 of
the Republic of Lithuania Law on Courts in the scope whereby
disciplinary action against the chairperson of a district or
regional court and the Court of Appeal, their deputies,
division chairpersons and other judges may be instituted by the
Minister of Justice on the proposal of the Director of the
Department of Courts or on his own initiative and that the
judge against whom disciplinary action has been instituted may
be removed from office on the proposal of the Minister of
Justice until the outcome of the case becomes clear contradicts
Part 2 of Article 109 and Part 5 of Article 112 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania mean that that the
official promulgation of the 21 December 1999 ruling of the
Constitutional Court in itself does not create any basis to
dismiss the disciplinary cases instituted against the judges
only due to the fact that they were instituted by the Minister
of Justice.
3. The provisions of Item 12 of Chapter IV of the stating
part of the ruling of 21 December 1999 of the Constitutional
Court of the Republic of Lithuania wherein it is asserted that
the State budget must provide as to how much finances are to be
allocated to every individual court, those of Item 12 of
Chapter IV of the stating part and those of Item 8 of the
ruling part wherein it is recognised that Part 2 of Article 69
of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Courts in the scope whereby
the competence of the Minister of Justice to arrange for the
financial supply of district, regional courts and the Court of
Appeal is established contradicts Part 2 of Article 109 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania mean that the
assignations provided for every individual court in the State
budget must be allocated to every individual court directly and
not through the Ministry of Justice, and that the Minister of
Justice may not administer these finances, however he, in case
this is provided for in a law, may be the administrator of the
assignations provided for in the State budget for supply
programmes for the whole judicial system; this provision also
means that the Minister of Justice, in the course of the
preparation of a draft State budget, has the right to get the
data concerning the needs of courts from respective
chairpersons of courts.
4. Item 5 of the ruling part of the ruling of 21 December
1999 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania
whereby it is recognised that Part 3 of Article 51 of the
Republic of Lithuania Law on Courts in the scope whereby a
judge of a district or regional court, that of the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Lithuania, in case he agrees,
may, by a decree of the President of the Republic, be delegated
for the term of up to one year to the structures of the
Ministry of Justice or those of the Department of Courts and
that for the term of the delegation the powers of the delegated
judge shall be suspended contradicts Part 1 of Article 5, Part
2 of Article 109 and Part 1 of Article 113 of the Constitution
of the Republic of Lithuania means that after the recognition
by the Constitutional Court ruling that the part of the article
of the Law on Courts providing for the delegation of a judge to
the institutions of the executive was recognised as
contradicting the Constitution, any further work of the
delegated judge at the Ministry of Justice or the Department of
Courts is not in line with Part 1 of Article 113 of the
Constitution and the status of judges provided for in the
Constitution.
5. The statement "any attempts to reduce the salary or
other social guarantees of a judge or cut the budget of the
judiciary are interpreted as infringement on the judicial
independence" of Part 6 of Item 7 of Chapter I of the stating
part of the 21 December 1999 ruling of the Constitutional Court
of the Republic of Lithuania means that it is prohibited to
reduce the remuneration or other social guarantees of a judge
during his or her judicial service.
6. The concept "judges' remuneration" in the statement
"judges' remuneration must not be reduced during his or her
judicial service" of Part 5 of Item 7 of Chapter I of the
ruling of 21 December 1999 of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Lithuania includes all payments paid to a judge
from the State budget.